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ABSTRACT

Worry and Rumination:
Measurement Invariance Across Gender

by

Janet A. Carter, Doctor of Philosophy
Utah State University, 2010

Major Professor: Scott C. Bates, Ph.D.
Department: Psychology

The present study examined the factor structure of the Penn State Worry
Questionnaire (PSWQ), the Student Worry Questionnaire-30 (SWQ-30), the Anxious
Thoughts Inventory (AnTI), the Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS), and the
Rumination-Reflection Questionnaire (RRQ). The present study also examined the
measurement invariance between men (n = 186) and women (n = 316) in a university
sample. Different models for each measure were identified through a review of the
literature, and the models were examined through confirmatory factor analyses. The
best-fitting models for each measure were retained for subsequent model modification to
improve fit and for invariance testing across gender. The results of the confirmatory
factor analyses and subsequent exploratory models provided general support for
invariance in the configural models, but only the RRQ displayed measurement, scalar,
and latent mean structure invariance. Results of the bootstrapped regression analyses
indicated that summated scores derived from the exploratory models demonstrated
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different relationships between anxiety and depression in men and women. Frequency of
worry, metaworry, and general anxiety symptoms significantly contributed to prediction
of anxiety in men, whereas metaworry, social worry, lethargy, general anxiety symptoms,
and health worries predicted anxiety in women. Social worry, metaworry, recrimination,
and reflection (negatively) contributed to prediction of depression in men, whereas social
worry, metaworry, lethargy, general anxiety symptoms, and social adequacy concerns
predicted depression in women.
(214 pages)
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Since conscious thoughts and personal perceptions strongly influence individual
behavior and emotions, behavioral and psychological research has specifically focused on
the role of personal appraisals and cognitions in relation to subjective distress and in
conjunction with the onset, maintenance, and duration of psychological disorders. For
more than three decades, a growing body of research has examined intrusive, repetitive,
and relatively uncontrollable thought processes, and two distinct and relatively
independent lines of research have emerged. One research line has focused on the
investigation of worry and the thought process implicated in the development and
maintenance of anxiety disorders, while the other research line has concentrated on the
study of rumination and the thought processes associated with increased duration and
severity of major depressive disorder.
While the constructs of worry and rumination emerged from largely distinct
research traditions, previous studies from the two research lines have suggested that
worry and rumination share conceptual similarities in that both constructs involve
repetitive, recurring thoughts (Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & DePree, 1983;
Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Roemer & Borkevec,
1994); exceed actual contextual or environmental demands (MacLeod & Byrne, 1996;
Martin & Tesser, 1996; Mathews, 1990); and sometimes serve a perceived adaptive
function (Davey, 1994c; Davey, Hampton, Farrell, & Davidson, 1992; Davey, Tallis, &
Capuzzo, 1996; Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001a, 2001b; Szabó & Lovibond, 2002;
Watkins & Baracaia, 2001).
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In spite of the apparent conceptual overlaps between worry and rumination, other
research has indicated that the two constructs retain unique, differentiating features
(Muris, Roelofs, Meester, & Boomsma, 2004; Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001a; Watkins,
2004b; Watkins & Baracaia, 2001; Wells & Carter, 2001). Research has indicated that
worry involves a future-oriented focus on anticipated threats (McLaughlin, Borkovec, &
Sibrava, 2007; Watkins, Moulds, & Mackintosh, 2005), but rumination typically revolves
around themes of loss (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). Borkovec and
his colleagues (Borkovec, Alcaine, & Behar, 2004; Borkovec & Hu, 1990; Borkovec &
Roemer, 1995) have conceptualized worry as a cognitive avoidant response that allows
individuals to skirt uncomfortable negative affect and aversive images, but NolenHoeksema and her colleagues (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008) have noted that rumination
typically focuses on the type of thought content and negative affect that worry serves to
avoid. Both worry and rumination have been associated with subjective distress and
linked to prolonged duration and increased intensity of negative affect (Nolen-Hoeksema,
2000; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008), but only worry
has been associated with decreases in autonomic arousal and other physiological changes
(Fresco, Frankel, Mennin, Turk, & Heimberg, 2002; Segerstrom, Tsao, Alden, & Craske,
2000).
A few studies have examined how the worry and rumination constructs
differentially relate to or contribute to anxiety and mood disorders (Fresco, Frankel et al.,
2002; Segerstrom et al., 2000; Segerstrom, Stanton, Alden, & Shortridge, 2003; Watkins,
2004b). These studies have primarily utilized two predominant worry and rumination
measures, the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, &
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Borkovec, 1990) and the Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS) derived from the Response
Styles Questionnaire (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). Both of these measures were
developed to assess the maladaptive aspect of worry and rumination, and both measures
have demonstrated sound psychometric characteristics. However, the PSWQ and the
RRS were initially assumed to be unifactorial, and recent research has indicated that the
two measures are multifactorial. Although some research has examined how the factors
differentially relate to measures of anxiety and depression (Fresco, Frankel et al., 2002;
Fresco, Heimberg, Mennin, & Turk, 2002; Roberts, Gilboa, & Gotlib, 1998), the
relationship between the identified worry and rumination factors and measures of anxiety
and depression are not yet clear. Furthermore, little research has examined newer
measures of worry and rumination that may tap different elements of the worry and
rumination constructs. Therefore, the present study seeks to add to the extant literature
by investigating and potentially confirming the factor structure of the PSWQ and RRS as
well as the factor structure of two other worry measures, the Student Worry
Questionnaire-30 (SWQ-30; Osman et al., 2001) and the Anxious Thoughts Inventory
(AnTI; Wells, 1994), and the factor structure of another rumination measure, the
Rumination-Reflection Questionnaire (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999).
A second research concern that emerges from an examination of the extant worryand rumination-related literature revolves around the fact that gender differences in worry
and rumination have emerged in studies where multiple-factor measures were used
(Carter, 2002; Osman et al., 2001; Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). These
findings suggest that gender differences should be considered in the study of rumination
and worry. However, to date only a single study (Brown, 2003) has specifically
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investigated gender invariance in the PSWQ. No studies have examined gender
invariance in other worry and rumination measures. Evidence of measurement invariance
across men and women indicates that the same set of indicators assesses the same
construct in different groups, whereas a lack of invariance implies that differences
between men and women may reflect not only a true mean difference between the groups
but also a difference in the relationship between the latent worry or rumination variable
and the obtained score (Raju, Laffitte, & Byrne, 2002). Kline (2005) referred to lack of
measurement invariance as “construct bias” (p. 295), which implies that a measure
assesses something different in one group versus another. Since measurement invariance
reflects the degree to which the psychometric properties of a measure remain constant
across groups, confirmation of measurement invariance across gender represents a
necessary prerequisite for meaningful interpretation of mean differences between men
and women in terms of the two constructs (Byrne, 1989; Meade, 2010).
Confirmation of measurement invariance across gender in the available worry and
rumination measures appears especially pertinent given that worry has been identified as
a contributory factor in generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), social anxiety, and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and rumination has been implicated in the difference in
the higher rates of depression found in women in comparison to men (Watkins, 2008).
Identifying possible sources of invariance in the measures used to assess worry and
rumination may improve understanding of the constructs that play a key role in
vulnerability to anxiety and mood disorders and may enhance efforts to develop treatment
interventions aimed at ameliorating the disorders.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

The present literature review addresses several topics related to the present study.
First, the present review provides an overview of the worry and rumination constructs,
including a summary of the historical antecedents and the foundational studies that
spurred separate worry and rumination lines of research, a synopsis of the definitions and
characteristics of each construct derived from the extant literature, and a summary of the
research findings related to gender differences found for each construct. Second, the
present review summarizes the conceptual similarities between worry and rumination,
especially those highlighted by concurrent studies of both constructs. Additionally, this
review describes the findings that suggest that worry and rumination represent related but
distinct constructs. Finally, this literature review describes the development and
psychometric properties of the Penn State Worry Questionnaire and the Ruminative
Response Scale, the predominant measures used to assess worry and rumination,
respectively.

The Worry Construct

Research Antecedents
Worry initially emerged as a construct of interest in the test anxiety literature
when Liebert and Morris (1967) linked task performance anxiety to worry, which they
described as cognitive concern about personal performance, consequences of failure,
negative self-evaluations or expectations, and comparisons of personal ability relative to
the performance of others (Deffenbacher, 1980; Liebert & Morris, 1967; Morris, Davis,
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& Hutchings, 1981). However, the construct of worry received limited attention outside
the test anxiety literature until Borkovec and his colleagues (Borkovec et al., 1983)
conducted insomnia research and found that uncontrolled intrusive thoughts at bedtime
prevented sleep onset and that a reduction of such thoughts improved sleep patterns.
Borkovec et al. (1983) noted that the insomnia-related literature consistently found
positive correlations between insomnia and chronic worry, and Borkovec and his
colleagues subsequently shifted their entire research focus to investigations of worry and
its relationship to anxiety (Roemer & Borkovec, 1994).
Academic and clinical interest in the worry construct increased following the
Borkovec et al. (1983) study and the publication of the revised third edition of the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III-R; American
Psychiatric Association [APA], 1987), which included generalized anxiety disorder
(GAD) as a separate diagnostic category and identified chronic, uncontrolled worry as its
main diagnostic criterion (Borkovec, 1994; Craske, 1999; Holaway, Rodebaugh, &
Heimburg, 2006). Worry remained the core diagnostic feature of GAD in the succeeding
editions of the DSM (APA, 1994, 2000), and subsequent research implicated worry in
other anxiety disorders such as panic disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, and social phobia (Andrews & Borkovec, 1988; Barlow, 2002;
Borkovec et al., 1983; Craske, Rapee, Jackel, & Barlow, 1989; Papageorgiou, 2006;
Tallis & de Silva, 1992; Watts, Coyle, & East, 1994).

Definitions of Worry
Since interest in the worry construct first emerged, several researchers have
offered definitions of worry. Breznitz (1971) described worry as an “elusive
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phenomenon” (p. 271) and viewed the construct as an interaction between active coping
and anxiety. He defined worry as a process that occurs when “an external threat
concerning a possible future event touches upon an anxiety-inducing content” (p. 273).
Similarly, MacLeod, Williams, and Bekerian (1991) incorporated concern about future
events in their definition of worry:
Worry is a cognitive phenomenon, it is concerned with future events where there
is uncertainty about the outcome, the future being thought about is a negative one,
and this is accompanied by feelings of anxiety (p. 478).
In keeping with these definitions, Barlow (2002) noted that worry could be
conceptualized as a maladaptive attempt to cope with the “anxious apprehension” (p. 64)
or chronic anxiety elicited by anticipated or future negative events.
In the anxiety-related literature, worry has also been defined as uncontrollable and
repetitious thoughts concerned with possible negative outcomes. Mathews (1990)
described worry as “the persistent awareness of possible future danger, which is
repeatedly rehearsed without being resolved” (p. 456). Borkovec and Lyonsfields (as
cited in Davey, 1994a) noted that worry is an unwanted and frequently uncontrollable
cognitive activity connected to negative thoughts and some degree of emotional
discomfort. Borkovec et al. (1983) also included the uncontrollable feature in their
definition of worry:
Worry is a chain of thoughts and images, negatively affect-laden and relatively
uncontrollable. The worry process represents an attempt to engage in mental
problem-solving on an issue whose outcome is uncertain but contains the
possibility of one or more negative outcomes. Consequently, worry relates
closely to fear process (p. 10).
Andrews and Borkovec (1988) later extended the definition of worry suggested
by Borkovec et al. (1983) by including cognitions associated with both anxious and
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depressed affect, with anxious content focused on uncertain future events and depressive
content focused on past events or past losses as well as hopelessness about the future.
Tallis, Davey, and Capuzzo (1994) contended that worry consisted of more than negative
automatic thoughts and suggested that worry is “a dynamic process in which themes
develop and are duly elaborated” (p. 63). Other researchers noted that worry typically
involved predominantly verbal thought activity (Barlow, 2002) and minimal imagery
(Borkovec, Ray, & Stöber, 1998).

Specific Characteristics of Worry
Frequency. Worry represents a common cognitive activity in both nonclinical
and clinical populations (Papageorgiou, 2006). Tallis, Davey, and Capuzzo (1994)
conducted one of the few studies examining the features of worry independent of GAD in
a sample of part- and full-time college students (ages 18 to 59). Participants classified as
low worriers reported worry episodes averaging “about once a week,” while participants
classified as high worriers reported worry episodes occurring an average of “about once a
day” (Tallis, Davey, & Capuzzo, 1994, p. 81). Out of 128 participants, 38% reported
worrying at least once per day, 19.4% reported worrying one time every two to three
days, and 15.3% reported worrying at least once per month. Similarly, Ruscio (2002)
recruited college students who did not meet DSM-IV (APA, 1994) diagnostic criteria for
GAD but who nevertheless reported excessive, chronic, and uncontrollable worry during
the previous six months. A portion of the non-GAD participants reported worry levels
that exceeded the average for the GAD participants, but GAD participants generally rated
worry as more severe. Ruscio obtained similar results in a replication sample.
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Additionally, Ruscio (2002) found that non-GAD high worriers in both the primary and
replication samples averaged approximately two to three worry episodes per week.
Other research related to the phenomenology of worry has typically compared
clinical groups diagnosed with GAD or other anxiety disorders with nonanxious control
groups selected on the basis of low assessed worry scores or the absence of reported
anxiety (Holaway et al., 2006; Ruscio, 2002). For instance, Craske et al. (1989) found
that nonanxious controls reported spending an average of 18.2% of each day worrying
over a one-month period, whereas the GAD participants reported spending an average of
60.7% of each day worrying. Subsequent research has produced similar results, with
clinical groups consistently reporting significantly more frequent worry than nonanxious
control groups (Borkvec, Shadick, & Hopkins, 1991; Dugas, Gagnon, Ladouceur, &
Freeston, 1998; Hoyer, Becker, & Roth, 2001; Roemer, Molina, & Borkovec, 1997;
Ruscio, 2002; Ruscio & Borkovec, 2004).
Duration. Tallis, Davey, and Capuzzo (1994) asked college students to estimate
the average duration of their worry episodes. On a scale ranging from “fleeting” to
“more than 12 hours,” the average duration of worry episodes for the sample lasted from
“5 to 10 minutes” but 10.8% reported fleeting worry episodes, 48.2% of the participants
reported worry episodes between 1 to 30 minutes, and 10.8% reported episodes lasting
between 1 and 2 hours (Tallis, Davey, & Capuzzo, 1994, p. 66). Results from studies
where participants monitored the frequency of their worries over one to three week
periods (Craske et al., 1989; Dupuy, Beaudoin, Rhéaume, Ladouceur, & Dugas, 2001;
Jung, 1992) indicated that worry commonly occurred for both non-GAD and GAD
participants. When asked to monitor all worries over 2 weeks, non-GAD participants
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reported worrying approximately 55 minutes per day, and participants diagnosed with
GAD reported significantly more time worrying, averaging 310 minutes of worry per day
(Dupuy et al., 2001). These results differed from the findings in the Craske et al. (1989)
study, where participants were asked to monitor their three most pressing worries over a
3-week period. No significant differences emerged between groups in that nonanxious
controls averaged 237.1 minutes of worry per day, and participants diagnosed with GAD
averaged 310.3 minutes of worry per day. When comparing their results with Craske et
al.’s, Dupuy et al. suggested that nonanxious controls experienced significantly less
frequent worry than clinical groups when considering a wide range of all worries but did
not significantly differ from clinical groups when considering a few most pressing
worries.
Severity and controllability. Worriers in the Borkovec et al. (1983) study
reported more difficulty stopping their worrisome thoughts than did nonworriers.
Similarly, Craske et al. (1989) found that perceptions of control over worry distinguished
between nonanxious participants and GAD participants, with the latter group providing
significantly lower ratings for perceived control over worrying, realism associated with
the worry, and success of corrective or preventive actions. Although the level of
maximum anxiety did not differ for the two groups, Craske et al. (1989) noted that the
level of anxiety tended to increase as the level of perceived lack of control over worry
increased. Subsequent research found similar differences in perceived control and
pervasiveness of worry (Borkovec et al., 1991; Davey, 1994b; Dugas et al., 1998; Hoyer
et al., 2001; Roemer et al., 1997). In a comparative study of worries and obsessions
(Wells & Morrison, 1994), those who experienced both types of thoughts over a 2-week
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period perceived worry and obsessions as similarly distracting, dismissable,
uncontrollable, distressing, and intrusive but rated worry as greater in verbal content and
longer in duration than obsessions. Surprisingly, when participants compared worry and
obsessions, they associated worry with a significantly greater compulsion to act.
Content. The results of studies using nonclinical participants have suggested that
worry in both children and adults is predominantly self-referent, but worry content varies
depending on the age and developmental stage of the individuals (Borkovec et al., 1991;
Tallis, Davey, & Capuzzo, 1994). In young children, worry content has typically
revolved around safety concerns, fear of animals, the dark, and imaginary creatures
(Vasey & Daleiden, 1994). Such worries decreased with age, but older children and
young adolescents reported worry about social competence, social evaluation, school
performance, health-related concerns and dying, and psychological well-being emerged
as central themes for participants in these age groups (Muris, Meesters, Merckelbach,
Sermon, & Zwakhalen, 1998). Generally, the variety and complexity of worries
increased as reasoning abilities developed (Vasey & Daleiden, 1994).
Borkovec et al. (1983) found that college students ranked academic concerns as
the most frequently occurring worry, followed by interpersonal, financial, personal,
philosophical, theological, and physical harm concerns. Other studies using college
samples (Davey, 1993; Osman et al., 2001; Tallis, Davey, & Bond, 1994; Tallis,
Eysenck, & Matthews, 1992) reported worries about intimate relationships, social
competence or evaluative concerns, personal achievement, work efficiency, and financial
circumstances among students. Tallis, Davey, and Bond (1994) compared levels of
worry for college students with levels of worry for professional and nonprofessional
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workers and found that the students reported more worry about intimate relationships and
work efficiency. They suggested that the differences were associated with age and
circumstances, with students worrying more about personal relationships, parental
approval, and the deadlines and pressures of exams.
Wisocki (1988, 1994) summarized research examining worry content in elderly
community samples and noted that high worriers reported more concerns about health
and chronic illnesses. In comparison to healthy contemporaries, those individuals who
were homebound due to chronic illness experienced more worries about personal
mobility, illness of a spouse or family member, and ability to care for one’s spouse.
Wisocki and her colleagues described three levels of worry among the elderly, with the
most frequent worry revolving around family (well-being for children and grandchildren,
health concerns, and finances). The second level of worries included concerns about
being alone, losing independence, being victimized by criminal acts of others, leaving
things in order after death, retaining personal decision-making ability, and experiencing
difficulties with driving. The third and least frequent level of worry encompassed
concerns about environmental and political issues, social evaluations by others, and
miscellaneous worries.
Studies comparing the content of worry among nonanxious control and GAD
groups have documented family/interpersonal concerns as a principal worry topic across
groups (Borkovec et al., 1991; Craske et al., 1989; Roemer et al., 1997), with GAD
groups typically reporting generally more worries within this domain (Dugas et al., 1998;
Sanderson & Barlow, 1990). Other identified worry domains have included work/school,
financial, and health concerns (Borkovec et al., 1991; Craske et al., 1989; Roemer et al.,
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1997). Studies have noted that both analogue and clinical GAD participants typically
report a greater number of worry topics than do participants in control groups (Borkovec
et al., 1991; Craske et al., 1989; Roemer et al., 1997), and worry patterns for GAD
participants differed from the control groups in that they reported higher relative levels of
miscellaneous worries falling outside the family/interpersonal, work/school, financial,
and illness/health categories. Roemer et al. examined reported miscellaneous worries and
found that GAD participants endorsed a higher proportion of worry concerning minor or
routine concerns. Papageourgiou and Wells (1999) noted that individuals with GAD
frequently view worrying as an accepted part of their personality.

Cognitive Traits Associated with Worry
Predominance of thought. Borkovec and his colleagues (Borkovec, 1994;
Borkovec & Inz, 1990) highlighted the cognitive nature of worry, describing the process
as a verbal-linguistic activity that frequently involved a predominance of thought rather
than imagery. Thought-sampling studies (Borkovec & Inz, 1990; East & Watts, 1994;
Freeston, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1996; Wells & Morrison, 1994; Wells & Papageorgiou,
1995) have documented the verbal nature of worry and provided evidence that worry
inductions for nonanxious control groups, analogue high trait worriers, and clinical GAD
participants produced greater frequencies of thought and lowered frequencies of imagery.
Physiological research has provided additional evidence of greater verbal and less
imaginal activity in worry and GAD (Borkovec et al., 1998).
Abstract nature of worry. Research has documented the abstract nature of
worry. For instance, the predominance of thought over imagery in worry has been linked
to its perceived avoidant functions, and research has shown that use of abstract thought in
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response to a perceived threat reduces an individual’s negative emotional experience
(Sibrava & Borkovec, 2006). Additionally, Stöber (1998b) derived problem topics from
the Worry Domains Questionnaire (Tallis et al., 1992) and found that the degree of
concreteness in problem elaborations depended on how pertinent participants found the
worry topics, with greater relevance significantly associated with increased abstract
thinking. Stöber and Borkovec (2002) replicated these findings in a clinical sample, with
GAD participants describing their major worries in less concrete terms than participants
in the control group. Although individuals generally perceive worry as a constructive
part of problem solving (Borkovec, 1994; Borkovec & Roemer, 1995; Tallis & Eysenck,
1994), these findings suggest that the increased abstract thinking associated with worry
likely makes it more difficult for individuals to fully identify and describe perceived risks
or expected negative consequences, which ultimately hinders effective implementation of
prevention or coping strategies.
Cognitive avoidance. Borkovec (1994) noted that GAD clients frequently
believed that worry served an avoidant function that allowed them to escape anticipated
feared outcomes. However, the majority of the feared outcomes represented low
probability events that rarely occurred, so individuals received negative reinforcement
when the event did not transpire (Borkovec, 1994; Borkovec, Hazlett-Stevens, & Diaz,
1999). Negative reinforcement, in turn, reduced subjective distress and uncomfortable
physiological arousal while fostering misperceptions that worry prevented the occurrence
of the anticipated feared outcome (Borkovec, 1994; Borkovec et al., 2004).
Research has demonstrated that worry reduces both subjective distress and
physiological arousal. For instance, studies have found evidence that self-reported use of
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worry as a distraction tool reliably differentiated between participants with GAD and
those with subthreshold GAD symptoms (Borkovec & Roemer, 1995; Freeston,
Rhéaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994). Borkovec and Hu (1990) found evidence
that worry interfered with cardiovascular responses to feared images, and Wells and
Papageorgiou (1995) found that worrying reduced anxiety following exposure to stressful
visual images. Similarly, Castaneda and Segerstrom (2004) found that high worry
phobics showed reduced physiological responses following presentation of feared
objects, whereas low worry phobics displayed comparatively stronger physiological
responses.
Although worry apparently reduces subjective distress and physiological arousal,
research has provided evidence of negative effects associated with continued cognitive
avoidance. In keeping with Foa and Kozak’s (1986) contention that cognitive avoidance
interferes with fear activation, subsequent emotional processing, habituation, and anxiety
reduction, Borkovec and Hu (1990) found that worry initially reduced arousal but then
interfered with habituation to phobic images. Similarly, Wells and Papageorgeou (1995)
found that worrying initially reduced anxiety after exposure to a disturbing film, but
participants in the exposure condition experienced significantly increased intrusions over
the next few days compared to participants who engaged in imaginal rehearsal of the
film. These findings support the idea that emotional avoidance negatively reinforces
worry and maintains threatening associations by interfering with new learning or
emotional processing.
Drawing on Borkovec’s (1994) cognitive avoidance theory of worry and research
associated with emotion regulation, Mennin, Heimberg, Turk, and Fresco (2005)
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proposed an emotion dysregulation model of GAD that focuses on heightened intensity of
emotions, poor understanding of emotions, negative reactivity or fear of emotions, and
maladaptive emotional management. Mennin et al. posited that individuals, especially
those with GAD, use maladaptive coping strategies such as worry in an effort to control
heightened emotional intensity and its associated discomfort. Worry, then, occurs in
conjunction with experiential avoidance, which Mennin et al. described as unwillingness
to engage in “internal experiences such as emotions, thoughts, images, and sensations,”
which “stems from efforts to control and diminish the experience of pain associated with
these internal events” (p. 1284). Borkovec’s (1994) avoidance theory of worry can be
viewed within and emotion regulation framework (Mennin et al., 2005), with worry
serving as a cognitive control strategy designed to address subjectively uncomfortable
emotional experiences.
Recent research has provided support for an emotion dysregulation model
(Mennin et al., 2005). For instance, Roemer, Salters, Raffa, and Orsillo (2005) collected
data from nonclinical and clinical samples and found that worry and GAD were
significantly associated with experiential avoidance and fear of emotional responding.
Roemer et al. (2005) found that worry and GAD were associated with a tendency to avoid
or control internal experiences and to fears concerning loss of emotional control. Mennin
et al. found that college students with GAD reported greater intensity of emotions, poor
understanding of emotions, greater negative reactivity to emotional experience, and less
ability to utilize effective self-soothing strategies than did control participants. Mennin et
al. obtained similar results in a second study using a clinical sample. Finally, results from
a third study indicated that college students with GAD but not control participants
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experienced greater increases in self-reported physiological symptoms and more
difficulty managing emotional reactions following an emotion-induction procedure.
Intolerance of uncertainty. Borkovec et al. (1983) observed that worry
frequently involved concern about future events, and their initial definition of worry
identified uncertainty about possible negative outcomes as an inherent feature of the
construct. In subsequent research, Tallis and his colleagues (Tallis & Eysenck, 1994;
Tallis, Eysenck, & Mathews, 1991b) found that worriers experienced difficulty with
problem solving when presented with ambiguity because they displayed elevated
evidence requirements for decision making and generally felt they should explore all
possibilities before discontinuing worry. Dugas and his colleagues (Koerner & Dugas,
2006) expanded on this research and developed a cognitive model of GAD that
conceptualized intolerance of uncertainty as a higher-order cognitive process that directly
contributes to worry. Koerner and Dugas described intolerance of uncertainty as a
dispositional characteristic that predisposes individuals to view uncertainty as stressful
and upsetting, perceive uncertainty about the future as unfair, view unexpected events as
negative, and believe that uncertainty interferes with personal functioning ability.
Because such individuals feel threatened by uncertainty, they tend to focus on controlling
or eliminating that uncertainty. For instance, in clinical work with individuals diagnosed
with all GAD, Koerner and Dugas noted that some patients felt overwhelmed by
relatively minor problems and delayed implementing appropriate solutions because they
felt the need to find the perfect option. Other patients preferred a certain negative
outcome rather than an uncertain one when faced with a problem.
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Research with nonclinical samples has documented a significant link between
worry and intolerance of uncertainty. Dugas, Gosselin, and Ladouceur (2001) found that
intolerance of uncertainty displayed stronger relationships to worry than to obsessivecompulsive symptoms and panic sensations, and the significant relationship remained
even after controlling for variance associated with other anxiety-related processes such as
perceived responsibility and anxiety sensitivity. Dugas, Schwartz, and Francis (2004)
found that intolerance of uncertainty more highly correlated with worry than with
depressive symptoms or cognitions in a nonclinical sample. Additionally, worry was
more highly related to intolerance of uncertainty than to other processes such as
perfectionism, need for control, and intolerance of ambiguity (Buhr & Dugas, 2006;
Dugas et al., 2001; Dugas, Marchand, & Ladouceur, 2005; Dugas et al., 2004).
Studies with clinical samples produced similar results in that patients with GAD
reported higher levels of intolerance of uncertainty than did patients with panic disorder
(Dugas et al., 2005), patients with other anxiety disorders (Ladouceur et al., 1999), and
nonclinical control participants (Dugas et al., 1998). In the laboratory study where
intolerance of uncertainty served as an independent variable, participants reported more
worry with increases in intolerance of uncertainty compared to those with decreases in
intolerance of uncertainty (Ladouceur, Gosselin, & Dugas, 2000). Based on these
findings, Dugas and his colleagues suggested that intolerance of uncertainty played a role
in the development and maintenance of worry.
Negative problem orientation. According to Matthews and Funke (2006),
elevated state worry stems from intolerance of uncertainty and contributes to problemsolving difficulties. For instance, worry interferes with task completion (Metzger, Miller,
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Cohen, Sofka, & Borkovec, 1990) and decision making (Tallis, Eysenck, & Mathews,
1991a). Dugas and his colleagues ascribed the problem-solving difficulties to negative
problem orientation, which involves perceptions of problems as threats, lack of
confidence in one’s problem-solving abilities, heightened frustration when problem
solving, and negative doubts about outcomes associated with problem-solving efforts
(Dugas, Freeston, & Ladouceur, 1997; Dugas, Letarte, Rhéaume, Freeston, & Ladouceur,
1995; D’Zurilla, Nezu, Maydeu-Olivares, & Kant, 1998; Robichaud & Dugas, 2005a,
2005b). Negative problem orientation has been linked to decreased problem-solving
confidence and increased catastrophic worrying (Davey, Jubb, & Cameron, 1996; Davey
& Levy, 1998). Trait worry has also been shown to correlate with measures of
perfectionism (Frost, Marten, Lahart, & Rosenblate, 1990; Pratt, Tallis, & Eysenck,
1997), feelings of responsibility for negative outcomes (Wells & Papageorgiou, 1998),
and inflated concerns over mistakes (Stöber & Joormann, 2001).
Positive beliefs about worry. The extant literature suggests that chronic worriers
and individuals diagnosed with GAD believe that worrying represents a necessary
process that must be utilized in order to avoid future catastrophes (Borkovec et al., 1999;
Borkovec & Roemer, 1995; Breitholtz, Johansson, & Öst, 1999; Davey et al., 1996;
Wells, 1994). For instance, Davey et al. (1992) conducted a series of correlational
studies and found that worry was positively associated with adaptive problem-solving
strategies and information-seeking cognitive styles. Davey and his colleagues (Davey,
1994a; Davey, Tallis, & Capuzzo, 1996) suggested that worry was involved in
constructive problem solving and that individuals believed that worry served to prevent
potential catastrophes. Borkovec and Roemer (1995) found that participants endorsed
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self-report items suggesting that worry provided motivation to get things done, offered
preparation for anticipated negative events, and provided a means to avoid or prevent
such events. Wells and Hackmann (1993) found that individuals with hypochondriasis
believed worrying about health kept them safe.
Negative beliefs about worry. While investigating worry, Davey, Jubb, and
Cameron (1996) found that participants reported that worry exaggerated problems,
disrupted efforts to deal with problems, and increased emotional discomfort. Wells
(1994) reported a case where an individual believed that worrying increased the
likelihood of occurrence for a feared negative event.

Gender Differences in Worry
Frequency. Several studies have documented gender differences in lifetime
prevalence rates of GAD and other anxiety disorders, with twice as many girls and
women experiencing anxiety disorders compared to boys and men (Carter, Wittchen,
Phister, & Kessler, 2001; Kessler, Walters, & Wittchen, 2004; Lewinsohn, Gotlib,
Lewinsohn, Seely, & Allen, 1998; Wittchen, 2002; Wittchen, Zhao, Kessler, & Eaton,
1994). Given that worry represents a defining feature of GAD and a component of other
anxiety disorders, one would expect to find gender differences in reported worry
frequency. However, relatively little research has specifically examined gender
differences in worry (Robichaud, Dugas, & Conway, 2003). When comparisons
involving worry frequency ratings and gender have been reported, the findings have been
mixed. For instance, women in nonclinical college samples reported greater worry
frequency than men in several studies using the PSWQ (Dugas et al., 1997, 2001; Meyer
et al., 1990; Stöber & Bittencourt, 1998) and one study using a single-item Likert scale as
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an estimate of worry frequency (McCann, Stewin, & Short, 1991). Similarly, Osman et
al. (2001) developed and investigated the psychometric properties of the Student Worry
Questionnaire-30 (SWQ-30) and found that women scored significantly higher than men
on total worry scores and the Worrisome Thinking subscale, a measure of general worry
concerns that displays a strong positive correlation with PSWQ scores. Carter (2002)
replicated the Osman et al. study and found significant gender differences in total worry
and worrisome thinking subscale scores. In contrast to these findings, other studies
utilizing worry frequency scores failed to find gender differences in worry among student
samples (Borkovec et al., 1983; Meyer et al., 1990) or in a clinical sample (Brown,
Antony, & Barlow, 1992).
A few studies have specifically focused on potential factors that mediate the
relationship between worry and gender. For instance, McCann et al. (1991) investigated
the relationship among worry, social desirability, and gender role orientation in a collegestudent sample. The results indicated that women reported significantly more worry than
men, and tendency to worry negatively correlated with both social desirability and
masculinity. Worry scores for women remained significant after controlling for both
variables. Additional analyses indicated gender differences in worry remained after
statistically controlling for social desirability, masculinity, and trait anxiety. These
findings were consistent with subsequent research (Lewinsohn et al., 1998) that indicated
that gender differences in anxiety were not a result of gender differences in social
desirability. However, these findings need to be explored in light of evidence that a
portion of the items on the PSWQ may reflect socially desirable responding (Fresco,
Heimberg, et al., 2002).
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Content. Studies examining gender differences in the specific content of worry
have also produced mixed findings. The initial normative studies involving the Worry
Domains Questionnaire (WDQ; Tallis et al., 1992) failed to find evidence of gender
differences in nonclinical or clinical samples (Tallis, Davey, & Bond, 1994). In contrast,
Osman et al. (2001) found gender differences in worry using the Student Worry
Questionnaire-30 (SWQ-30), a multifactorial measure that included content related to
general worry concerns, financial concerns, concern about significant others, social
adequacy concerns, academic concerns, and general anxiety symptoms. Their findings
indicated that women scored significantly higher than men on general worry concerns,
academic concerns, and general anxiety (a measure of physiological symptoms). Gender
differences approached significance for the scale assessing concern about significant
others. Carter (2002) replicated the findings of significant gender differences and found
small to medium effect sizes (Cohen’s d ranging from .33 to .46) in terms of general
worry concerns, academic concerns, and general anxiety. Like Osman et al., Carter failed
to find statistically significant gender differences in terms of the concern about significant
others although the results indicated a small effect size (Cohen’s d = .23), which
suggested that women reported slightly more relationship concerns than did men in the
sample.
In another content-related study, Wood, Conway, Pushkar, and Dugas (2005) used
the original and a modified, high-worry version of the Worry Domains Questionnaire
(WDQ; Tallis et al., 1992) to examine individuals’ perceptions of worry and perceived
gender differences in worry across relationship, finance, conscientiousness, and
achievement domains. Findings indicated a significant effect for gender, with women
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reporting greater perceptions of worry than men. This is consistent with other research
(Conway, Wood, Dugas, & Pushkar, 2003) that examined individuals’ perceptions of
maladaptive worry. Findings indicated that participants perceived that women generally
engaged in more problematic worry than did men, and the trend appeared stronger when
participants rated men or women they knew.

The Rumination Construct

Research Antecedents
Nolen-Hoeksema (1987) noted that epidemiological studies of mental disorders
frequently found that women experienced higher rates of unipolar affective disorders than
did men, and her meta-analysis documented evidence of gender differences in depression.
As part of her review, Nolen-Hoeksema summarized possible explanations for gender
differences and asserted that psychosocial artifacts, biological explanations, gender role
explanations, psychoanalytic theories, or learned helplessness theories did not fully
explain the magnitude of gender differences in depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990,
2001).
Nolen-Hoeksema (1991) presented the response styles theory of depression as an
explanation for the gender differences in depression. She theorized that an individual’s
typical way of responding to depressed mood could directly influence the trajectory of
the mood. Specifically, she noted that a ruminative response style, where an individual
repetitively focuses on the “causes, meanings, and consequences of depressive
symptoms” (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, p. 569), adversely impacted the severity,
chronicity, and recurrence of depressive episodes, regardless of the source of the
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depression. In contrast, individuals who engaged in distracting activities in response to
depressed mood experienced less severe and less frequent bouts of depressive symptoms
(Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). Nolen-Hoeksema emphasized the passive nature of
rumination, conceptualizing a ruminative response style as one where the individual
focuses on his or her mood, especially negative mood, without engaging in active
problem solving or initiating efforts to alleviate depressive symptoms. Nolen-Hoeksema
and her colleagues (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2004)
differentiated rumination from automatic negative thoughts, noting that rumination
influenced negative thinking but accounted for unique variance in the prediction of
depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker, & Larson, 1994; Spasojevic & Alloy, 2001).
Nolen-Hoeksema conceptualized ruminative response style as a stable characteristic
(Nolen-Hoeksema, 2004; Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow, & Fredrickson, 1993) and noted
that women tended to engage in a ruminative response style more frequently than did
men. She suggested that rumination acted as a causal factor in the greater rates of
depression among women (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991).
Subsequent studies have provided support for Nolen-Hoeksema’s (1987, 1991)
response style theory (Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989; Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema,
1990; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema et
al., 1993; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1994). Other researchers have documented the link
between ruminative thinking and duration and severity of depressive symptoms
(Andersen & Limpert, 2001; Just & Alloy, 1997; Nolan, Roberts, & Gotlib, 1998; NolenHoeksema, McBride, & Larson, 1997; Spasojevic & Alloy, 2001; Teasdale & Green,
2004; Thayer, Rossy, Ruiz-Padial, & Johnsen, 2003; Vickers & Vogeltanz-Holm, 2003;

25
Watkins & Mason, 2002). Additionally, research with analog samples has suggested that
rumination contributed to more resistance or negative responses to activation-oriented
treatment rationales (Addis & Carpenter, 1999).
Mor and Winquist (2002) conducted a meta-analysis of the literature to examine
the relationships between different forms of self-focused attention and negative affect.
They noted that Nolen-Hoeksema’s (1987, 1991) conceptualization of rumination
represented “a unique form of self-focus” (Mor & Winquist, 2002, p. 640) that
significantly related to negative affect. The results of Mor and Winquist’s meta-analysis
indicated that ruminative self-focus consistently displayed a stronger relationship to
negative affect than did nonruminative self-focus in both correlational and experimental
studies. More recently, Watkins (2008) conducted an extensive meta-analysis of
different forms of repetitive thought and presented evidence that heavily implicated
depressive rumination and other types of unconstructive repetitive thought in the onset
and maintenance of depression.

Definitions of Rumination
Although researchers have reached a general consensus in defining worry, they
have not yet reached agreement on a general definition of rumination. Nolen-Hoeksema
and her colleagues conceptualized rumination as repetitive and passive self-focused
thoughts revolving around an individual’s current depressive symptoms or negative
feelings and the implication of those symptoms and feelings (Lyubomirsky & NolenHoeksema, 1995; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). Nolen-Hoeksema noted that rumination
involved “repetitively focusing on the fact that one is depressed; on one’s symptoms of
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depression; and on the causes, meanings, and consequences of depressive symptoms”
(Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, p. 569).
More recently, Conway, Csank, Holm, and Blake (2000) defined rumination as
“repetitive thoughts concerning one’s present distress and the circumstances surrounding
the sadness” (p. 404). According to these researchers, ruminative thoughts are privatelyheld cognitions related to the precipitating events associated with negative affect or the
nature of negative mood, and such thoughts fail to motivate individuals to meet goals or
to take corrective action to resolve problems. Like Nolen-Hoeksema (1991), Conway et
al. (2000) viewed rumination as a passive process that did not stimulate goal-directed,
instrumental behavior.
Martin and Tesser (1996) broadened the definition of rumination and incorporated
a goal-discrepancy component. They described rumination as a broad class of recurring,
repetitive thoughts “that revolve around a common instrumental theme and that recur in
the absence of immediate environmental demands requiring the thoughts” (Martin &
Tesser, 1996, p. 1). The broader definition proposed by Martin and Tesser noted that
rumination not only included verbal content but also any kind of emotional, imaginal, or
physiological content that involved a common, recurrent, instrumental theme out of
proportion to the immediate demands of the environment. Martin and Tesser outlined a
model of rumination that posited that rumination related to unmet goals and occurred
when individuals encountered either unexpected movement toward or away from a
specific goal. The model assumed that individuals rarely ruminated as they generally
progressed toward identified goals. Rather, Martin and Tesser asserted that individuals
ruminated when the rate of progress associated with a goal differed from expectations.
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Alloy and her colleagues (Alloy et al., 2000; Robinson and Alloy, 2003) noted
that Nolen-Hoeksema’s (1991) response style theory emphasized the exacerbating
influence of rumination rather than specific causal mechanisms associated with depressed
mood, so these researchers extended Nolen-Hoeksema’s (1991) response style theory and
introduced the concept of stress-reactive rumination. Whereas Nolen-Hoeksema (1991;
Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1993) described rumination as an emotion-focused process,
Alloy and her colleagues conceptualized stress-reactive rumination as a tendency to
ruminate on negative inferences following stressful life events. Unlike NolenHoeksema’s concept of rumination, which involved self-focused thoughts that occurred
in conjunction with depressive symptoms, stress-reactive rumination occurred prior to the
onset of depressed mood. The construct has since been heavily implicated in the etiology
of depression (Alloy & Abramson, 1999; Robinson & Alloy, 2003).
Other research has distinguished between the maladaptive rumination
conceptualized by Nolen-Hoeksema (1987, 1991) and an adaptive rumination referred to
as “experiential (mindful) self-awareness” (Watkins & Teasdale, 2004, p. 2). Unlike
depressive rumination, which involves analyzing and thinking about events and feelings,
mindful self-awareness involves direct, nonevaluative experiential awareness in the
moment (Teasdale, 1999; Watkins, 2004a; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001, 2004).
Experiential awareness has been linked to positive characteristics such as openness to
experience and a problem-solving orientation toward problems (McFarland & Buehler,
1998; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999; Treynor et al., 2003), whereas analytical rumination
has been implicated in negative outcomes such as increased overgeneral autobiographical
memory (Watkins & Teasdale, 2001, 2004), impaired social problem solving (Watkins &
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Baracaia, 2001; Watkins et al., 2005), higher rates of intrusive thoughts (Watkins,
2004b), and increases in depressive mood (Watkins, 2004a). These results align with
factor-analytic studies investigating the underlying structure of the Ruminative Response
Scale of the RSQ (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991), which have indicated that the
scale includes a brooding factor that incorporates self-critical, symptom-focused negative
thinking (Bagby & Parker, 2001; Bagby, Rector, Bacchiochi, & McBride, 2004; Conway
et al., 2000; Lam, Schuck, Smith, Farmer, & Checkley, 2003; Roberts et al., 1998;
Treynor et al., 2003) and a reflection factor that encompasses a problem-solving
orientation (Lam et al., 2003; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999; Treynor et al., 2003).

Specific Characteristics of Rumination
Frequency. Although rumination has garnered research attention because of its
relationship with depression, relatively little research to date has focused on the specific
phenomenology of the construct (Pearson, Brewin, Rhodes, & McCarron, 2008). Early
research by Nolen-Hoeksema et al. (1993) examined the consistency of response styles
over a 30-day period of time but only examined the frequency of ruminative responses in
conjunction with self-reports of depressed mood. A later study by Nolen-Hoeksema et al.
(1997) reported average rumination scores derived from analysis of interview transcripts
rather than specific information about rumination frequency. Similarly, additional
research by Nolen-Hoeksema and her colleagues (Nolen-Hoeksema, Larson, & Grayson,
1999; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1994) reported average scores on the Response Styles
Questionnaire (RSQ; Nolen-Hokesema & Morrow; 1991) or measures derived from the
RSQ (Nolen-Hoeksema & Jackson, 2001; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991).
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Papageorgiou and Wells (1999) examined the features of anxious and depressive
thoughts by asking a sample of college students (19 men, 35 women) to keep a thought
diary over a two-week time period. The diary developed for the study included sections
for recording content and duration of anxious or depressive thoughts. Results indicated
that 54 (100%) participants experienced at least one depressive and one anxious thought
and 45 (83.3%) experienced two depressive and two anxious thoughts within the twoweek time frame. However, participants were specifically asked to record only their first
two depressive and first two anxious thoughts that occurred during their daily routine, so
it is not possible to extrapolate total frequency scores from the Papageorgiou and Wells
(1999) data.
More recently, Pearson et al. (2008) explored the phenomenology of rumination
in a clinical sample. They recruited 22 (6 men, 16 women) participants who were
receiving or waiting for treatment at a community mental health clinic. Twenty-one of
the 22 participants reported ruminating at least one or more times per day, but Pearson et
al. provided no further information about the frequency of ruminative episodes.
Duration. The Papageorgiou and Wells (1999) study indicated that the duration
of the recorded depressive thoughts lasted an average of 17.1 minutes. Watkins et al.,
(2005) expanded research regarding the phenomenology of rumination using a
nonclinical sample of women. Watkins et al. developed a rumination list using items
from the RSQ (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) and items identified as typical
ruminative thoughts in previous research (Watkins & Baracaia, 2001). Watkins et al.
asked participants to choose one item that most nearly represented their personal
experience of rumination and complete the Cognitive Intrusions Questionnaire (CIQ;
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Freeston, Ladouceur, Thibodeau, & Gagnon, 1992) in relation to that one item. Results
indicated that participants experienced their identified ruminative thought across time for
an average 9.9 years, and specific rumination episodes typically lasted an average of 26.2
minutes.
In clinical sample utilized in the Pearson et al. (2008), 3 participants reported
rumination episodes averaging 15 minutes or less per day, and 2 participants reported
episodes averaging all day, which Pearson et al. defined as 10 hours. The results
indicated that the mean of typical rumination episodes averaged 2.8 hours per day, with
25% of the sample reporting a modal duration of 2 hours.
Severity and controllability. Martin and Tesser (1996) characterized ruminative
thoughts as “unintended and difficult to eliminate” (p. 1). Student participants in the
Papageourgiou and Wells (1999) study ranked depressive thoughts as less intrusive, less
involuntary, easier to control, easier to dismiss, and less distracting than anxious
thoughts, but the differences were not statistically significant. Depressive thoughts were
associated with less instrumental behavior or problem-solving effort and lower
confidence in problem solving ability when compared to anxious thoughts. Papageorgiou
and Wells noted that individuals typically view depressive rumination as a personal
characteristic of self rather than an ego-dystonic, intrusive cognitive process.
Content. According to Nolen-Hoeksema et al. (2008), rumination content in
depressed individuals typically involves negative thoughts focused on one’s feelings and
problems rather than “specific content of thoughts” (p. 400). Papageourgiou and Wells
(1999) noted that specific appraisals characterized particular psychological disorders,
with depression associated with thoughts and images revolving around themes of past
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personal loss or failure. When comparing anxious and depressive thoughts,
Papageourgiou and Wells found that participants described depressive thoughts as
significantly less verbal in nature compared to anxious thoughts. Participants also rated
depressive thoughts as significantly more past oriented than anxious thoughts, but the two
types of thoughts did not significantly differ in terms of present or future orientation.
Martin and Tesser (1996) hypothesized that the content of rumination depends on
the degree to which a goal has been disrupted or blocked and on the individual’s
perceived progress toward or away from a goal. According to Martin and Tesser,
movement toward a goal influences content, with movement toward a goal producing
positive affect and movement away from a goal producing negative affect. Wänke and
Schmid (1996) noted that ruminative thinking occurred in the absence of goals and
suggested that an “awareness of an alternative state” (p. 179) prompted rumination and
influenced content.

Cognitive Traits Associated with Rumination
Negative thinking. Rumination has been conceptualized as a stable trait or
response style (Bagby et al., 2004; Just & Alloy, 1997; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow,
1991; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1993, 1994) that encompasses a maladaptive process that
apparently increases negative thinking (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995;
Lyubomirsky, Caldwell, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998). Nolen-Hoeksema et al. (2008)
noted that rumination is highly correlated with other types of negative thought such as
“negative inferential or attributional styles, dysfunctional attitudes, hopelessness,
pessimism, self-criticism, low mastery, dependency, sociotropy, neediness, and
neuroticism” (p. 400). However, research results have indicated that rumination
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accounted for unique variance beyond that explained by depressive symptoms (NolenHoeksema et al., 1994; Spasojevic & Alloy, 2001) and mediated the relationship between
depression and maladaptive cognitive styles (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008).
Experimental research has indicated that dysphoric or clinically depressed
individuals who ruminate tend to amplify negative thoughts involving past, current, and
future events (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). During experimental rumination inductions
originally introduced by Nolen-Hoeksema and her colleagues (Nolen-Hoeksema &
Morrow, 1993), dysphoric participants recalled significantly more negative memories
from their immediate past and provided higher frequency estimates of negative current
events in their lives than did dysphoric individuals placed in distraction conditions
(Lyubomirsky et al., 1998; McFarland & Buehler, 1998; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008;
Pyszczynski, Hamilton, Herring, & Greenberg, 1989). Additionally, during experimental
rumination conditions, dysphoric individuals tended to spontaneously talk about
problems, whereas dysphoric individuals in distracting conditions and nondysphoric
individuals tended to talk about more positive situations (Lyubomirsky, Tucker,
Caldwell, & Berg, 1999). Generally, dysphoric ruminators typically displayed
significantly more negativity, self-criticism, and self-blame about current problems and
less confidence and assurance about problem-solving abilities. Additionally, research has
shown that dysphoric ruminators displayed negative cognitive distortions such as
minimizing successes or overgeneralizing about failures. Consequently, dysphoric
ruminators tended to choose more negatively-biased or distorted interpretations when
presented with hypothetical negative life events (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema,
1995; Lyubomirsky et al., 1999; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). The negative distortions
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extended to predictions about future events in that dysphoric ruminators reported lower
expectations of positive events (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995), less likelihood
of finding solutions to problems (Lyubomirsky et al., 1999), and less participation in fun
activities (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993). Studies using clinical samples have
found similar results, with ruminators displaying more negative thinking about self and
the future (Lavender & Watkins, 2004; Morgan & Banerjee, 2008; Rimes & Watkins,
2005). Additionally, depressed individuals recalled more negative events and processed
negative information faster as mood worsened (Clark & Teasdale, 1982)
Attention biases. The negative thinking associated with rumination may result
from an attention bias for negative information. According to Wenzlaff (2004),
depressed individuals typically emphasize negative aspects of their experiences while
minimizing positive aspects, and research has demonstrated positive correlations between
depressive mood and a focus on negative information (Wenzlaff, Rude, Taylor, Stultz, &
Sweatt, 2001) asked dysphoric and nondysphoric participants to identify hidden words in
letter grids that depicted equal amounts of positive, negative, and neutral words.
Dysphoric participants identified more negative than positive words, whereas
nondysphoric participants located more positive words than negative ones. A follow-up
study by Wenzlaff (2002) indicated that dysphoric individuals typically identified
negative words before positive words, suggesting that such individuals displayed a
negative attentional bias. Additional research using a modified version of the Stroop
color-naming task has also documented evidence of a negative attentional bias among
depressed individuals (Gotlib & McCann, 1984, Morrison & O’Connor, 2008).

34
Other research has provided evidence of additional cognitive biases among
depressed individuals. For instance, dysphoric and depressed individuals tend to magnify
the importance of failures (Wenzlaff & Grozier, 1988), minimize achievements
(Sweeney, Anderson, & Bailey, 1986), and recall more negative information (Blaney,
1986), which tends to foster depressive rumination. However, the nature and function of
the mechanisms that contribute to these cognitive biases are not yet well understood
(Matthews & Wells, 2000).
Cognitive inflexibility. Research has indicated that individuals who ruminated
displayed less cognitive flexibility and experienced more difficulty with set shifting than
did nonruminators (Lyubomirsky & Tkach, 2004). For instance, dysphoric students who
focused on self or on emotions displayed relatively poorer performance in terms of
cognitive discrimination (Kuhl, 1981) and anagram-solving tasks (Strack, Schwarz,
Gshneidinger, 1985). Additionally, Davis and Nolen-Hoeksema (2000) found that
individuals with a ruminative response style made more perseveration errors on a card
sorting task and took more time on a measure of psychomotor speed.
Cognitive deficits apparently increase when rumination occurs in conjunction
with depressive symptoms. Experimental studies have demonstrated that dysphoric
individuals who ruminated reported diminished concentration on academic tasks,
required more time for reading tasks and test taking, and showed deficits in planning and
performance (Lyubomirsky, Kasri, & Zehm, 2003; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008).
Watkins and Brown (2002) found that depressed patients who ruminated tended to
engage in stereotyped counting responses in a random-number generation task.

35
Overgeneral autobiographical memory. Research has linked rumination with
the maintenance of overgeneral memory (OGM), a cognitive deficit involving recall of
general, categoric descriptions or summaries of multiple events rather than detailed,
event- or time-specific personal memories (Barnard, Watkins, & Ramponi, 2006; Raes,
Watkins, Williams, & Hermans, 2008; Williams et al., 2007). OGM has been
conceptualized as a stable vulnerability marker associated with dysphoria, seasonal
affective disorder (SAD), depression, suicidality, and PTSD (Dalgleish, Spinks, Yiend, &
Kuyken, 2001; Mackinger, Pachinger, Leibetseder, & Fartacek, 2000; McNally, Lasko,
Macklin, & Pitman, 1995; Park, Goodyear, & Teasdale, 2004; Peeters, Wessel,
Merckelbach, & Boon-Vermeeren, 2002; Raes, Hermans, Williams, Beyers, Eelen, &
Brunfaut, 2006; Raes, Hermans, Williams, Bijttebier, & Eelen, 2008; Raes, Hermans,
Williams, Geypen, & Eelen, 2006; Schönfeld & Ehlers, 2006; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001;
Williams & Broadbent, 1986), and it has been tied to poor social problem solving and a
history of abuse and/or trauma (Goddard, Dritschel, & Burton, 1996; Kao, Dritschel, &
Astell, 2006; Williams et al., 2007). Although OGM has been consistently linked with
depressive symptoms, other research has indicated that OGM does not typically occur in
conjunction with GAD, social phobia, specific phobias, or high trait anxiety (Williams et
al., 2007).
Watkins and his colleagues (Barnard et al., 2006; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001,
2004) hypothesized that rumination played a “bidirectional causal role” in OGM
(Barnard et al., 2006, p. 345). In keeping with this hypothesis, correlational research has
documented positive associations between high trait levels of rumination and relatively
greater OGM (Ramponi, Barnard, & Nimmo-Smith, 2004). Research with nonclinical
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samples (Barnard et al., 2006; Sutherland & Bryant, 2007) found that rumination
decreased specific memory recall and increased OGM relative to distraction.
Experimental studies with previously dysphoric, currently dysphoric, or depressed
participants obtained similar results (Crane, Barnhofer, Visser, Nightingale, & Williams,
2007; Park et al., 2004; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001, 2004).
Although rumination and OGM appear mutually related, research has documented
a complex relationship between the two constructs. For instance, Park et al. (2004)
found that rumination increased OGM in their adolescent sample, but distraction had no
significant effect. Additionally, the increase in OGM with rumination only occurred with
negative cues. Similarly, Barnard et al. (2006) found that participants did not experience
changes in OGM unless focused on self-related themes, and they concluded that the
impact of rumination on OGM occurred in the presence of self-focused, analytical
processing.
Other research has indicated that the differential effects found for rumination
versus distraction involved changes in the degree of specific memories rather than direct
changes in OGM (Barnard et al., 2006; Mackinger & Svaldi, 2004; Peeters et al., 2002;
Raes, Hermans, Williams, Demyttenaere et al., 2005; Raes, Hermans, Williams, & Eelen,
2006; Raes, Watkins, et al., 2008; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001). Analysis conducted by
Raes, Hermans, Williams, Beyers, et al. (2006) indicated that rumination significantly
mediated the association between OGM and depression. Because ruminative thoughts
tend toward a negative bias, such thoughts likely encourage negative categoric
descriptions (Lyubomirsky et al., 1998; Teasdale & Green, 2004). As a result, depressed
individuals experience a cycle of depressed mood, ruminative thinking, and negative
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OGM (Crane et al., 2007; Park et al., 2004; Raes, Hermans, Williams, Beyers, et al.,
2006).
Cognitive avoidance. Since Borkovec and his colleagues have proposed an
avoidance theory of worry (Borkovec et al., 1998; Stöber & Borkovec, 2002), Watkins
and Moulds (2007a) extended the conceptualization of avoidance to the rumination
construct and found that depressed participants produced more abstract descriptions of
problems than did never-depressed controls. Additionally, Watkins and Moulds found
that the association between self-focus on problems and reduced concreteness remained
significant after controlling for worry and anxiety. Watkins and Moulds surmised that
reduced concreteness served a cognitive avoidant function.
Moulds, Kandris, Starr, and Wong (2007) investigated the relationship between
rumination and avoidance in a nonclinical sample. They hypothesized that rumination
would display positive correlations with the cognitive avoidance subscales of the
Cognitive-Behavioral Avoidance Scale (CBAS; Ottenbreit & Dobson, 2004). They
found significant correlations among rumination, avoidance, and depression. However,
when the researchers controlled for anxiety, the correlation between behavioral avoidance
and rumination remained significant, but the correlation between cognitive avoidance and
rumination did not. These findings suggested that rumination does not necessarily
facilitate cognitive avoidance, but Moulds et al. (2007) noted that rumination fosters
focus on cognitive content, which may deflect the emotional impact typically associated
with such thoughts.
Intolerance of uncertainty. Although several studies have linked intolerance of
uncertainty to excessive worry in both clinical and nonclinical samples (Dugas et al.,
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2001; Dugas et al., 2004; Koerner & Dugas, 2006), little research to date has specifically
examined the relationship between depressive rumination and intolerance of uncertainty.
However, de Jong-Meyer, Beck, and Riede (2009) suggested that one could assume that
rumination displayed a similar relationship to intolerance of uncertainty given the
commonalities across anxiety and depression constructs. They tested this assumption and
found that intolerance of uncertainty showed significant positive correlations with both
rumination and depression in separate dysphoric and community samples, but the
correlations were significantly lower in the dysphoric sample. Additionally, regression
analyses revealed that intolerance of uncertainty and rumination acted as significant
predictors of depression scores for the community sample but not for the dysphoric
sample.
Problem-solving deficits. Although individuals tend to view rumination as an
effective problem-solving strategy (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001a, 2003), rumination in
conjunction with dysphoria tends to interfere with effective problem solving. When
placed in experimental rumination conditions, dysphoric participants typically tend to
appraise their problems as more unsolvable and more overwhelming (Lyubomirsky et al.,
1999). Additionally, dysphoric participants found it more difficult to generate effective
problem solutions (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Lyubomirsky et al., 1999).
These results have been replicated in studies utilizing clinically depressed individuals
(Donaldson & Lam, 2004; Watkins & Baracaia, 2002; Watkins & Moulds, 2005, 2007a,
2007b). Research also indicated that rumination interferes with implementing of problem
solutions such that dysphoric individuals displayed a reduced tendency of actually
implementing solutions (Lyubomirsky et al., 1999). Other research has indicated that
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individuals who ruminate are less likely to display confidence in any problem solutions
they have generated, require more time to work on solutions for four they make a
commitment, and feel less confident when asked orally present their solutions (Ward,
Lyubomirsky, Sousa, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003).
Positive beliefs about rumination. Similar findings were obtained from studies
investigating positive beliefs about rumination. Papageorgiou and Wells (2001a) found
that participants classified rumination as a coping strategy. Watkins and Baracaia (2001)
obtained similar results and reported that participants viewed rumination as advantageous
in that it increased understanding and insight about the self and depression, facilitated
problem solving, allowed one to learn from past mistakes, prevented future mistakes, and
increased empathy. In a series of separate studies, Papageorgiou and Wells (2001b)
found that positive beliefs about rumination revolved around perceptions that rumination
enhanced problem solving, increased insight, helped to identify causes and triggers of
depression, prevented future mistakes and failures, and helped to prioritize important
tasks.
Negative beliefs about rumination. Papageorgiou and Wells (2001a) noted that
individuals’ negative beliefs about rumination centered on themes of uncontrollability,
potential harm, and interpersonal and social consequences of rumination. In the Watkins
and Baracaia study (2001), participants reported that rumination was problematic in that
it increased depressed and negative feelings, reduced constructive and pleasant activities,
wasted time, increased negative and unrealistic thinking, and increased social withdrawal.
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Gender Differences in Rumination
Nolen-Hoeksema (1990) noted that women reported significantly greater levels of
depressed mood than did men, and the gender differences in depressive symptoms have
been documented in early adolescence (Hankin et al., 1998; Jose & Brown, 2008).
Nolen-Hoeksema (1987, 1991) contended that rumination mediated the gender
differences in depressive symptoms. Since Nolen-Hoeksema proposed the response
styles theory to explain gender differences in depression, several studies have
documented greater tendencies toward rumination in women relative to men (Butler &
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1994; Grant et al., 2004; Nolen-Hoeksema & Jackson, 2001; NolenHoeksema, Larson, & Grayson, 1999; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1993, 1999; Roberts et al.,
1998; Ziegert & Kistner, 2002). However, a substantial number of studies have failed to
document gender differences in rumination (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993,
1995; Lyubomirsky et al., 1999, 2003; Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 1999; NolenHoeksema & Morrow, 1991).

Conceptual Similarities Between Worry and Rumination

Nolen-Hoeksema et al. (2008) succinctly summarized the similarities between
worry and rumination. Although the worry and rumination constructs emerged from
separate research traditions, the two constructs appear conceptually similar, positively
correlated, and similarly related to both anxiety and depression. Conceptual similarities
are evident in that both constructs are regarded as largely verbal or cognitive activities.
As noted above, operational definitions of both constructs have typically included a
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unifying component of recurring, repetitive thoughts that are focused on negative events
(Fresco, Frankel, et al., 2002; Segerstrom et al., 2000).
Both worry and rumination are also conceptually similar in that the cognitive
activity associated with the constructs appears to exceed existing environmental
demands. An additional cognitive similarity arises from research that indicated that
individuals tend to hold positive beliefs about both worry and rumination.
The conceptual similarities between worry and rumination also encompass an
individual’s negative beliefs about worry and rumination. Both worry and rumination,
then, involve repetitive, recurring thoughts that typically focus on negative events or
negative feelings. In addition, the cognitive activity involved in worry and rumination
typically exceeds the existing environmental demands. Although individuals endorsed
positive beliefs and perceived worrisome or ruminative thoughts as generally helpful,
individuals also endorsed negative beliefs suggesting that worry and rumination were
associated with perceptions of uncontrollability and potential adverse consequences.
In keeping with the definitional and conceptual similarities between constructs, a
number of studies have documented strong correlations between worry and rumination.
For instance, Segerstrom and her colleagues (Segerstrom et al., 2000) examined the
relationships among global rumination (a measure of repetitive thought), depressive
rumination, and worry in both undergraduate and clinical samples. They reported strong,
positive correlations among measures, with the highest correlations occurring between
worry and global rumination (students, r = .52; patients, r = .55; ps < .005) and between
worry and depressive rumination (students, r = .40, p < .005; patients, r = .32, p < .05).
In another study, Fresco, Frankel, et al. (2002) reported strong, positive correlations (r =
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.46, p < .005) between worry- and rumination-related factors derived from self-report
items. Watkins (2004b) examined whether particular appraisals and response strategies
associated with intrusive thoughts increased tendencies to worry or to ruminate and found
significant correlations (r = .51, p < .001) between worry and rumination. Muris et al.
(2004) used an adolescent sample in the Netherlands to examine relationships among
self-reported rumination, worry, anxiety symptoms, and depression symptoms. Their
findings indicated that worry and rumination strongly correlated with each other (r = .55,
p = .001).
The strong correlations between worry and rumination indicate that the two
constructs share considerable overlap, and other researchers (Segerstrom et al., 2000;
Starcevic, 1995; Szabó & Lovibond, 2002; Watkins, 2004b) have provided additional
evidence of possible overlap between the worry and rumination constructs. For instance,
Starcevic (1995) recruited individuals with diagnoses of generalized anxiety disorder
(GAD) or major depressive episode (MDE) as specified by the DSM-III-R (1987). Both
anxious and depressed participants completed the PSWQ, a commonly used self-report
measure that assessed the frequency and intensity of general worry. Comparison of the
mean worry scores obtained from the anxious and depressed groups indicated that the
groups did not significantly differ in terms of reported frequency and intensity of
pathological worry. Szabó and Lovibond examined the cognitive content of naturally
occurring worry episodes by asking participants to monitor and record their worrisome
thoughts in a daily diary. They indicated that almost half of the recorded thoughts related
to problem solving and almost equal percentages of the recorded thoughts related to
anticipation of future negative events and to rumination (17% and 11%, respectively),
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which suggested that worry included thought content typically associated with
depression. These findings indicate that worry processes are not solely tied to anxiety
and that rumination processes are not uniquely linked to depression. Thus, one can
assume that worry and rumination share some processes that are common to both anxiety
and depression.
Watkins (2004b), too, found evidence of overlap in processes when he examined
appraisals and strategies associated with worry and with rumination. His findings
indicated that both worry and rumination displayed significant positive correlations with
self-report items related to disapproval of the thought (worry, r = .29; rumination, r = .35;
ps < .001), self reprimands for having the thought (worry, r = .27; rumination, r = .30; ps
< .001), and dwelling on causes and meanings of the thought (worry, r = .33; rumination,
r = .40; ps < .001). In addition, both worry and rumination were negatively correlated
with control over the intrusive thought (-.29 and -.28, respectively, ps < .001).
Watkins (2004b) found further evidence of overlap when he employed separate,
common factor analyses to identify appraisal and strategy factors associated with worry
and rumination. In terms of appraisals, Watkins identified five appraisal factors
associated with worry (realism of the intrusive concern, problem-solving confidence and
control over the intrusive thought, disapproval of thought and effort aimed at dismissing
the thought, responsibility for the thought or situation, and appraised seriousness of the
situation depicted in the thought). Watkins also identified five appraisal factors
associated with rumination (disapproval of the thought and effort aimed at dismissing the
thought, problem-solving confidence and control over the thought, responsibility for the
thought, appraised seriousness of the situation depicted in the thought, and need to
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understand the thought). Both worry and rumination were significantly correlated with
the appraisal factor that related to degree of disapproval and effort at dismissing an
intrusive thought. In terms of strategies, Watkins identified five factors associated with
worry (distraction, problem-solving, dwelling on consequences, thought stopping or
minimizing, and neutralizing or taking no action). Watkins also identified five strategy
factors associated with rumination (dwelling on consequences, neutralizing thought
through mental effort, using negative mental control, distraction, and taking no action).
Both worry and rumination were significantly correlated with the strategy factor related
to dwelling on consequences. Thus, it appears that both worry and rumination included
focusing on the details and consequences associated with intrusive thoughts.
Given the strong correlations and apparent overlap between the worry and
rumination constructs, it is not surprising that additional findings in the research have
indicated that worry and rumination share similar relationships to anxiety and depression.
For instance, Segerstrom et al. (2000) used structural equation modeling and found that
repetitive thought, a latent variable derived from worry and rumination measures,
positively correlated with both anxiety and depression (rs = .44 and .66, respectively; ps
< .05) in two undergraduate samples. In a similar vein, Watkins (2004) found that worry
and rumination both significantly correlated with assessed anxiety and depression, with
the highest correlation between worry and anxiety. In addition, Fresco, Frankel, et al.
(2002) examined the relationship between the constructs by subjecting items from worry
and rumination scales to factor analysis and found that a factor derived from the PSWQ
(Meyer et al., 1990) and a factor derived from Response Styles Questionnaire (RSQ;
Nolen-Hokesema & Morrow; 1991) showed similar relationships to measures of anxiety
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and depression. Thus, worry and rumination apparently share a common thought-related
component, which accounts for a portion of the observed overlap between the constructs.
That common element, in turn, appears to contribute to both anxiety and depression.
In summary, findings in the extant worry- and rumination-related literature have
shown consistent positive correlations between worry and rumination measures, and
some studies have demonstrated at least partial overlap between the two constructs. In
addition, findings have indicated that the constructs appear to share similar relationships
to measures of anxiety and depression.

Distinct Features of Worry and Rumination

Despite the conceptual similarities and apparent overlap between the worry and
rumination constructs, other researchers have indicated that worry and rumination can be
differentiated from each other (Fresco, Frankel, et al., 2002; Muris et al., 2004; Watkins,
2004b) and that the two constructs relate differently to anxiety and depression (Muris et
al., 2004; Segerstrom et al., 2000; Watkins, 2004b; Wells & Carter, 2001). For instance,
exploratory factor analysis conducted by Muris et al. (2004) showed that the worry and
rumination constructs maintained a degree of distinctiveness in that worry and rumination
items did not load on more than one factor. In a similar exploratory factor analysis,
Fresco et al. (2002) found that worry and rumination items loaded on separate factors
and that no factors contained both worry and rumination items. One factor, Worry
Engagement, consisted of positively-coded items from the PSWQ, which related to the
frequency, intensity, and controllability of worry. A second factor, Dwelling on the
Negative, included rumination-related items from the RSQ (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow,
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1991), which related to thoughts about one’s current mood state and motivation levels. A
third factor, Active Cognitive Appraisal, consisted of items from the RSQ (NolenHoeksema & Morrow, 1991) that related to one’s ability to integrate emotional
experience with an understanding of self and one’s situation while depressed. A final
factor, Absence of Worry, consisted of negatively coded PSWQ items that tapped one’s
ability to dismiss worrisome thoughts. The Dwelling on the Negative and Worry
Engagement factors positively correlated with measures of anxiety and depression, but
the Dwelling on the Negative factor showed a small but significantly stronger
relationship to raw measures of anxious arousal and general depressive symptoms. The
relationship between Dwelling on the Negative and anxious arousal remained
significantly stronger even after controlling for depression. Fresco, Frankel, et al. (2002)
concluded that worry and rumination represented correlated but distinct cognitive
processes, but the results also indicated that both worry and rumination are multifactorial
constructs.
In an effort to determine which particular thought appraisals or strategies in
response to intrusive thoughts were associated with worry and rumination, Watkins
(2004a) tested a number of predictions derived from conceptualizations of worry,
rumination, thought suppression (Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000), goal-discrepancy theories
(Carver & Scheier, 1990; Martin & Tesser, 1996; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987),
cognitive avoidance theory (Borkovec et al., 1998; Borkovec & Roemer, 1995), and
metacognitive models (Watkins & Baracaia, 2001; Wells & Carter, 2001). Although
Watkins found some overlap between the appraisals and strategies associated with worry
and with rumination, he found that some appraisals and strategies significantly correlated
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with worry but not rumination (effort put into dismissing thought, replacing thought with
an unpleasant thought, dwelling on details, and dwelling on consequences). In contrast,
other appraisals significantly correlated with rumination but not worry (need to
understand situation, seriousness of consequences, need to prevent situation, personal
importance, and analyzing the situation). Thus, while worry and rumination appeared to
share a common repetitive-thought component (Segerstrom et al., 2000), the specific
thought appraisals and strategies associated with the two constructs appeared to differ.
When Watkins (2004b) subjected individual appraisal and strategy items to
common factor analyses, he identified distinct appraisal and strategy factors associated
with worry and rumination. Both worry and rumination were significantly associated
with an appraisal factor that related to disapproval of the thought and effort put into
dismissing the thought, and both constructs were significantly associated with a strategy
factor related to dwelling on the consequences of a thought. However, rumination
displayed a unique, significant correlation with an appraisal factor associated with the
perceived importance of the intrusive thought. In addition, rumination showed a unique,
significant correlation with a strategy factor associated with negative control (e.g.,
reprimanding self, replacing thought with another unpleasant thought). Thus, it appeared
that worry and rumination included shared factors such as disapproval of the thought and
a focus on the consequences associated with the thought. However, rumination uniquely
related to appraisals of perceived importance and strategies related to negative control.
Watkins also found that worry and rumination appraisals related differently to anxiety
and depression measures, with effort put into dismissing thoughts and dwelling on
causes, meanings, details, and consequences significantly correlated with anxiety. These
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findings indicated that worry and rumination shared similar cognitive processes but also
involved at least some distinctive processes. In addition, it appeared that particular
thoughts displayed stronger relationships with anxiety than with depression.
Research by Wells and Carter (2001) has provided additional evidence of
different thought content associated with anxiety and depression. Their research has
indicated that distinctions between anxiety and depression involved metacognitions or an
individual’s thoughts and beliefs, both positive and negative, about intrusive thoughts.
For instance, Wells and Carter compared beliefs about worry held by nonpatient controls
and individuals diagnosed with GAD, social phobia, panic disorder, and major
depression. The results of the multigroup discriminant analysis (MDA) showed that the
GAD group showed the highest negative metacognition scores, while scores from the
depressed group were lower than the GAD scores but higher than scores from the other
anxiety groups. While individuals in the depressed group displayed moderate levels of
negative metacognitions, they also displayed high levels of social worry, which set them
apart from all other anxiety groups except those in the social phobia group. Because the
results indicated that individuals in the depressed group were relatively high in terms of
negative metacognitions, Wells and Carter suggested that differentiating between anxiety
and depression may depend on an examination of the content specificity of
metacognitions or “worry about worry” rather than an examination of Type 1 worries or
those thoughts dealing with external events and “noncognitive internal events” (Wells &
Carter, 2001, p. 86).
Other studies examining the relationship among worry, rumination, anxiety, and
depression have provided additional evidence that worry and rumination differentially
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relate to anxiety and depression. For instance, some studies (Muris et al., 2004;
Segerstrom et al., 2000) have shown that both constructs show stronger relationships to
anxiety rather than to depression. Segerstrom et al. tested the relationship among
repetitive thought, a latent variable derived from worry and rumination measures, and
subsequent changes in assessed anxiety and depression. They assessed repetitive
thought, anxiety, and depression prior to midterm examinations and 1 week after the
examinations. The results indicated that repetitive thought did not predict depression in
an undergraduate sample 1 week after a stressful exam period, but repetitive thought did
show a stronger predictive relationship to follow-up anxiety.
Additional evidence that worry and rumination differentially related to anxiety
and depression emerged from a study conducted by Muris and his colleagues (Muris et
al., 2004). In order to examine the relative contributions of worry and rumination to
symptoms of anxiety and depression, they administered worry, rumination, anxiety,
depression, and attribution measures to a sample of adolescents and then conducted a
series of regression analyses. Muris et al.’s findings indicated that both worry and
rumination related substantially more to anxiety symptoms than to depressive symptoms.
In an analysis predicting depression symptoms from rumination, distraction, and
attribution scores, each construct explained unique variance in depression symptoms.
When predicting depression symptoms from rumination, distraction, and worry scores,
distraction and worry explained a significant portion of the variance. When rumination,
distraction, attributions, and worry were included in the regression equation, only
distraction, negative attributions, and worry were significant predictors. In other words,
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rumination did not contribute to depressive symptoms when worry was included in the
regression equation.
Muris et al. (2004) conducted an additional regression analysis predicting anxiety
from rumination, distraction, and worry scores, and only worry made a significant
contribution. When predicting anxiety symptoms from rumination, distraction, and
attribution scores, rumination and negative attributions accounted for significant portions
of the variance. In a final regression analysis predicting anxiety symptoms from
rumination, distraction, worry, and attribution scores, worry was the most powerful
predictor and negative attributions explained an additional portion of the variance. These
results indicated that worry and rumination were more clearly related to anxiety
symptoms than to depression symptoms. In addition, worry emerged as a unique
predictor of anxiety symptoms after controlling for rumination.
In summary, the results from several studies have highlighted conceptual
similarities, considerable overlap, and strong correlations between worry and rumination
(Fresco, Frankel, et al., 2002; MacLeod & Byrne, 1996; Mathews, 1990; Muris et al.,
2004; Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001a, 2001b; Segerstrom et al., 2000; Starcevic, 1995;
Watkins, 2004b; Watkins & Baracaia, 2001). However, other research has also provided
evidence of distinctions between worry and rumination. For instance, factor analyses
(Fresco, Frankel, et al., 2002; Muris et al., 2004) of items taken from common worry and
rumination measures showed that the worry items and rumination items loaded on
separate factors, indicating that the worry and rumination constructs were highly
correlated but distinct. In addition, researchers found that the common measures used to
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assess worry and rumination appeared to be multifactorial measures (Fresco, Frankel, et
al., 2002; Watkins, 2004b).
Other research (Watkins, 2004b; Wells & Carter, 2001) has indicated the worry
and rumination constructs appeared to share similar cognitive processes while differing in
terms of specific content. The content, in turn, appeared to differentially relate to anxiety
and depression, suggesting that the specific content of worry or rumination dictates how
each of the constructs relates to anxiety or depression. Research by Watkins indicated
that effort put into dismissing thoughts and dwelling on the causes, meanings, details, and
consequences associated with intrusive thoughts significantly correlated with anxiety.
Research by Wells and Carter (2001) added further support for the idea that specific
thought content differentiates between anxiety and depression when their findings
indicated that anxious individuals reported the high levels of negative beliefs about worry
while depressed individuals displayed less negative beliefs about worry but high levels of
social worry.
While separate studies examining the relationship between worry and anxiety and
the relationship between rumination and depression have implicated both worry and
rumination as underlying and maintaining factors in anxiety and depression, respectively,
the few studies that have jointly examined the relationship among worry, rumination,
anxiety, and depression have provided evidence that both worry and rumination displayed
a stronger relationship to anxiety rather than to depression in nonclinical samples (Fresco,
Frankel, et al., 2002; Muris et al., 2004; Segerstrom et al., 2000).
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Factor Structure of Worry and Rumination Measures

The Penn State Worry Questionnaire
Development. Meyer et al. (1990) noted that prior anxiety research primarily
assessed worry by asking worriers what percentage of time they typically spent worrying
and that existing assessment instruments focused on worry versus emotionality or
cognitive versus somatic complaints. They recognized the need for a psychometrically
sound self-report instrument and subsequently developed the Penn State Worry
Questionnaire (PSWQ) to measure the specific trait of worry.
Meyer et al. (1990) used several sources to produce an initial pool of 161 items
for the questionnaire, including Borkovec’s clinical and research experiences with worry
and GAD, daily diary entries made by GAD clients who participated in an outcome
study, items from the Borkovec and Mathews (1988) cognitive/somatic anxiety
inventory, and items based on Meyer’s theoretical conceptions about worry. A large
group of college students responded to the items on a scale of 1 (“not at all typical of
me”) to 5 (“very typical of me”), and Meyer et al. used principle components factor
analysis to identify one general worry factor and several smaller factors. The general
worry factor related to the frequency and intensity of worry. The smaller factors related
to physical safety and health concerns, social evaluation concerns, use of worry as a
positive coping strategy, feelings of depression or pessimism about life, and future
relationship concerns. Meyer et al. retained items related to the general worry factor and
produced a 16-item questionnaire.
Factor structure. The PSWQ represents the predominant worry measure utilized
in the extant research, and several factorial models have been identified in the literature.
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Meyer et al. (1990) initially conceptualized the PSWQ as a unifactorial measure, with all
16 items contributing to a latent worry factor. In keeping the Meyer et al.’s
conceptualization, Brown et al. (1992) utilized principal component analyses of the
PSWQ and found a unifactorial solution. However, Brown et al. utilized a clinical
sample of individuals diagnosed with anxiety disorders, and found that omission of Item
1, the item with the lowest factor loadings in the Meyer et al. study, improved reliability
estimates across diagnostic groups. van Rijsoort, Emmelkamp, and Vervaeke (1999) also
noted that Item 1 displayed the poorest corrected item-total correlation in their
community sample.
While some studies have supported the unifactorial structure of the PSWQ, results
from other factor analyses (Carter et al., 2005; Fresco, Frankel, et al., 2002; Fresco,
Heimberg, et al., 2002; Hazlett-Stevens, Ullman, & Craske, 2004; van Rijsoort et al.,
1999) have indicated that the PSWQ includes two factors: one factor including the 11
positively-worded items and a second factor including the 5 reverse-scored items. Brown
(2003) presented a cogent argument that the two-factor solution derived from the PSWQ
resulted from method effects (Brown, 2003; Startup & Erickson, 2006), and he suggested
that a single-factor model that included only the positively-worded items from the PSWQ
should be examined through CFA model testing. Brown convincingly argued that the
two-factor solution results from method effects instead of conceptually meaningful
differences between factors. Although Brown specifically addressed method effects in
his model comparisons and examined the measurement invariance across gender, his
comparative study did not include unifactorial models consisting of only the positivelyworded items from the PSWQ (Fresco, Frankel, et al., 2002; Hopko et al., 2003).
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Hopko et al. (2003) examined the factor structure of the PSWQ in a clinical
sample of older adults with GAD (mean age = 66.6 years) and noted that neither the
single-factor nor two-factor models provided adequate fit for the data. Through a series
of model modification procedures, they eliminated all of the reverse-scored items (1, 3, 8,
10, 11) and three positively-worded items (14, 15, 16).
In summary, the available research has presented several different CFA models: a
single-factor model that includes all of the PSWQ items, a single-factor model that
excludes Item 1, a single-factor model that only includes the 11 positively-worded items,
a single-factor model that includes 8 positively-worded items, and a two-factor model
comprising the 11 positively-worded items and the 5 negatively-worded items. The
Carter et al. (2005) study examined invariance across ethnic groups and found variance
between White-American and African-American university students. Only Brown (2003)
examined invariance across gender and found measurement invariance across groups but
a significant difference in latent group means, with women scoring significantly higher
than men on the latent worry score. Furthermore, only Hopko et al. (2003) specifically
addressed the issue of multivariate assumptions underlying CFA procedures in that they
noted their data fell within acceptable limits in terms of skewness and kurtosis.

The Student Worry Questionnaire-30
Development. Although the PSWQ has been the predominant worry measure in
the extant literature, other researchers have developed alternative measures. Osman et al.
(2001) developed the SWQ-30 in response to Davey’s (1993) call for a measure that
assessed both the frequency and intensity of worry as well as specific content domains
associated with worry. Validation studies by Osman and his colleagues (Carter, 2002;
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Osman et al., 2001) indicated that the SWQ-30 included six distinct factors: Worrisome
Thinking, Financial-related Concerns, Significant Others’ Well-being, Social Adequacy
Concerns, Academic Concerns, and General Anxiety Symptoms. The Worrisome
Thinking factor tapped the frequency of worry and highly correlated with PSWQ scores.
The General Anxiety Symptoms factor assessed common anxiety symptoms frequently
experienced by individuals who worry, and the remaining factors tapped worrisome
concerns typically experienced by college students. Although the initial validation
studies (Carter, 2002; Osman et al., 2001) associated with the instrument indicated that
the measure displayed strong psychometric properties, the results also highlighted
possible gender differences in latent factor scores given that women scored significantly
higher than men in terms of Worrisome Thinking, Academic Concerns, and General
Anxiety. Additionally, gender differences in Significant Others’ Well-being approached
statistical significance.
Factor structure. In subsequent research involving the SWQ-30 (Osman et al.,
2001), Swerdzewski (2009) examined the factor structure of the measure and found that
model fit improved with removal of four redundant items. Swerdzewski specified four a
priori models to test the factor structure of the SWQ-30: a correlated six-factor model
(Model 1) that adhered to the developers original conceptualization, a higher-order model
(Model 2) that included a higher-order latent worry factor, a correlated three-factor model
(Model 3) with separate factors for worry frequency, worry content, and general anxiety
symptoms, and a correlated two-factor model (Model 4) that included process and
content factors. Swerdzewski found that the six factor model originally conceptualized
by Osman et al. provided the best fit across three samples of college students. However,
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Swerdzewski noted that fit improved with the elimination of redundant items (Items 2, 4,
8, and 18). Additionally, Swerdzewski found scalar invariance in items from the
Worrisome Thinking, Social Adequacy Concerns, Financial-Related Concerns, and
Generalized Anxiety Symptom factors. Swerdzewski’s study focused on invariance
across time but did not examine invariance across gender. Additionally, he reported that
his data approximated a normal distribution despite evidence of multivariate nonnormality (Mardia’s coefficient = 98.94). Therefore, there is currently limited evidence
regarding the invariance of the SWQ-30 that uses statical methods that account for nonnormality.

The Anxious Thoughts Inventory
Development. Wells (1994) developed the AnTI to assess content domains of
worry and to distinguish between content (Type 1) and metacognitive (Type 2) worries.
Wells developed the original item pool for the AnTI from interviews with individuals
with panic disorder or GAD and from existing measures that assessed depressive
symptoms, obsessive-compulsive symptoms, and trait anxiety (Wells, 2006a).
Factor structure. Wells (1994) subjected the initial item pool for the AnTI to a
series of factor analyses using nonclinical samples, which resulted in the retention of
three factors encompassing social worry, health worry, and meta-worry or cognitions
about worry. The first-order, three-factor model has not yet been tested through CFA,
and no research to date has looked at the factor structure of the AnTI across gender,
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The Ruminative Responses Scale
Development. Based on Nolen-Hoeksema’s response style theory of depression,
Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1991) developed a 71-item Response Styles
Questionnaire (RSQ) to assess differing responses to negative mood. Respondents were
asked to focus on thoughts when they felt “sad, blue, or depressed” and to indicate how
frequently they experienced each response utilizing a four-point Likert scale ranging
from 1 (“almost never”) to 4 (“almost always”). Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow utilized a
priori groupings of the items into four subscales: Ruminative Responses, Distracting
Responses, Problem-Solving, and Dangerous Activities. The Problem-Solving and
Dangerous Activities subscales demonstrated unacceptably low internal consistency (.68
and .44, respectively), so the subscales were excluded from subsequent studies (Luminet,
2004; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). Subsequent rumination-related research has
primarily relied on the Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow,
1991), a 22-item scale that focuses on the meaning of ruminative thoughts as well as the
feelings, symptoms, and possible causes and consequences related to depressed mood
(Luminet, 2004).
Factor structure. Recent research (Fresco, Frankel, et al., 2002; Roberts et al.,
1998; Treynor et al., 2003) has indicated that the RRS contains multiple factors. In the
first of two studies with student samples, Roberts et al. conducted exploratory factor
analysis of the RRS and identified three factors. The first factor involved symptom-based
rumination and contained items that related to depressive symptoms. The second factor
included items related to self-focus and isolation, and a third factor tapped self-blame.
Six items were not retained from the final three-factor solution. Roberts et al. conducted
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confirmatory factor analysis and tested the three-factor solution with a second student
sample and found that the model provided adequate fit for the data.
In response to research that suggested that individual items on the RRS (NolenHoeksema & Morrow, 1991) may be “contaminated by symptoms, which could create a
spurious relationship with depression” (Segerstrom et al., p. 674). Nolen-Hoeksema and
her colleagues (Treynor et al., 2003) re-evaluated previous data (Nolen-Hoeksema et al.,
1999) in order to investigate whether item content explained the relationship between
rumination and depression. After removing items with depression content, Treynor et al.
found support for a two-factor model of rumination that included reflective pondering
and brooding components. The findings indicated that the two factors differentially
related to depression in terms of predictive ability and gender difference mediation, and
Treynor et al. suggested that Nolen-Hoeksema’s (1987) response style theory needed to
be refined to differentiate between the two components in rumination research.

The Rumination-Reflection Questionnaire
Development. Trapnell and Campbell (1999) originally developed the RRQ in an
effort to distinguish between the maladaptive and adaptive components of rumination.
They conceptualized rumination and reflection as “neurotic and intellective variants of
private self-consciousness” (p. 291). Trapnell and Campbell developed rumination items
based on research findings related to metacognitions and evaluations associated with both
anxiety and depression. For the rumination items, they specifically sought items that
carried a negative tone about attentional tendencies rather than affective states. Trapnell
and Campbell derived the reflection items from research associated with the cognitive
and motivational tendencies typically linked to openness to experience. They hoped to
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capture cognitions defined by curiosity and interest in abstact or philosophical thinking.
Trapnell and Campbell initially produced an initial 28-item questionnaire, which they
refined into a 24-item questionnaire through subsequent analyses. The resulting
reflection scale showed positive correlations with openness to experience, and the
rumination scale showed positive correlations with neuroticism.
Factor structure. Trapnell and Campbell (1999) developed the RRQ as a twofactor model intended to differentiate between anxious self-focus and intellectually
curious or inquisitive self-focus. Their two-factor model has not been subjected to CFA
to date, and no research has examined invariance across gender. This study, then, sought
to add to the existing literature by confirming the factor structure of the RRQ and testing
invariance across gender.

Gender Differences in Worry and Rumination

A second research concern revolves around the fact that gender differences in
worry and rumination emerge when considering multiple factors associated with worry
and rumination. For instance, Osman et al. (2001) found gender differences in worry
using the Student Worry Questionnaire-30 (SWQ-30), a multifactorial measure that
included content related to general worry concerns, financial concerns, concern about
significant others, social adequacy concerns, academic concerns, and general anxiety
symptoms. Their findings indicated that women scored significantly higher than men on
total scores, general worry concerns (a scale that is strongly and positively correlated
with the PSWQ, academic concerns, and general anxiety (a measure of physiological
symptoms). Gender differences approached significance for the scale assessing concern
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about significant others. Carter (2002) replicated the findings of significant gender
differences and found medium to large effect sizes (Cohen’s d ranging from .33 to .46) in
terms of the total scores, general worry concerns, academic concerns, and general
anxiety.
Similar findings about gender differences for rumination factors have recently
emerged. Treynor et al. (2003) found significant gender differences for the two
rumination factors of reflective pondering and brooding as well as depression, with
women showing significantly higher means than men on all three variables. Treynor and
her associates concluded that previous findings that indicated that rumination mediated
the relationship between gender and depression may actually be due to the brooding
component of rumination rather than the reflective pondering component. However, the
relationship among gender, worry factors, and anxiety remains virtually unexplored; very
little research has examined the relationship among gender, rumination factors, and
depression, and no study to date has examined gender differences while jointly
considering both worry and rumination.

Research Questions, Hypotheses, and Analyses

Based on the review of the literature, this study seeks to address several questions
related to predominant measures of worry and rumination. First, given that research has
documented different multifactorial structure for selected worry and rumination
measures, one of the purposes of this study involved identifying which model provides
the best fit for the data. It was hypothesized that a two-factor model of the PSWQ would
provide a better fit for the data compared to one-factor models. Additionally, it was
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expected that the SWQ-30 (Osman et al., 2001) would consist of six distinct factors—
Worrisome Thinking, Financial-related Concerns, Significant Others’ Well-being, Social
Adequacy Concerns, Academic Concerns, and General Anxiety Symptoms. It was also
hypothesized that the AnTI (Wells, 1994) would consist of three distinct factors—Social
Worries, Health Concerns, and Metaworry.
Based on the research related to specific rumination measures, it was
hypothesized that the RRS (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) would consist of three
distinct factors—depression-related items, brooding items, and reflection items).
Additionally, it was expected that the RRQ (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999) would consist
of two distinct factors—a rumination factor and a reflection factor.
This study also sought to determine if the best-fit models derived from the
specific worry and rumination measures would display invariance across gender. It was
hypothesized that measurement models for each of the measures would remain invariant
across gender.
Finally, this study examined whether the summated latent variable scores derived
from the specific worry and rumination measures differentially predicted concurrent
anxiety and depression scores for men and women. Given that the extant literature has
identified considerable construct overlap between worry and rumination, no specific
hypotheses were tested.
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CHAPTER III
METHODS

Participants

Two independent samples of college students were recruited in the fall (n = 260)
and spring (n = 305) semesters of the 2007-2008 academic year, and participants
completed questionnaire packets that included demographic information and research
measures. Completed questionnaires were screened for missing data, and packets were
eliminated if participants failed to complete any item (except demographic information)
on any measure. Sixty-three questionnaire packets were excluded from data analysis due
to missing information (fall = 16, spring = 47), leaving 244 complete cases in the fall
sample and 258 complete cases in the spring sample (N = 502). The two samples did not
differ in terms of gender, χ2(1, N =502) = 3.03, p = .08; ethnicity, χ2(5, N = 502) = 8.81, p
= .12; or religious affiliation, χ2(5, N = 497) = 2.31, p = .81. However, the samples
displayed significant differences in age, marital status, and educational level. The fall
sample included a wider age range (M = 21.80, SD = 5.90; ages 18 – 52) than did the
spring sample (M = 19.98, SD = 2.45; ages 17 – 37), t(319.96) = 4.47, p = .000. A
significantly greater number of participants in the fall sample were married, divorced, or
widowed (n = 52) than were participants in the spring sample (n = 22), χ2(3, N = 498) =
18.37, p = .000). Similarly, the fall sample included a proportionally greater number of
non-Freshmen students (68.9%) than did the spring sample (39.6%), χ2(5, N = 497) =
71.19, p = .000. The demographic characteristics of the sample are presented in Table 1.
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Table 1
Demographic Characteristics
Fall
N
%
Gender
Male
Female
Ethnicity
European American/White
African American
Hispanic/Latino
Asian or Asian American
Native American
Other
Not Specified
Marital Status
Single
Married
Divorced, Not Remarried
Widowed
Not Specified
Education Level
Freshman
Sophomore
Junior
Senior
Graduate Student
Not Specified
Religious Affiliation
Protestant
Catholic
LDS (Mormon)
Buddhist
Other
Not Specified

Spring
N
%

Combined
N
%

81
163

(33.2)
(66.8)

105
153

(40.7)
(59.3)

186
316

(37.1)
(62.9)

224

(91.8)

11
4

(4.5)
(1.6)

5

(2.0)

224
5
9
5
3
8
4

(86.8)
(1.0)
(3.5)
(1.9)
(1.2)
(3.1)
(1.6)

448
5
20
9
3
13
4

(89.2)
(1.0)
(4.0)
(1.8)
(0.6)
(2.6)
(0.8)

192
45
6
1

(78.7)
(18.4)
(2.5)
(0.4)

232
16
6

(89.9)
(6.2)
(2.3)

4

(1.6)

424
61
12
1
4

(84.5)
(12.2)
(2.4)
(0.2)
(0.8)

78
48
65
45
7
1

(32.0)
(19.7)
(26.6)
(18.4)
(2.9)
(0.4)

152
65
24
11
1
5

(58.9)
(25.2)
(9.3)
(4.3)
(0.4)
(2.0)

230
113
89
56
8
6

(45.8)
(22.5)
(17.7)
(11.2)
(1.6)
(1.2)

7
5
210
1
20
1

(2.9)
(2.0)
(86.1)
(0.4)
(8.2)
(0.4)

11
9
208
2
22
6

(4.3)
(3.5)
(80.6)
(0.2)
(8.5)
(2.3)

18
14
418
3
42
7

(3.6)
(2.8)
(83.3)
(0.6)
(8.4)
(1.4)
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Data Collection Procedures

Participants were recruited from several undergraduate and graduate courses at a
large western university. All participants were entered in a random drawing for music or
book gift certificates in exchange for participation, and a portion of the students also
received extra credit from course instructors in exchange for participation. Participants
attended a single research session, where the researcher introduced the study as an
investigation of the relationship between an individual’s thought processes and reported
feelings of anxiety and/or depression. After providing informed consent, all participants
completed a questionnaire packet that included a demographic information form followed
by the research measures. The order of administration of the research measures was
counterbalanced across participants in the overall sample.

Measures

Demographic Information
Participants completed a brief background questionnaire constructed for the
present study detailing age, gender, ethnic background, marital status, current education
level, and religious affiliation.

Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ)
The PSWQ is a 16-item self-report questionnaire designed to assess the frequency
and intensity of general worry. Each item is rated on a scale of 1 (“not at all typical of
me”) to 5 (“very typical of me”). Possible scores range from 16 to 80, with high scores
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representing greater reported levels of general worry. Five of the questionnaire items (1,
3, 8, 10, and 11) are reverse scored to minimize the effects of acquiescence.
The PSWQ has demonstrated good psychometric properties in previous research.
In Meyer et al.’s (1990) initial validations studies, the PSWQ demonstrated criterion
validity in that the measure differentiated between two anxiety disorder groups and
among different levels of GAD. Results from the initial validation studies (Meyer et al.,
1990) also indicated that the measure displayed high reliability estimates among college
populations with reported alpha coefficients ranging from .91 to .95 in four separate
studies. Subsequent research across nonclinical, clinical, and community samples
produced reliability estimates ranging from .86 to .95 (Borkovec, 1994; Brown et al.,
1992; Davey, 1993; van Rijsoort et al., 1999). The PSWQ also demonstrated adequate
test-retest reliability estimates over 2 to 10 weeks (r = .74 - .92) in college samples
(Meyer et al., 1990; Molina & Borkovec, 1994; Stöber, 1998a). The Chronbach’s
coefficient alpha for the current sample was 0.94. Meyer et al. (1990) reported presented
evidence of validity for the PSWQ as a measure for assessing trait worry.

Student Worry Questionnaire-30 (SWQ-30)
The SWQ-30 (Osman et al., 2001) is a 30-item self-report measure intended for
use with college undergraduates. The SWQ-30 taps the process of worrying, the specific
content of worry, and the physical/somatic symptoms of worry. Each item is rated on a
scale of 0 (“Almost never characteristic of me”) to 4 (“Almost always characteristic of
me”). The SWQ-30 includes six scales: Worrisome Thinking (WST), Financial-Related
Concerns (FRC), Significant Others’ Well-Being (SOW), Social Adequacy Concerns
(SAC), Academic Concerns (ACA), and General Anxiety Symptoms (GAS). The WST
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scale assesses the act of worrying and is similar to the general worry component assessed
by the PSWQ. The FRC, SOW, SAC, and ACA scales tap specific worry contents
relevant to college students. The GAS scale assesses general physical/somatic symptoms
associated with worry. Osman et al. (2001) and Carter (2002) reported convergent and
content validity based on correlations between the SWQ-30 and measures of trait anxiety
and worry. Both Osman et al. and Carter reported Cronbach alpha values ranging from
.80 (GAS) to .94 (SOW) on the individual scales and an alpha value of .94 for the total
score. In the current sample, the SWQ-30 demonstrated strong alpha coefficients for the
six individual scales: WST (.90), FRC (.87), SOW (.92), SAC (.86, ACA(.88), and GAS
(.83). The coefficient alpha for the total score in this sample was .94.

Anxious Thoughts Inventory (AnTI)
The AnTI (Wells, 1994) is a 22-item measure of trait worry that assesses social
worry, health worry, and meta-worry. Each items is rated on a scale of 1 (“almost
never”) to 4 (“almost always”). Possible scores range from 22 to 88, with high scores
representing greater severity. Wells (1994, 2000) generated the initial item pool for the
AnTI from interviews with patients diagnosed with panic disorder and GAD. Additional
items were based on items from the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward,
Mendelsohn, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961), the Maudsley Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory
(as cited in Wells, 2000), and a trait anxiety subscale. Wells then utilized student
samples to develop the final three-factor measure.
According to Wells (2000), the social and health subscales assess worry content,
whereas the meta-worry subscale assesses process dimensions of worry and
metacognitions or “worry about worry” (p. 113). According to Wells (2006a), the AnTI
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displayed adequate convergent validity with the PSWQ, and the AnTI metaworry
subscale correlated with the Meta-Worry Questionnaire (MWQ; Wells, 2005), another
measure of metaworry. Additionally, Wells (2006a) reported adequate construct validity
as evidenced by correlations with other anxiety measures. Wells (2006a) cited higher
scores on the health subscale in panic disorder groups and higher scores on the social
subscale in social phobic groups as evidence of discriminative validity. Wells and Carter
(2001) reported adequate alpha coefficients for each of these subscales: social worry
(.84), health worry (.81), and meta-worry (.75). Wells and Carter also reported test-retest
reliabilities for the three subscales over a six-week period: social worry (.76), health
worry (.84), and meta-worry (.77). In this sample, the social, health, and metaworry
subscales of the AnTI achieved internal consistency reliability estimates of .87, .82, and
.83, respectively, and the alpha coefficient for the total scale equaled .91.

Ruminative Responses Scale of the Response Styles Questionnaire
The Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991), one
of the subscales derived from the original RSQ (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991),
consists of 22 items that address meanings typically associated with rumination, feelings
related to depressed mood, symptoms experienced when depressed, and causes
underlying depressed mood (Luminet, 2004). Respondents rate each item on a scale of 1
(“almost never”) to 4 (“almost always”). Possible scores range from 22 to 88, with high
scores representing greater reported levels of ruminative thinking.
Roberts et al. (1998) and Kasch, Klein, and Lara (2001) provided evidence of
convergent validity with emotion-focused coping, negative temperament, self-criticism,
and neuroticism. Roberts et al. (1998) found evidence of convergent validity in terms of

68
current and lifetime depressive symptoms, but evidence of predictive validity in terms of
later reports of depressive symptoms has been mixed (Bagby et al., 1999; Just & Alloy,
1997; Kasch et al., 2001; Luminet, 2004). Previous research has indicated that the scale
displayed high internal consistency, with Chronbach alphas ranging from .88 to .92
(Bagby et al., 1999; Just & Alloy, 1997; Nolan et al., 1998; Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis,
1999; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1994, 1999; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). NolenHoeksema et al. (1993) reported a stable intraclass correlation (.75, p < .0001) for the
RRS across five interviews during an 18-month period. For the present sample, the alpha
coefficient for the 22-item scale equaled .94.
Based on concerns about item overlap with depressive content, Treynor et al.
(2003) used previously-collected data (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1999) and revised the
RRS to eliminate potentially confounding items. The resulting abbreviated version of the
RRS consisted of two factors: a reflection factor (Items 7, 11, 12, 20, and 21) that related
to problem-solving efforts and a brooding factor (Items 5, 10, 13, 15, and 16) that related
to anxious or negative thoughts. Treynor et al. reported a coefficient alpha for the
reflection factor of .72, with a test-retest correlation of .60 after approximately one year.
They reported a coefficient alpha for the brooding factor of .77, with a test-retest
correlation of .62 after approximately one year. The alpha coefficient for the five-item
(7, 11, 12, 20, and 21) reflection factor in the current sample equaled .70, and the alpha
coefficient for the five-item (5, 10, 13, 15, and 16) brooding factor equaled .80.

Rumination-Reflection Questionnaire (RRQ)
Trapnell and Campbell (1999) distinguished between ruminative and reflective
self-focus based on the distinction between neuroticism and openness to experience
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dimensions of the five-factor model of personality. They subsequently developed a
questionnaire to assess ruminative and reflective traits. After reviewing the neuroticismrelated literature, Trapnell and Campbell included rumination items that incorporated
recurrent thinking associated with negative affective states such as anxiety, depression,
and anger. Their conceptualization of rumination closely corresponded to Martin and
Tesser’s (1996) definition of rumination. Trapnell and Campbell also included items that
assessed a more adaptive self-focus or reflection. The reflective items represented traits
associated with openness to experience such as intellectual curiosity and “pleasurable,
intrinsic interest in abstract or philosophical thinking” (p. 292). The final version of the
Rumination-Reflection Questionnaire or RRQ included 24 items, 12 items that assess
ruminative self-focus and 12 items that assess more adaptive self-curiosity and reflective
thinking. Respondents rate each item on a scale ranging from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 5
(“strongly agree”). Five items on the reflection scale are reverse scored (13, 14, 17, 20,
and 24), whereas three items on the rumination factor are reverse scored (6, 9, and 10).
Trapnell and Campbell examined construct validity and reported that the rumination scale
displayed a strong positive relationship with markers of neuroticism while the reflection
scale demonstrated the strongest positive relationship with openness to experience.
Trapnell and Campbell reported good internal consistency with a Cronbach’s alpha of .91
for the reflection factor and .90 for the rumination factor. In addition, the two factors
displayed minimal correlations with each other (r = .22, direct oblimin rotation). For this
sample, Cronbach’s alpha for the reflection factor equaled .89, and the alpha coefficient
for the rumination factor equaled .90.
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Beck Depression Inventory
The BDI (Beck et al., 1961) is a 21-item questionnaire that assesses the affective,
cognitive, behavioral, and somatic symptoms of depression. Each item includes four
statements that respondents rate from 0 to 3 in terms of perceived intensity. In a metaanalysis of the psychometric properties of the BDI, Beck, Steer, and Garbin (1988)
reported evidence of concurrent validity from a total of 35 studies that included
correlations between the BDI and other depression measures. Additionally, Beck et al.
(1988) summarized multiple studies that support the construct validity of the BDI. In
terms of reliability, they reported an average internal consistency coefficient of .86 for
psychiatric patients and .81 for nonpsychiatric patients. Cronbach’s alpha for this sample
equaled .90.

Beck Anxiety Inventory
The BAI (Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988) is a 21-item questionnaire that
assesses the severity of anxiety. Beck et al. derived the BAI items from three self-report
measures that assessed anxiety (Beck & Steer, 1993). Respondents rate descriptive
statements of anxiety symptoms on a 4-point scale ranging from 0 (“Not at all”) to 3
(“Severely, I could barely stand it”). The maximum score is 63 points. Beck and Steer
noted that content validity of the BAI was addressed by inclusion of symptoms
representative of anxiety, especially those for panic disorder and GAD. Additionally,
Beck and Steer reported ample support for convergent, construct, discriminant, and
factorial validity. Initial validations studies (Beck et al., 1988) reported high internal
consistency estimates, with coefficient alphas of .92 in a sample of outpatients and .94 in
a clinical sample. Chronbach alphas for other clinical samples ranged from .85 to .93
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(Beck & Steer, 1993). Test-retest correlations after one week equaled .75, p < .001 (Beck
& Steer, 1993). Cronbach’s alpha for this sample equaled .91.

Data Analysis

Pre-analysis data screening. After elimination of cases with missing data,
preparation for structural equation model testing in the Analysis of Moment Structures
(AMOS 17) involved review of the inter-item correlation matrices to ensure that all
summative items displayed positive correlations. Additionally, data screening included
examination of linear regression scatterplots (with case numbers entered as the dependent
variable) and normal and detrended probability plots. Examination of skewness and
kurtosis statistics supplemented visual inspection of the plots. Normality checks of
skewness and kurtosis statistics and Mardia’s coefficient of multivariate kurtosis
indicated that the samples for both worry measures, the PSWQ and the SWQ-30 (Osman
et al., 2001), and for both rumination measures, the RRQ (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999)
and the RRS (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) did not meet the underlying
assumption of normality. The distribution of scores from the AnTI displayed similar
nonnormal characteristics. Square root, logarithm, and squared transformations of data
(Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010) failed to resolve concerns about normality,
especially in regard to multivariate kurtosis. Therefore, subsequent confirmatory factor
analytic (CFA) models were estimated using Bollen-Stine bootstrap procedures with
Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation.
Model testing. All CFA models of the worry and rumination measures were
tested based on bootstrapped maximum-likelihood estimation procedures using the

72
AMOS program, and all analyses were performed on the variance-covariance matrix.
The metric of each latent variable was set by fixing one factor loading to 1. For initial
model comparisons, all other parameters were freely estimated. For subsequent testing
for measurement invariance across gender, equality constraints were applied across
groups, starting with factor loadings and applying increasing restrictive constraints as
outlined by Byrne (2010).
Given that the data collected in this study violated underlying assumptions of
normality (e.g., kurtosis), subsequent evaluation of model fit utilized the Bollen-Stine
bootstrap p value and bootstrap adjusted chi-square and goodness-of-fit statistics.
Assessment of goodness of fit for the hypothesized (default) models utilized multiple fit
indexes including the chi-square (χ2) statistic with the Bollen-Stine bootstrap p value and
the χ2 likelihood ratio statistic (shown as CMIN/DF in AMOS). Schumacker and Lomax
(2004) noted that χ2 likelihood values of 5 or less indicated adequate fit, while Kline
(2005) recommended values of 3 or less as indicators of good fit. However, Garson
(2008) noted that values less than 1 represented poor model fit.
Based on research precedents (Byrne, Stewart, Kennard, & Lee, 2007) and
Blunch (2008), CFA models were also evaluated for goodness of fit based on the
Comparative Fit Index (CFI), the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation or RMSEA
(Browne & Cudeck, 1993), the Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR), and
the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI). CFI values of .95 or more suggest good fit (Byrne et al.,
2007). RMSEA has several advantages as a measure of fit because it approximates a
noncentral chi-square distribution, which does not require a true null hypothesis or
perfect fit in the population (Kline, 2005). RMSEA also includes a correction for model
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complexity and sample size. By convention, models with RMSEA values less than or
equal to .08 represent adequate fit, while models with values less than or equal to 0.05
represent good fit (Shumacker & Lomax, 2004). Models with values greater than .10
should not be accepted (Blunch, 2008). Confidence intervals (90% level) for the
RMSEA values are included with the measures of fit. MacCallum, Browne, and
Sugawara (1996) used a value of .05 to determine close model fit. Confidence intervals
values below .05 suggest good model fit, whereas confidence intervals that encompass
.05 suggest adequate fit. The PCLOSE statistic tests the null that the population RMSEA
is no greater than .05. If PCLOSE is less than .05, one may reject the null and conclude
that the computed RMSEA is greater than .05 and indicative of a poor fit (Garson, 2008).
The SRMR reflects the overall difference between observed and predicted correlations
derived from the covariance matrixes (Kline, 2005). SRMR values of .10 or less indicate
adequate fit (Kline, 2005), although Hu and Bentler (1999) suggested values close to .08.
The TLI provided another measure of relative fit, and values exceeding .95 indicate good
fit (Byrne, 2001). Although Hu and Bentler recommended a two-index strategy for
evaluating model fit, this study adopted recommendations from Fan and Sivo (2005) and
considered convergence of multiple fit indexes in the assessment of model fit. Table 2
summarizes criteria for evaluating goodness of model fit and cut points for differentiating
between adequate and good models. In addition to goodness-of-fit indexes, the
Consistent Akaike Information Criterion (CAIC) and the Expected Cross-Validation
Index (ECVI) values were included when alternative non-nested models were compared
(Browne & Cudeck, 1993; Byrne, 2010). Lower values indicate a higher probability of
model replication.
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Table 2
Criteria for Evaluating CFA Model Fit
Model Fit
Criterion

Adequate

Good

CMIN/DF

<5

<3

CFI

> .90

> .95

TLI

> .90

> .95

RMSEA

< .08

< .05

Interval includes .05

Interval values < .05

< .10

< .08

RMSEA Confidence Intervals
SRMR
PCLOSE

> .05

Note. CMIN/DF = χ2 likelihood ratio statistic; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; TLI =
Tucker-Lewis Index; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation, SRMR =
Standardized Root Mean Square Residual; PCLOSE = p value for testing close fit
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS

Factorial Validity of Worry Measures

The Penn State Worry Questionnaire
Confirmatory factor analyses. Since researchers have not yet reached
consensus regarding the factor structure of the PSWQ, the first research question in this
study involved the comparative fit of different measurement models presented in the
literature. To assess the comparative fit of different PSWQ models, this study examined
five a priori CFA measurement models: 1) the 16-item, one-factor model originally
conceptualized by Meyer et al. (1990), 2) the 16-item, two-factor model that included a
factor consisting of positively-worded items and a factor consisting of negatively-worded
items (Carter et al., 2005; Fresco, Frankel, et al., 2002; Fresco, Heimberg, et al., 2002;
Hopko et al., 2003; Olatunji et al., 2007), 3) a 15-item, one-factor model that omitted
Item 1 based on findings from the Brown et al. (1992) and van Rijsoort et al. (1999)
studies, 4) an 11-item, one-factor model consisting of all positively-worded items (2, 4, 5,
6, 7, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16), and 5) an abbreviated 8-item, one-factor model consisting
of the positively-worded items (2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 12, and 13) retained by Hopko and his
colleagues (2003). Given’s Brown’s (2003) assertion that the two-factor model allowed
for error variance associated with negatively-worded items, it was hypothesized that the
two-factor solution would provide better fit than the 16-item, one-factor model.
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Descriptive statistics. Univariate normality in the sample was assessed through
examination of the absolute skewness and kurtosis standardized (Z) values, with
skewness Z-values greater than │3.00│and kurtosis Z-values greater than │10.00│
suggesting univariate nonnormality (Kline, 2005). Additionally, multivariate kurtosis
was assessed by examining the multivariate Z-value, with values greater than│5.00│
suggesting multivariate nonnormality (Byrne, 2010). The means, standard deviations,
skewness, and kurtosis values for the 16 items comprising the PSWQ are reported in
Table 3, with results indicating significant nonnormality in the distribution of scores in
terms of skewness and multivariate kurtosis.

Table 3
Means, Standard Deviations, Skewness, Kurtosis, and Z-values for the PSWQ
Variable

Mean

SD

Skew

Z-value

Kurtosis

Z-value

Item 1
Item 2
Item 3
Item 4
Item 5
Item 6
Item 7
Item 8
Item 9
Item 10
Item 11
Item 12
Item 13
Item 14
Item 15
Item 16

3.49
2.24
3.35
2.29
2.32
2.91
2.13
3.12
2.43
3.92
2.93
2.29
2.67
1.96
1.91
2.95

1.08
1.01
1.16
1.03
1.18
1.12
1.12
1.10
1.07
1.09
1.16
1.24
1.19
0.99
1.05
1.15

-.54
.78
-.29
.57
.62
.24
.90
-.02
.62
-.59
.00
.72
.36
.97
1.16
.25

-.4.92
7.09
-2.62
5.20
5.67
2.17
8.21
-.13
5.62
-5.42
.03
6.58
3.25
8.91
10.57
2.32

-.43
.29
-.90
-.25
-.54
-.66
.16
-.83
-.12
-.81
-.94
-.48
-.70
.56
.77
-.61

-1.98
1.35
-4.13
-1.16
-2.47
-3.01
.75
-3.79
-.56
-3.69
-4.28
-2.18
-3.21
2.56
3.51
-2.79

48.04

22.42

Multivariate
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Comparative fit of the PSWQ models. The goodness-of-fit statistics for the
different PSWQ models are provided in Table 4. The results indicated that all five a
priori models displayed significant bootstrapped χ2 values. Models 1 and 2 represented
nested models, and Model 1, the 16-item, unifactorial model originally proposed by
Meyer et al. (1990), served as a baseline model for comparison with Model 2, the twofactor model identified in several previous studies (Brown, 2003; Fresco, Heimberg, et
al., 2002; Hazlett-Stevens et al., 2004; Olatunji et al., 2007). As hypothesized, Model 2
provided significantly better fit than Model 1 (Δχ2 (1) = 143.96, p < .001), but the fit
indexes for both Models 1 and 2 did not meet the criterion cutoffs indicative of good fit.
Given the evidence that the negatively-worded items contributed to model misfit
(Brown, 2003), one would expect improvement in model fit with partial or complete
elimination of the negatively-worded items. However, the RMSEA values for the 15item and 11-item unifactorial models (Models 3 and 4, respectively) exceeded the .08
criterion, and the PCLOSE values did not exceed .05. Model 5, the 8-item, unifactorial
model presented by Hopko et al. (2003), met criterion cutoffs established for good fit in
terms of CMIN/DF values slightly less than 3, CFI and TLI statistics greater than .95, and
a PCLOSE statistic greater than .05. The RMSEA value exceeded the .05 cutoff value
established as a criterion for good fit.
Model modification. Although the 8-item, single-factor model (Model 5)
introduced by Hopko et al. (2003) provided the best fit among the different models, the
fit statistics for the abbreviated scale suggested that the model still potentially contained
points of strain (e.g., RMSEA > .05). Since Hopko et al. fitted their 8-item model to
data collected from a clinical sample of elderly adults (M = 66.6 years, SD = 6.5 years)

Table 4
Goodness-of-Fit Statistics From Related to the Penn State Worry Questionnaire CFA Models
Models

B-S χ2

df

p

CMIN/
DF

CFI

TLI

RMSEA

90% CI

SRMR

PCLOSE
χ2 diff

16-item, one- vs two-factor nested models
1)
2)

One-factor
Two-factor

510.81

104

.00

4.91

.92

.91

.09

(.08 - .10)

.05

.00

366.85

103

.00

3.56

.95

.94

.07

(.06 - .08)

.04

.00

Unifactorial, nonnested models

143.96***

Δ df

1

CAIC

ECVI

1)

16-item

510.81

104

.00

4.91

.92

.91

.09

(.08 - .10)

.05

.00

741.81

1.15

3)

15-item

467.45

90

.00

5.19

.92

.91

.09

(.08 - .10)

.05

.00

684.00

1.05

4)

11-item

220.70

44

.00

5.02

.95

.94

.09

(.08 - .10)

.04

.00

379.50

.53

5)

8-item

59.43

20

.01

2.97

.98

.98

.06

(.05 - .08)

.03

.12

174.93

.18

Note. B-S χ2 = Bollen-Stine bootstrap adjusted chi-square; CMIN/DF = χ2 likelihood ratio statistic; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; TLI
= Tucker-Lewis Index; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation, SRMR = Standardized Root Mean Square Residual;
PCLOSE = p value for testing close fit; CAIC = Consistent Akaike Information Criterion; ECVI = Expected Cross-Validation Index.
Bolded model indicates best comparative fit and model retained for modification/invariance testing.
*** p < .001
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and this sample involved nonclinical college students, the modification indexes and the
standardized residual covariances for the 8 items were examined to determine whether
model respecification would improve fit. The modification statistics associated with the
regression weights and covariances indicated possible content overlap between Items 12
(“I have been a worrier all my life”) and 13 (“I notice that I have been worrying about
things”), and the highest standardized residual covariance (2.15) occurred between these
same items. Freely estimating the error covariance between Items 12 and 13 resulted in a
statistically significant improvement in model fit (Δχ2(1) = 22.00, p < .00), and the
modified model displayed good fit statistics for the entire sample (χ2(19) = 37.43, BollenStine bootstrap p = .11; CMIN/DF = 1.97, CFI = .99, TLI = .99, RMSEA = .04, SRMR
= .02, PCLOSE = .66). Model modification appeared justified given the redundancy
between Items 12 and 13 and the statistical significance of the added error covariance
parameter. The modified model that included the added error covariance was retained for
subsequent testing for invariance across gender.
Prior to testing for invariance across gender, separate models were conducted to
test adequate fit for men (n = 186) and for women (n = 316). The results indicated good
fit for men (χ2(19) = 21.00, Bollen-Stine bootstrap p = .72; CMIN/DF = 1.11, CFI = 1.00,
TLI = 1.00, RMSEA = .02, SRMR = .03, PCLOSE = .78) and good fit for women (χ2 (19)
= 31.63, Bollen-Stine bootstrap p = .22; CMIN/DF = 1.67, CFI = .99, TLI = 1.00,
RMSEA = .05, SRMR = .02, PCLOSE = .56). The factor loadings and factor
determinants for the total sample, men, and women are presented in Table 5.
Examination of correlations between the full PSWQ and the abbreviated model indicated
that scores from the 8-item, abbreviated model were highly correlated with scores from
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Table 5
Standardized Regression Weights for the Abbreviated PSWQ

Item
2 My worries overwhelm me
4 Many situations make me worry
5 I know I shouldn’t worry about things, but
I just cannot help it
6 When I am under pressure I worry a lot
7 I am always worrying about something
9 As soon as I finish one task, I start to
worry about everything else I have to do
12 I’ve been a worrier all my life
13 I notice that I have been worrying about
things
Factor determinants
Mean
SD

Total
Sample

Men

Women

.77
.84

.69
.83

.79
.84

.88
.74
.80

.84
.74
.72

.90
.73
.84

.68
.59

.59
.57

.70
.59

.72

.76

.70

.05
19.28
7.07

.03
17.52
6.35

.05
20.32
7.28

Note. All standardized regression weights significant (p < .001). Mean and standard
deviation (SD) derived from summing items.

the 16-item PSWQ (r = .97 for total sample, r = .96 for men, and r = .97 for women, all
ps < .01), suggesting that the modified model still represented the underlying worry
construct tapped by the full-length PSWQ.
Tests of invariance across gender for the modified PSWQ. Gender invariance
in the modified 8-item model of the PSWQ was conducted following guidelines outlined
by Byrne and her colleagues (Byrne, 2010; Byrne, Shavelson, & Muthén, 1989). The
process involved sequential examination of configural invariance (reference model) and
measurement invariance that included examination of factor loadings invariance, and
factor variance-covariance invariance, and item uniqueness or error invariances.
Additionally, this study examined the invariance of the latent mean structure that
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involved sequential examination of factor loadings invariance (reference model), item
intercepts (scalar) invariance, and latent means invariance. Accordingly, invariance
across gender was first tested by conducting a simultaneous analysis of data from both
men and women to evaluate the equality of the modified model between genders. The
results indicated that the simultaneous reference model provided a good fit for the data
(χ2(38) = 52.63, Bollen-Stine bootstrap p = .46; CMIN/DF = 1.39, CFI = .99, TLI = .99,
RMSEA = .03, SRMR = .03, PCLOSE = .99), which provided support for the configural
invariance of the model.
Given the evidence of satisfactory model fit derived from the simultaneous
analysis of multigroup data, measurement invariance across gender was assessed by
constraining the factor loadings, factor variance, and the error covariance between Items
12 and 13 equal across genders. Although Byrne (2004, 2010) noted that invariance
testing generally excludes testing for the equality of error covariance across groups,
testing the error covariance between Items 12 and 13 appeared justified given the
apparent overlap in item content and the statistically significant degree of error
covariance between the items. Comparison of the fully-constrained measurement model
(χ2(47) = 77.39) with the baseline model (χ2(38) = 52.63) resulted in a significant change in
chi-square (Δχ2(9) = 24.76, p = .00), which suggested that the measurement model did not
remain invariant across men and women. Sequential application of equality constraints
to the factor loadings indicated that Items 4, 6, 9, 12, and 13 were invariant across
gender. However, Item 2 (“My worries overwhelm me”), Item 5 (“I know I should not
worry about things, but I just cannot help it”), and Item 7 (“I am always worrying about
something”) demonstrated variance across gender in that women displayed higher item
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means than men in the sample. Constraining the invariant factor loadings and the
variance on the latent worry variable resulted in a nonsignificant change in chi-square
(Δχ2(6) = 10.11, p = .12, ns), which indicated that only factor loadings on Items 2, 5, and 7
displayed significant group differences within the measurement model. Additional
invariance testing indicated that the error covariance between Items 12 and 13 remained
invariant across gender.
Latent mean structure invariance tests were conducted wherein the invariant
measurement parameters and the item intercepts were constrained to be equal, and the
latent variable mean was constrained at zero for men. Comparison of the mean structure
model (χ2(51) = 78.35) with the baseline multigroup model (χ2(38) = 52.63) resulted in a
nonsignificant change in chi-square (Δχ2(13) = 25.72, p = .02), suggesting that the
intercepts were not invariant across gender. Examination of the modification indexes
indicated that the intercept associated with Item 6 (“When I am under pressure I worry a
lot”) contributed to invariance across gender, with women displaying higher intercepts.
Relaxing the constraint on the intercept for Item 6 resulted in a nonsignificant difference
between the constrained model and the unconstrained baseline multigroup model (Δχ2 (12)
= 16.88, p = .15, ns). These results suggested that the abbreviated PSWQ demonstrated
partial scalar invariance. Examination of the latent group means indicated that women in
this sample scored significantly higher (p < .00) on the latent dimension of worry than
did men (unstandardized M difference = .30, z = 3.86).
Taken together, the results of the sequential invariance testing provided support
for the configural model of the abbreviated PSWQ. Additionally, the results of the
invariance testing indicated that the abbreviated model examined in this study displayed
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partial measurement invariance across gender in terms of factor loadings on the latent
worry variable for Items 2, 5, and 7. The abbreviated PSWQ displayed partial scalar
invariance in that group differences emerged in terms of the intercept for Item 6. Group
differences also occurred in the latent mean, with women scoring significantly higher on
the latent worry variable. The invariance tests for the abbreviated, 8-item PSWQ are
summarized in Table 6.

Table 6
Overview of Invariance Tests Across Gender for the Abbreviated PSWQ
χ2

df

Δ
χ2

1) Baseline multigroup model

52.63

38

---

---

---

2) Factor loadings and error covariance
constrained equal

72.53

46

22.90

8

.00

3) Factor loadings 4, 6, 9, 12, and 13
constrained equal

61.49

42

8.86

4

.06 (ns)

4) Invariant factor loadings and error
covariance constrained equal

62.08

43

9.54

5

.09 (ns)

6) Invariant factor loadings, variance, and
error covariance constrained equal

62.74

44

10.11

6

.12 (ns)

7) Invariant factor loadings, variance,
error covariance, and intercepts
constrained equal

78.35

51

25.72

13

.02

8) Invariant factor loadings, variance,
error covariance, and intercept for Item 6
relaxed

69.51

50

16.88

12

.15 (ns)

Model Description

Δ
df

Statistical
Significance
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The Student Worry Questionnaire-30
Confirmatory factor analyses. Given the limited research associated with the
factor structure of the SWQ-30, a second research question in this study involved testing
the comparative fit of Osman et al.’s six-factor model of the SWQ-30. Consequently,
this study examined four a priori models: the six-factor model (Model 1) originally
conceptualized by Osman et al. (2001); a higher-order, six-factor model with a latent
worry factor (Model 2); a three-factor model (Model 3) with worry frequency, worry
content, and general anxiety symptom factors; and a two-factor model (Model 4) that
included process (worrisome thinking and general anxiety) and content factors. Based on
previous factor analytic studies (Carter, 2002; Osman et al., 2001), it was hypothesized
that the six-factor model of the SWQ-30 would provide the best fit for the data.
Descriptive statistics. The means, standard deviations, skewness, and kurtosis
values for the 30 items comprising the SWQ-30 are reported in Table 7. The skewness
and kurtosis values indicated significant nonnormality in terms of skewness and
multivariate kurtosis for this sample.
Comparative fit of the SWQ-30 models. The goodness-of-fit statistics from the
SWQ-30 models are provided in Table 8. Both the two-factor and three-factor models
displayed poor fit for the data. As hypothesized, the six-factor model (Model 1) provided
significantly better fit than did the second-order model with a latent worry factor (Model
2). While Model 1 provided significantly better fit than did Model 2, the fit indexes did
not meet the established criterion cutoffs indicative of good fit (e.g., CFI and TLI > .95,
RMSEA < .05), which suggested that the model contained points of misspecification.
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Table 7
Means, Standard Deviations, Skewness, Kurtosis, and Z-values for the SWQ-30
Variable

Mean

SD

Skew

Z-value

Kurtosis

Z-value

Item 1
Item 2
Item 3
Item 4
Item 5
Item 6
Item 7
Item 8
Item 9
Item 10
Item 11
Item 12
Item 13
Item 14
Item 15
Item 16
Item 17
Item 18
Item 19
Item 20
Item 21
Item 22
Item 23
Item 24
Item 25
Item 26
Item 27
Item 28
Item 29
Item 30

1.93
2.64
1.78
1.77
1.56
2.04
2.40
1.38
1.61
1.82
1.41
1.71
1.18
1.07
1.82
1.28
2.39
1.54
1.37
2.43
1.96
1.64
1.93
1.48
1.25
1.69
2.29
1.61
1.73
.88

1.04
.95
1.12
1.28
1.17
1.06
1.10
1.11
1.18
1.13
1.23
1.22
1.12
1.11
1.19
1.09
.98
1.05
1.09
.97
1.14
1.13
1.15
1.11
1.26
1.13
1.21
1.30
1.09
1.21

.04
-.28
.21
.13
.40
-.02
-.20
.52
.32
.18
.56
.25
.81
.86
.21
.71
-.14
.48
.52
-.26
.11
.25
.09
.54
.78
.17
-.35
.37
.22
1.23

.40
-2.56
1.95
1.17
3.66
-.14
-1.79
4.74
2.93
1.63
5.10
2.26
7.44
7.87
1.93
6.49
-1.30
4.38
4.75
-2.41
1.00
2.27
.82
4.98
7.09
1.53
-3.22
3.36
1.98
11.22

-.53
-.43
-.68
-1.08
-.61
-.51
-.67
-.46
-.80
-.68
-.68
-.89
-.02
-.11
-.88
-.12
-.33
-.28
-.38
-.22
-.81
-.66
-.77
-.26
-.48
-.71
-.77
-.94
-.55
.35

-2.40
-1.98
-3.10
-4.93
-2.81
-2.34
-3.06
-2.11
-3.65
-3.10
-3.11
-4.07
-.08
-.52
-4.02
-.56
-1.50
-1.29
-1.75
-1.02
-3.70
-3.04
-3.53
-1.19
-2.21
-3.24
-3.53
-4.28
-2.52
1.58

107.65

27.52

Multivariate

Table 8
Goodness-of-Fit Statistics Related to the Student Worry Questionnaire-30 CFA Models
Models

B-S χ2

df

p

CMIN/
DF

CFI

TLI

RMSEA

90% CI

SRMR

PCLOSE
χ2 diff

30-item nested models

Δ df

1)

Six-factor

1005.20

390

.00

2.58

.94

.93

.06

.05 - .06

.05

.01

2)

Higher Order
Six-factor

1037.28

399

.00

2.60

.93

.93

.06

.05 - .06

.06

.01

32.08***

9

3)

Three-factor

3832.70

402

.00

9.53

.64

.61

.13

.12 - .13

.10

.00

2827.50***

12

4)

Two-factor

4016.21

404

.00

9.94

.62

.59

.13

.13 - .14

.10

.00

3011.02***

14

Note. B-S χ2 = Bollen-Stine bootstrap adjusted chi-square; CMIN/DF = χ2 likelihood ratio statistic; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; TLI
= Tucker-Lewis Index; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation, SRMR = Standardized Root Mean Square Residual;
PCLOSE = p value for testing close fit. Bolded model indicates best comparative fit and model retained for modification and
invariance testing.
*** p < .001
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Model modification. Since the goodness-of-fit statistics associated with the
original six-factor conceptualization of assessed worry (Osman et al., 2001) did not meet
the cutoff criteria for good fit (e.g., CFI and TLI > .95, RMSEA < .05, PCLOSE > .05),
the standardized residual covariance matrix was examined to identify possible points of
misfit. Items were eliminated in a stepwise fashion based on consideration of
modification index values, standardized residual covariances, and conceptual reasoning.
In addition, consideration was given to preserving adequate reliability estimates within
each factor. In total, the post hoc analyses resulted in deletion of one manifest indicator
from each of the latent variables:
Item 18

“It is hard for me not to worry about daily events or situations”
(WorrisomeThinking)

Item 4

“I worry about not having enough money for the basic necessities of
life” (Financial-related Concerns)

Item 26

“I worry about the general well-being of a close family member”
(Significant Others’ Well-being)

Item 6

“I worry about saying the right thing when expressing my opinion in
discussions with other people” (Social Adequacy Concerns)

Item 2

“I worry about getting bad grades in my courses” (Academic
Concerns)

Item 21

“I have trouble concentrating on a task or work when I worry about
things” (General Anxiety Symptoms).

Elimination of Items 2, 4, 6, 18, 21 and 26 left four indicators associated with
each latent variable and resulted in improved model fit (χ2(237) = 467.23, Bollen-Stine
bootstrap p = .00, CMIN/DF = 1.97, CFI = .97, TLI = .96, RMSEA = .04, SRMR = .04,
PCLOSE = .95). The modified, 24-item SWQ-30 model was retained for subsequent
analysis. Separate models were conducted to test adequate fit for men (n = 186) and
women (n = 316), and the results indicated good fit for men (χ2(237) = 338.37, Bollen-
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Stine bootstrap p = .12, CMIN/DF = 1.43, CFI = .96, TLI = .95, RMSEA = .05, SRMR =
.05, PCLOSE = .60). Fit statistics for women showed a significant bootstrapped chisquare value but overall good fit (χ2(237) = 399.44, Bollen-Stine bootstrap p = .00,
CMIN/DF = 1.69, CFI = .97, TLI = .96, RMSEA = .05, SRMR = .04, PCLOSE = .75).
The factor loadings and factor determinants for the total sample, men, and women are
presented in Table 9. Because only six items (Items 2, 4, 6, 18, 21, and 26) were
eliminated during model modification, all correlations between the subscale scores and
total scores on the full, 30-item SWQ-30 and the modified, 24-item SWQ-30 were > .98
(all ps < .01) for the total sample, men, and women.
Tests of invariance across gender for the modified SWQ-30. A simultaneous
analysis of data from both men and women indicated that the modified six-factor model
provided good fit for the data (χ2(474) = 737.95, Bollen-Stine bootstrap p = .00, CMIN/DF
= 1.56, CFI = .96, TLI = .96, RMSEA = .03, SRMR = .05, PCLOSE = 1.00). The results
provided support for the invariance of the configural model, and this multiple group
model provided the baseline for subsequent tests of invariance across gender.
Given the evidence of satisfactory model fit derived from the simultaneous
analysis of multigroup data, a second model was specified wherein all factor loadings
were constrained equal in order to assess measurement invariance across gender, and the
model with constrained factor loadings provided good fit for the data (χ2 (492) = 761.70,
Bollen-Stine bootstrap p = .00, CMIN/DF = 1.55, CFI = .96, TLI = .96, RMSEA = .03,
SRMR = .06, PCLOSE = 1.00). Comparison to the simultaneous baseline model showed
a nonsignificant change in chi-square value (Δχ2 (18) = , p = .16, ns), which indicated that
the factor loadings displayed invariance across gender. The invariant factor loadings
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Table 9
Standardized Regression Weights for the Modified SWQ-30
Item

Full
Sample

Worrisome Thinking
1 I worry a lot about many daily events and
situations in life.
10 I worry a lot about the past and future.
11 I feel like I am worrying about something all
the time.
14 No matter how hard I try, I cannot stop
worrying about something.

Financial Related Concerns
12 I worry about running out of money.
16 I worry about having a major financial crisis.
23 I worry about being financially secure in the
future.
30 I worry about taking out too many loans to pay
for daily expenses
5
8
13
19

Significant Others’ Well-Being
I worry about something terrible happening to
a close family member.
I worry that a close family member might
become seriously ill or injured.
I worry that a close family member might die.
I worry about the physical health of a close
family member

Social Adequacy Concerns
3 I worry about embarrassing myself around
other people (for example, professors,
strangers, other students).
22 I worry about asking other people questions
for fear of sounding dumb.
24 I worry about making a fool of myself around
other people.
29 I worry about what other people think about
me.

Men

Women

.69
.79

.66
.76

.71
.81

.86

.85

.87

.87

.85

.88

.84
.83
.79

.84
.84
.75

.83
.82
.82

.54

.56

.53

.88

.89

.88

.94
.89

.91
.85

.94
.90

.80

.81

.78

.79

.83

.77

.72

.75

.71

.91
.74

.91
.78

.91
.72

(table continues)
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Standardized Regression Weights for the Modified SWQ-30
Item

7
17
20
27

9
15
25
28

Full
Sample
Academic Concerns
I worry about doing poorly on most exams or
projects.
I worry about keeping up with or handling my
academic workload.
I worry about being well prepared for most
exams or projects
I worry about maintaining a minimum grade
point (GPA) each semester.
General Anxiety Symptoms
I feel physically tired and exhausted when I
worry about things.
I feel restless or impatient when I worry about
things.
I experience muscular aches, headaches or
soreness when I worry about things.
My sleep is restless and disturbed when I
worry about things.

Factor determinants
Mean
SD

Men

Women

.80

.81

.79

.80

.75

.82

.84

.85

.83

.63

.54

.66

.76

.62

.81

.74

.74

.76

.71

.61

.71

.62

.62

.61

.00
39.96
16.65

.00
36.09
15.81

.00
42.23
16.74

Note. All standardized regression weights significant (p < .001). Mean and standard
deviation (SD) derived from summing all 24 items.

were subsequently held equal, and the variances associated with each latent variable and
the covariances among the latent variables were constrained equal. The results indicated
that men and women significantly differed in terms of the variances associated with
significant others’ well being (men = .60, women = .76, p = .04) and social adequacy
concerns (men = .78, women = .60, p = .04). Holding the variance constraints equal on
the worrisome thinking, financial-related concerns, academic concerns, and general
anxiety latent variables while relaxing the variance constraints on significant others’ well
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being and social adequacy concerns latent variables resulted in a nonsignificant change in
chi-square (Δ χ2(22) = 34.15, p = .05).
Examination of the covariance among latent variables indicated significant
differences in the covariance between worrisome thinking and academic concerns (p =
.03), with women (r = .59) displaying higher covariance estimates than men (r = .43) or
35% and 18% of the variance between the two variables for women and men,
respectively. Additionally, the covariance between worrisome thinking and general
anxiety symptoms (p = .02) was not invariant in that men (r = .87) displayed higher
covariance estimates than women (r = .77). Relaxing the constraints on the covariance
between worrisome thinking/academic concerns and worrisome thinking/general anxiety
symptom latent variables resulted in a nonsignificant change in chi-square (Δ χ2(35) =
42.32, p = .18). The differences in variances and covariances indicated that the modified
SWQ-30 displayed only partial measurement invariance.
The invariant factor loadings, variances, covariances, and item intercepts were
constrained equal, and the latent variable mean was constrained at zero for men.
Comparison of the mean structure model (χ2(527) = 822.75) with the baseline multigroup
model (χ2(474) = 737.95) resulted in a significant change in chi-square (Δχ2(53) = 84.80, p =
.00), suggesting that the intercepts were not invariant across gender. Examination of the
modification indexes indicated that the intercepts associated with Items 15 and 22
contributed to variance across gender, with men displaying higher intercept estimates on
Item 15 and women displaying higher intercept estimates on Item 22. Relaxing the
constraints on the two intercepts resulted in a nonsignificant chi-square indicating partial
scalar invariance (Δχ2(51) = 63.16, p = .12, ns). Examination of the latent group means
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indicated that women in this sample scored significantly higher on the worrisome
thinking (unstandardized latent M difference = .24, z = 2.57, p = .01), significant others’
well-being (unstandardized latent M difference = .41, z = 5.17, p < .00), academic
concerns (unstandardized latent M difference = .28, z = 3.62, p < .00), and general
anxiety symptoms (unstandardized latent M difference = .43, z = 5.14, p < .00). Table 10
provides a summary of the sequential invariance tests across gender.
In summary, the sequential invariance testing across gender for the modified
SWQ-30 provided support for the configural model. However, variance across gender
emerged within the measurement model in terms the variances associated with the
significant others’ well-being and the social adequacy concerns latent variables.
Additionally, variance across gender occurred in terms the covariances between the
worrisome thinking and general anxiety symptoms latent variables and between the
worrisome thinking and academic concerns latent variables. The modified SWQ-30 also
demonstrated only partial scalar invariance, with the intercepts associated with Items 15
and 22 demonstrating variance across gender. Finally, examination of the latent mean
structure model indicated that women obtained higher means on the worrisome thinking,
significant others’ well-being, academic concerns, and general anxiety symptoms latent
variables.

Anxious Thoughts Inventory
Confirmatory factor analyses. Given the relative paucity of research on the
factorial validity of the AnTI, another research question in this study focused on testing
the comparative fit of the three-factor structure of the measure. Based on Wells’
conceptualization, it was hypothesized that a three-factor model that included health
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worry, social worry, and metaworry dimensions would demonstrate adequate fit for the
data.

Table 10
Overview of Invariance Tests Across Gender for the Modified SWQ-30

Model Description

χ

2

df

Δ
χ2

Δ
df

Statistical
Significance

1) Multigroup baseline model

737.95

474

---

---

---

2) Factor loadings constrained

761.70

492

23.75

18

.16 (ns)

3) Factor loadings and variances
constrained

778.58

498

40.63

24

.02

4) Factor loadings and WST, FRC, ACA,
GAS variances constrained

772.10

496

34.15

22

.05 (ns)

5) Factor loadings, WST, FRC, ACA,
GAS variances, and covariances
constrained

791.62

511

53.67

37

.04

6) Invariant factor loadings, variances,
WST/FRC, WST/SOW, WST/SAC,
FRC/SOW, FRC/SAC, FRC/ACA,
FRC/GAS, SOW/SAC, SOW/ACA,
SOW/GAS, SAC/ACA, SAC/GAS, and
ACA/GAS covariances constrained

780.27

509

42.32

35

.18 (ns)

7) Invariant factor loadings, variances,
and covariances with intercepts
constrained

822.75

527

84.81

53

.00

8) Invariant factor loadings, variances,
and covariances constrained; intercepts
15 and 22 relaxed

801.11

525

63.16

51

.12 (ns)

Note. WST = worrisome thinking, FRC = financial related concerns, SOW = significant
others’ well-being, SAC = social adequacy concerns, ACA = academic concerns, GAS =
general anxiety symptoms
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Descriptive statistics. The means, standard deviations, skewness, and kurtosis
values for the 22-item AnTI are reported in Table 11. The skewness and kurtosis values
indicated significant nonnormality in the distribution of scores for this sample.

Table 11
Means, Standard Deviations, Skewness, Kurtosis, and Z-values for the AnTI
Variable

Mean

SD

Skew

Z-value

Kurtosis

Z-value

Item 1
Item 2
Item 3
Item 4
Item 5
Item 6
Item 7
Item 8
Item 9
Item 10
Item 11
Item 12
Item 13
Item 14
Item 15
Item 16
Item 17
Item 18
Item 19
Item 20
Item 21
Item 22

2.65
1.47
1.61
1.56
1.43
2.00
1.34
1.97
2.29
1.94
1.89
1.92
1.78
1.83
1.27
1.71
2.07
1.81
1.29
1.74
1.59
1.60

.80
.68
80
.81
.72
.87
.65
.87
.93
.95
.87
.80
.82
.84
.62
.79
.84
.89
.61
.78
.85
.86

.09
1.41
1.23
1.33
1.68
.58
2.01
.73
.35
.69
.68
.70
.81
.84
2.56
1.04
.53
.83
2.38
.96
1.32
1.32

.85
12.93
11.28
12.17
15.35
5.28
18.42
6.66
3.23
6.27
6.23
6.43
7.41
7.67
23.43
9.47
4.82
7.61
21.76
8.79
12.02
12.05

-.60
1.80
.91
.93
2.14
-.24
3.61
-.03
-.70
-.53
-.33
.17
-.02
.15
6.49
.70
-.23
-.25
5.97
.65
.79
.80

-2.76
8.21
4.14
4.25
9.78
-1.10
16.52
-.13
-3.18
-2.41
-1.51
.78
-.10
.67
29.68
3.18
-1.07
-1.13
27.32
2.95
3.63
3.68

129.94

44.80

Multivariate
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Comparative fit of the AnTI. The three-factor model of the AnTI exhibited a
significant bootstrapped χ2 value (χ2 = 774.94, Bollen-Stine p = .00); and contrary to the
hypothesis, other goodness-of-fit statistics indicated relatively poor fit (CFI = .87, TLI =
.86, RMSEA = .07, PCLOSE = .00). Given the poor fit of the first-order, three-factor
model and (1994, 2006a) differentiation between Type 1 and Type 2 worry, a post hoc
model including process (Type 1 worry) and content (Type 2 worry) latent variables was
tested. However, the goodness-of-fit statistics showed that the model provided poor fit
for the data (e.g., CFI = .75, TLI = .72, RMSEA = .10). Additionally, another post hoc
model that included a second-order latent worry variable was tested, but the model did
not meet the criterion cutoffs indicative of good fit (e.g., CFI = .87, TLI = .86, RMSEA =
.07).
Model modification. Given that the three-factor model of the AnTI provided a
less than optimal fit for the data, potential points of misspecification were identified
through examination of the modification indexes and the standardized residual covariance
matrix. Standardized residual values greater than │2.00│ were considered indicative of a
problematic residual. Following procedures outlined by Hopko et al. (2003), items were
eliminated from analysis one item at a time until the subsequent model displayed
acceptable fit.
Examination of the modification indexes and residuals showed several
problematic items on the social latent variable, and Items 1, 8, 14, and 20 were
subsequently eliminated. Additionally, Items 10 and 15 were eliminated as indicators on
the health latent variable, and Items 6 and 16 were eliminated as indicators on the
metaworry latent variable. The resulting model still displayed a significant χ2 value but
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demonstrated good fit (χ2(74) = 136.12, Bollen-Stine bootstrap p = .02; CMIN/DF = 1.84,
CFI = .98, TLI = .97, RMSEA = .04, SRMR = .03, PCLOSE = .92). The goodness-of-fit
statistics for the AnTI models are displayed in Table 12. The 14-item, modified threefactor model was retained for further analysis, and separate models were conducted to
test adequate fit in men (n = 186) and women (n = 316). The results indicated good fit
for men (χ2(74) = 104.37, Bollen-Stine bootstrap p = .41, CMIN/DF = 1.41, CFI = .96, TLI
= .95, RMSEA = .05, SRMR = .06, PCLOSE = .57) and for women (χ2 (74) = 131.95,
Bollen-Stine bootstrap p = .02, CMIN/DF = 1.78, CFI = .97, TLI = .96, RMSEA = .05,
SRMR = .04, PCLOSE = .49). The factor loadings and factor determinants for the total
sample, men, and women are presented in Table 13. Examination of bivariate
correlations between each subscale and total scores from the 22-item AnTI and from the
abbreviated, 14-item AnTI were > .92 (all ps < .01) for the total sample, for men, and for
women. The social subscale displayed the lowest correlations (total sample r = .93, men
r = .92, and women r = .93), which is in keeping with the fact that four items were
removed from this subscale during model modification. The results suggested that the
modified model still tapped the underlying constructs included in the full-length AnTI.
Tests of invariance across gender for the modified AnTI. Since no study to
date has examined measurement invariance of the AnTI, this study examined possible
sources of variance across gender in the modified, 14-item three-factor model of the
measure. Invariance across gender was first assessed by conducting a simultaneous
analysis of data from men and women to evaluate the equality of the modified model
between genders. The results indicated that the simultaneous reference model provided a
good fit for the data (χ2(148) = 236.35, Bollen-Stine bootstrap p = .08, CMIN/DF = 1.60,

Table 12
Goodness-of-Fit Statistics Related to the AnTI Models
Models

B-S χ2

df

p

CMIN/
DF

CFI

TLI

RMSEA

90% CI

SRMR

PCLOSE
χ2 diff

22-item nested models
1)

Three-factor

2)

Two-factor

3)

Higher-order,
three factor

Δ df

774.94

206

.00

3.76

.87

.86

.07

.07 - .08

.06

.00

1329.60

208

.00

6.39

.75

.72

.10

.10 - .11

.09

.00

554.66***

2

774.94

206

.00

3.76

.87

.86

.07

.07 - .08

.06

.00

ns

0

Note. B-S χ2 = Bollen-Stine bootstrap adjusted chi-square; CMIN/DF = χ2 likelihood ratio statistic; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; TLI
= Tucker-Lewis Index; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation, SRMR = Standardized Root Mean Square Residual;
PCLOSE = p value for testing close fit. Bolded model indicates best comparative fit and model retained for modification and
invariance testing.
*** p < .001
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Table 13
Standardized Regression Weights for the modified AnTI

Item
Social
2 I think I am a failure
9 I worry about my abilities not living up to
other people’s expectations.
12 I worry that people don’t like me.
17 I worry about my failures and weaknesses.
18 I worry about not being able to cope in life
as adequately as others seem to.
Health
4 If I experience unexpected physical
symptoms I have a tendency to think the
worst possible thing is wrong with me.
5 I have thoughts of becoming seriously ill.
7 I worry about having a heart attack or
cancer.
19 I worry about death.
Metaworry
3 When looking to my future I give more
thought to the negative things than the
positive things that might happen to me.
11 I worry that I cannot control my thoughts
as well as I would like to.
13 I take disappointments so keenly that I
can’t put them out of my mind.
21 I think I am missing out on things in life
because I worry too much.
22 I have repetitive thoughts such as counting
or repeating phrases.

Factor determinacy
Mean
SD

Full
Sample

Men

Women

.72

.68

.74

.68
.61
.79

.70
.59
.76

.66
.62
.81

.78

.78

.78

.66
.82

. 56
.79

.66
.82

.70
.55

.70
.56

.68
.53

.64

.57

.68

.63

.62

.65

.63

.65

.63

.68

.67

.68

.45

.48

.43

.00
23.66
7.01

.00
22.55
6.12

.00
24.31
7.41

Note. All standardized regression weights significant (p < .001). Mean and standard
deviation (SD) derived from summing all 14 items.
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CFI = .96, TLI = .96, RMSEA = .04, SRMR = .06, PCLOSE = 1.00). The results
provided support for the invariance of the configural model and suggested that one model
adequately represented both men and women. This simultaneous, multiple-group model
provided the baseline for subsequent tests of invariance across gender.
Given the evidence of satisfactory model fit derived from the simultaneous
analysis of multigroup data, a second model was specified wherein all factor loadings,
were constrained equal. Comparison of the constrained model (χ2 (159) = 243.72) with the
simultaneous reference model (χ2 (148) = 236.35) produced a nonsignificant change in chisquare (Δχ2(11) = 7.37, p = .77, ns), which indicated that the factor loadings on the social,
health, and metaworry latent variables were invariant across gender. The invariant factor
loadings were subsequently held equal, and the variances associated with each latent
variable and the covariances among the three latent variables were constrained equal.
The results indicated that men and women significantly differed in terms of the variance
on the health latent variable (men = .06, women = .13, p = .00). Holding the variance
constraints on the social worry and metaworry latent variables while relaxing the variance
constraints on the health latent variable resulted in a nonsignificant change in chi-square
(Δ χ2(8) = 6.14, p = .63).
Examination of the covariance among the three latent variables indicated a
significant difference in the covariance between the health and metaworry latent variables
(p = .03), with women (r = .49) demonstrating higher covariance estimates than men (r =
.47) or 24% and 22% of the variance between the health and metaworry latent variables
for women and men, respectively. Relaxing the constraint on the covariance between the
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health and metaworry latent variables resulted in a nonsignificant change in chi-square (Δ
χ215) = 24.57, p = .06).
The invariant factor loadings, variances, covariances and the item intercepts were
constrained equal, and the latent variable mean was constrained at zero for men.
Comparison of the mean structure model (χ2(174) = 282.36) with the baseline multigroup
model (χ2(148) = 236.35) showed a significant change in chi-square (Δχ2 (26) = 46.01, p =
.01), which indicated that men and women differed in terms of item intercepts.
Sequential testing of individual item intercepts indicated group differences in terms of the
intercept associated with Item 21 (“I think I am missing out on things in life because I
worry too much”), with women displaying the highest intercepts. Relaxing the constraint
on the intercept for Item 21 resulted in a nonsignificant change in chi-square indicating
partial scalar invariance (Δχ2(25) = 37.59, p = .05, ns). Examination of the latent group
means indicated that women in this sample scored significantly higher (p < .00) on the
latent health variable than did men (unstandardized M difference = .20, z = 5.74, p < .00).
Table 14 summarizes the sequential invariance tests for the modified AnTI.
In summary, the sequential invariance tests across gender provided support for the
configural model of the modified AnTI, but the measure demonstrated only partial
measurement invariance with differences between men and women in terms of the
variance of the health latent variable, the covariance between the health and metaworry
variables, and the mean on the health variable. In this sample, women scored
significantly higher on the latent health variable mean.
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Table 14
Overview of Invariance Tests Across Gender for the Modified AnTI

Model Description

χ

2

df

Δ
χ2

Δ
df

---

---

Statistical
Significance

1) Baseline multigroup model

236.35

148

2) Factor loadings constrained equal

243.72

159

7.37

11

.77 (ns)

3) Factor loadings and variances
constrained equal

268.10

162

31.75

14

.00

4) Factor loadings and social variance
constrained equal

245.76

160

9.41

12

.67 (ns)

5) Factor loadings, social and health
variances constrained equal

268.10

161

31.75

13

.00

6) Factor loadings, social and metaworry
variances constrained equal

245.78

161

9.43

13

.74 (ns)

264.29

164

27.94

16

.03

260.92

163

24.57

15

.06 (ns)

9) Factor loadings, social and metaworry
variances, social/health and
health/metaworry constrained equal

263.05

163

26.70

15

.03

10) Factor loadings, social and
metaworry variances, social/metaworry
and health/metaworry constrained equal

263.45

163

27.10

15

.03

11) Invariant parameters and all
intercepts constrained equal; latent means
for men constrained at zero

282.36

174

46.01

26

.01

273.94

173

37.59

25

.05 (ns)

7) Factor loadings, social and metaworry
variances, and covariances constrained
equal
8) Factor loadings, social and metaworry
variances, social/health and
social/metaworry covariances constrained
equal

12) Invariant parameters and means
constrained; Intercept 21 relaxed

---
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Factorial Validity of Rumination Measures

The Ruminative Responses Scale
Confirmatory factor analyses. Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1991) originally
conceptualized the RRS as a unifactorial measure of rumination, but debate has
subsequently emerged regarding the factor structure of the measure. This study
examined the comparative fit of four a priori CFA measurement models of RRS found
in the extant literature: 1) the 22-item, one-factor model originally conceptualized by
Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow; 2) a 15-item, three-factor model (Roberts et al., 1998)
that consisted of a “Symptom-Based Rumination” factor (Items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 16),
an “Introspection/Self-Isolation” factor (Items 10, 11, 18, 20, and 21), and a “SelfBlame” factor (Items 9, 12, and 19; p. 411); 3) a 19-item, two-factor model consisting of
“dwelling on the negative” (Items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 19) and “active
cognitive appraisal” factors (Items 6, 10, 17, 18, 20, 21, and 22; Fresco, Frankel et al.,
2002); and 4) an abbreviated, two-factor scale derived from the original Ruminative
Response Questionnaire. The abbreviated scale featured two distinct rumination factors—
an adaptive reflection factor (Items 6, 10, 11, 17, and 18) and a more maladaptive
brooding factor Items 9, 12, and 13) . 1 In keeping with the findings in the Treynor et al.
(2003) study, it was hypothesized that the abbreviated model that included reflection and
brooding latent variables would provide the best fit for the data.

1

The abbreviated two-factor model presented by Treynor et al. (2003) included 10 items, 5 items that
loaded on a reflection latent variable and 5 items that loaded on a brooding latent variable. However, the
brooding latent variable in this study included only three items because the latent variable in the Treynor et
al. study included two items from the Response Style Questionnaire (RSQ) that were not included in this
study or the previously published studies involving the 22-item RRS (Fresco, Frankel, et al., 2002; Roberts
et al., 1998). The two differing items included in the Treynor et al. study but excluded from this study were
“Think What am I doing to deserve this?” and “Why can’t I handle things better?”
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Descriptive statistics. The means, standard deviations, skewness, and kurtosis
values for the 22-item RRS are reported in Table 15. The skewness and kurtosis values
indicated significant nonnormality in terms of skewness and multivariate kurtosis in the
distribution of scores for this sample.

Table 15
Means, Standard Deviations, Skewness, Kurtosis, and Z-values for the RRS
Variable

Mean

SD

Skew

Z-value

Kurtosis

Z-value

Item 1
Item 2
Item 3
Item 4
Item 5
Item 6
Item 7
Item 8
Item 9
Item 10
Item 11
Item 12
Item 13
Item 14
Item 15
Item 16
Item 17
Item 18
Item 19
Item 20
Item 21
Item 22

2.16
1.43
1.78
2.01
2.09
2.26
1.53
1.84
1.95
2.15
1.52
2.42
1.81
1.90
2.12
1.87
1.76
2.17
1.67
1.83
1.82
1.62

.94
.70
.83
.88
.93
1.04
.84
.89
.93
1.03
.87
.82
.89
.89
.97
.87
.96
.99
.89
.92
.97
.86

.42
1.70
.79
.60
.51
.27
1.55
.77
.67
.49
1.62
.45
.87
.75
.49
.78
1.06
.48
1.21
.96
.93
1.29

3.84
15.51
7.26
5.49
4.64
2.45
14.21
7.06
6.10
4.50
14.85
4.12
7.95
6.88
4.49
7.17
9.66
4.39
11.09
8.77
8.52
11.80

-.72
2.61
-.14
-.33
-.60
-1.11
1.53
-.32
-.50
-.90
1.61
-.38
-.08
-.22
-.74
-.11
.01
-.79
.54
.04
-.24
.81

-3.30
11.95
-.63
-1.50
-2.74
-5.05
6.98
-1.48
-2.29
-4.12
7.37
-1.72
-.37
-.99
-3.40
-.48
.04
-3.62
2.46
.16
-1.10
3.71

143.06

49.32

Multivariate
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Comparative fit of the RRS models. The goodness-of-fit statistics for the four a
priori RRS models are provided in Table 16. The results indicated that all four a priori
models displayed relatively poor fit for the data, with all four models showing significant
bootstrapped χ2 values, RMSEA values > .05, and both CFI and TLI values < .95.
Contrary to the hypothesis, the abbreviated model presented by Treynor et al. (2003)
provided the poorest fit for the data (χ2 (19) = 178.63, Bollen-Stine bootstrap p < .00,
CMIN/DF = 9.40, CFI = .89, TLI = .84, RMSEA = .13, SRMR = .06, PCLOSE = .00).
Of the four a priori models, Roberts et al.’s (1998) three-factor model provided the best
fit for the data, but the goodness-of-fit statistics (χ2(87) = 307.42, Bollen-Stine bootstrap p
< .00, CMIN/DF = 3.53, CFI = .93, TLI = .92, RMSEA = .07, SRMR = .05, PCLOSE =
.00) did not meet the criterion cutoffs established for this study. Given that the Roberts et
al. (1998) three-factor model provided the best fit of the four a priori CFA models, the
model was examined for possible points of misfit and model modification.
Model modification. Since the goodness-of-fit statistics indicated that the threefactor model (Roberts et al., 1998) contained areas of misfit, items were eliminated in a
stepwise fashion based on examination of the modification indexes, the standardized
residual covariances, and conceptual reasoning. Elimination of items continued until all
standardized residual covariances were less than│2.00│, resul ting in deletion of Item 1
(“Think about how alone you feel”) and Item 18 (“Go someplace alone to think about
your feelings”). Removal of these two items produced a standardized residual covariance
matrix with values of less than│2.00│and improved model fit in comparison to the
initial three-factor model (χ2(62) = 185.76, Bollen-Stine bootstrap p < .00, CMIN/DF =
3.00, CFI = .95, TLI = .94, RMSEA = .06, SRMR = .04, PCLOSE = .02). Although the

Table 16
Goodness-of-Fit Statistics Related to the Ruminative Responses Scale CFA Models
Models

1)

One-factor

2)

B-S χ2

df

p

CMIN/
DF

CFI

TLI

RMSEA

90% CI

SRMR

PCLOSE

CAIC

ECVI

1432.58

209

.00

6.85

.78

.76

.11

.10 - .11

.07

.00

1750.20

3.04

Three-factor

307.42

87

.00

3.53

.93

.92

.07

.06 - .08

.05

.00

545.63

.75

3)

Two-factor

785.96

151

.00

5.21

.87

.86

.09

.09 - .10

.06

.00

1067.48

1.72

4)

Abbreviated
two-factor

178.63

19

.00

9.40

.89

.84

.13

.11 - .15

.06

.00

301.34

.42

Note. B-S χ2 = Bollen-Stine bootstrap adjusted chi-square; CMIN/DF = χ2 likelihood ratio statistic; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; TLI
= Tucker-Lewis Index; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation, SRMR = Standardized Root Mean Square Residual;
PCLOSE = p value for testing close fit; CAIC = Consistent Akaike Information Criterion; ECVI = Expected Cross-Validation Index.
Bolded model indicates best comparative fit and model retained for invariance testing.
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elimination of the two items improved model fit, the goodness-of-fit statistics still
indicated less than optimal fit.
Faced with four a priori models that did not provide good fit for the data, even
after modifications, the 22 items from the RRS were regrouped into three clusters based
on the results of previous research and conceptual reasoning. One cluster included items
identified as those that overlapped with depressive symptoms in the Roberts et al. (1998)
and Treynor et al. (2003) studies (Items 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 16). These items
represented indicators for a lethargy latent variable. A second recrimination latent
variable included indicators that consisted of additional items that overlapped with
depressive symptoms (Items 1, 14, 15, and 19) but also included a self-blaming focus.
Item 12 (“Think about a recent situation, wishing it had gone better”) and Item 13
(“Think, Why do I have problems other people don’t have?”) were added as indicators on
the recrimination latent variable because the content coincided with a negative, selfblaming focus. The remaining items (Items 6, 10, 11, 17, 18, 21, and 22) contributed to a
reflection latent variable. These indicators included items that Treynor et al. (2003)
identified as reflective or adaptive thinking processes and items that Fresco et al. (2002)
identified as active appraisals. Item 20 (“Listen to sad music”) was omitted from this
exploratory model since it produced problematic residuals in the a priori three-factor
model (Roberts et al., 1998) and appeared at odds with the content of the indicators on
the recrimination and reflection or active appraisal latent variables.
Like the confirmatory models, the exploratory model of the RRS provided
inadequate fit for the data (χ2(186) = 756.73, Bollen-Stine bootstrap p < .00, CMIN/DF =
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4.07, CFI = .90, TLI = .88, RMSEA = .08, SRMR = .06, PCLOSE = .00). Sequential
elimination of problematic items resulted in elimination of the following items:
Item 17

“Analyze your personality to try to understand why you are
depressed.”

Item 6

“Analyze recent events to try to understand why you are depressed.”

Item 22

“Try to understand yourself by focusing on your depressed feelings.”

Item 18

“Go someplace alone to think about your feelings.”

Item 9

“Think, Why do I always react this way.”

Item 4

“Think about how hard it is to concentrate.”

The resulting model provided good fit for the data (χ2(87) = 203.62, Bollen-Stine
bootstrap p = .00, CMIN/DF = 2.34, CFI = .97, TLI = .96, RMSEA = .05, SRMR = .04,
PCLOSE = .37). Separate models were conducted to test goodness of fit for men (n =
186) and women (n = 316). The results indicated that the goodness-of-fit statistics did
not meet the criterion cutoffs indicative of optimal fit for men (χ2(87) = 149.58, BollenStine bootstrap p = .10, CMIN/DF = 1.72, CFI = .95, TLI = .94, RMSEA = .06, SRMR =
.05, PCLOSE = .11) or for women (χ2(87) = 166.26, Bollen-Stine bootstrap p = .01,
CMIN/DF = 1.91, CFI = .96, TLI = .96, RMSEA = .06, SRMR = .04, PCLOSE = .30),
with a RMSEA values greater than .05. Examination of the modification indexes and
standardized residual covariance matrix for men did not reveal problematic items, but the
residual covariance matrix for women indicated a problematic residual between Item 11
(“Write down what you are thinking about to analyze it”) and Item 16 (“Think about how
you don’t feel up to doing anything”). Item 11 served as one of three indicators on the
reflection variable, so the model was reconfigured to completely eliminate the reflection
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latent variable. The resulting exploratory model included only lethargy and recrimination
latent variables.
Retesting the two-factor model with the entire sample indicated that the twofactor model provided good fit for the data (χ2(53) = 118.73, Bollen-Stine bootstrap p =
.01, CMIN/DF = 2.24, CFI = .98, TLI = .97, RMSEA = .05, SRMR = .03, PCLOSE =
.50). The model was tested separately for men and women to assess goodness of fit. The
results indicated that the model still fell short of the criterion cutoffs indicative of optimal
fit for men (χ2(53) = 97.22, Bollen-Stine bootstrap p = .06, CMIN/DF = 1.83, CFI = .95,
TLI = .94, RMSEA = .07, SRMR = .05, PCLOSE = .09), with RMSEA values above the
.05 criterion and the TLI still just short of the criterion for this study. Similarly, the
results indicated that the model did not provide optimal fit for women (χ2(53) = 103.04,
Bollen-Stine bootstrap p = .03, CMIN/DF = 1.94, CFI = .97, TLI = .96, RMSEA = .06,
SRMR = .04, PCLOSE = .29), with RMSEA values above the .05 criterion. However,
the model represented an improvement in fit compared to the three-factor model
presented by Roberts et al. (1998), so the more parsimonious two-factor model was
retained for assessing invariance across gender. The factor loadings and factor
determinants for the total sample and for men and women are presented in Table 17. The
correlations between the total score on the full, 22-item RRS (Nolen-Hoeksema &
Morrow, 1991) and the total score on the abbreviated, 12-item RRS were statistically
significant (total sample r = .94, men r = .94, and women r = .94; all ps < .01).
Tests of invariance across gender for the modified RRS. A simultaneous
analysis of data from both men and women indicated that the modified, two-factor model
provided good fit for the data (χ2(106) = 200.39, Bollen-Stine bootstrap p < .01, CMIN/DF
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Table 17
Standardized Regression Weights for the Modified RRS

Item

Full
Sample

Men

Women

.64

.61

.65

.61

.46

.66

.78

.78

.77

.62
.74

.67
.71

.61
.75

.78

.78

.78

.71

.70

.70

.59

.63

.55

.65
.81

.73
.83

.60
.78

.79

.79

.78

.69

.67

.69

.00
22.64
7.32

.00
20.94
6.78

.00
23.64
7.46

Lethargy
2 Think “I won’t be able to do my job/work
because I feel badly.”
3 Think about your feelings of fatigue and
achiness.
5 Think about how passive and unmotivated
you feel.
7 Think about how you don’t seem to feel
anything anymore.
8 Think “Why can’t I get going?”
16 Think about how you don’t feel up to
doing anything.
Recrimination
1 Think about how alone you feel.
12 Think about a recent situation, wishing it
had gone better.
13 Think “Why do I have problems other
people don’t have?”
14 Think about how sad you feel.
15 Think about ll your shortcomings, failings,
faults, mistakes.
19 Think about how angry you are with
yourself.

Factor determinacy
Mean
SD

Note. All standardized regression weights significant (p < .001). Mean and standard
deviation (SD) derived from summing all 12 items.
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= 1.89, CFI = .96, TLI = .96, RMSEA = .04, SRMR = .05, PCLOSE = .93), which
provided support for the invariance of the configural model. This multiple group model
provided the baseline for subsequent tests of invariance across gender.
Given the evidence of satisfactory model fit derived from the simultaneous
analysis of multigroup data, a second model was specified wherein all factor loadings
were constrained equal in order to assess invariance across gender. Comparison of the
constrained model (χ2(116) = 220.74) with the simultaneous baseline model (χ 2(106) =
200.31) resulted in a significant change in chi-square (Δ χ2 (10) = 20.43, p = .03) indicating
that the factor loadings demonstrated variance across men and women. Sequential
examination of the equality constraints indicated that the factor loadings on the
recrimination latent variable (Items 1, 12, 12, 14, 15, and 19) displayed invariance across
gender. However, the factor loadings on the lethargy latent variable displayed variance
across gender, with Items 2, 3, 8, and 16 displaying invariance but Item 5 (“Think about
how passive and unmotivated you feel”) and Item 7 (“Think about how you don’t seem to
feel anything anymore”) demonstrating variance across gender in that women displayed
higher item means than men in the sample.
Additional invariance testing of the modified RRS indicated that the variance on
the latent recrimination variable displayed invariance across gender (Δχ2 (9) = 15.86, p =
.07), but men and women significantly differed in terms of the variance associated with
the latent lethargy variable (men = .37, women = .50, p = .02). Holding the invariant
factor loadings and the variance on the recrimination latent variable constant and
constraining the covariance between the recrimination and lethargy latent variables
resulted in a significant change in chi-square (Δχ2(10) = 21.45, p = .02), with women
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showing higher covariance estimates (r = .83) than men (r = .75), which represented 69%
and 57% of the variance between the two latent variables for women and men,
respectively. These findings indicated that the modified RRS demonstrated only partial
measurement invariance.
Results of the latent mean structure invariance tests of item intercepts and latent
factor means indicated significant group differences. The invariant factor loadings, the
variance on the recrimination latent variable, and the item intercepts were constrained
equal, and the latent variable means were constrained at zero for men. Comparison of the
mean structure model (χ2(125) = 248.45) with the baseline multigroup model (χ2(106) =
200.31) resulted in a significant change in chi-square (Δχ2(19) = 48.15, p = .00),
suggesting that the intercepts were not invariant across gender. Examination of the
modification indexes indicated that the intercept associated with Item 3 contributed to
invariance across gender. Relaxing the constraint on the intercept for Item 3 resulted in a
nonsignificant change in chi-square (Δχ2(124) = 24.07, p = .15, ns). Examination of the
latent group means indicated that women in this sample scored significantly higher on
both the recrimination (unstandardized latent M difference = .24, z = 4.00, p < .01) and
the lethargy (unstandardized latent M difference = .21, z = 3.15, p < .01).
In summary, the sequential invariance testing across gender provided support for
the invariance of the configural model, but the measurement model demonstrated only
partial invariance across gender in that men and women differed in terms of the variance
and covariances associated with the latent lethargy variable. Additionally, group
differences emerged in terms of the intercept associated with Item 3 (“Think about your
feelings of fatigue and achiness”), which suggested that the modified RRS demonstrated
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partial scalar invariance. Men and women also differed in terms of the latent group
means, with women scoring higher than men on both latent variables. The results of the
invariance tests across gender are summarized in Table 18.

Table 18
Overview of Invariance Tests Across Gender for the Modified RRS

Model Description

χ

2

df

Δ
χ2

Δ
df
---

Statistical
Significance

1) Baseline multigroup model

200.31

106

---

---

2) Factor loadings constrained equal

220.74

116

20.43

10

.03

3) Factor loadings on recrimination
constrained equal (Items 1, 12, 13, 14, 15, &
19)

205.96

111

5.66

5

.34 (ns)

4) Factor loadings on lethargy constrained
equal (Items 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, & 16)

215.07

111

14.76

5

.01

5) Factor loadings on Items 1, 12, 13, 14, 15,
19, 2, 3, 8, & 16 constrained equal

215.94

114

15.63

8

.05 (ns)

6) Invariant factor loadings and recrimination
variance constrained equal

216.17

115

15.86

9

.07 (ns)

7) Factor loadings and lethargy variance
constrained equal

219.99

115

19.68

9

.02

8) Invariant factor loadings, variance, and
covariance constrained equal

221.76

116

21.45

10

.02

9) Invariant parameters and intercepts
constrained equal; latent means for men
constrained at zero

248.45

125

48.15

19

.00

10) Invariant parameters constrained;
intercept 3 relaxed

224.38

124

24.07

18

.15 (ns)
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The Rumination-Reflection Questionnaire
Confirmatory factor analysis. Although Trapnell and Campbell (1999)
specifically developed the RRQ to assess ruminative and reflective dimensions of private
self-consciousness, research investigating the factor structure of the RRQ has been
limited. Therefore, this study examined a two-factor CFA model of the RRQ featuring
the neurotic (ruminative) and exploratory (reflective) factors originally conceptualized by
Trapnell and Campbell. It was hypothesized the two-factor model would provide good fit
for the data.
Descriptive statistics. The means, standard deviations, skewness, and kurtosis
values for the 24-item RRQ are reported in Table 19. The skewness and kurtosis values
indicated significant nonnormality in the distribution of scores for this sample.
Comparative fit of the RRQ model. The CFA results indicated that the twofactor model of the RRQ demonstrated a significant bootstrapped χ2 value (χ 2(251) =
885.84, Bollen-Stine p = .00), and the goodness-of-fit indexes did not meet the criterion
cutoffs indicative of good fit (CMIN/DF = 3.53, CFI = .88, TLI = .87, RMSEA = .07,
SRMR = .05, PCLOSE = .00). Since the RRQ contains negatively-worded items that
require reverse scoring and since Brown (2003) suggested that such items potentially
introduced method effects, a post hoc model that included a third factor consisting of the
negatively-worded items (Items 6, 9, 10, 13, 14, 17, 20, and 24) was tested. The results
indicated that the model provided poor fit for the data (χ2(249) = 1218.26, Bollen-Stine p =
.00, CMIN/DF = 4.89, CFI = .82, TLI = .80, RMSEA = .09, SRMR = .12, PCLOSE =
.00). A second post hoc two-factor model that omitted all negatively-worded items
provided better fit (χ2(103) = 373.94, Bollen-Stine p = .00, CMIN/DF = 3.63, CFI = .93,
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Table 19
Means, Standard Deviations, Skewness, Kurtosis, and Z-values for the RRQ
Item

Mean

SD

Skew

Z-value

Kurtosis

Z-value

Item 1
Item 2
Item 3
Item 4
Item 5
Item 6
Item 7
Item 8
Item 9
Item 10
Item 11
Item 12
Item 13
Item 14
Item 15
Item 16
Item 17
Item 18
Item 19
Item 20
Item 21
Item 22
Item 23
Item 24

2.71
3.00
2.77
3.43
2.84
3.30
3.27
3.47
3.19
3.02
2.86
2.27
3.44
3.39
3.27
3.47
3.68
3.28
2.81
3.57
3.31
3.34
2.99
2.99

1.15
1.17
1.19
1.14
1.22
1.05
1.07
.96
1.04
1.04
1.16
1.05
1.13
1.05
1.02
.95
.87
1.07
1.12
.94
.91
1.06
1.06
1.08

.17
-.13
.12
-.56
.14
-.30
-.40
-.64
-.05
.14
.10
.70
-.36
-.22
-.01
-.19
-.30
-.06
.15
-.40
-.08
-.19
.13
.11

1.59
-1.19
1.12
-5.10
1.31
-2.70
-3.63
-5.82
-.48
1.25
.95
6.41
-3.32
-2.04
-.12
-1.69
-2.74
-.50
1.33
-3.64
-.75
-1.72
1.14
1.01

-.88
-.95
-1.01
-.52
-1.01
-.63
-.60
-.14
-.78
-.72
-.91
-.11
-.56
-.63
-.51
-.40
-.30
-.82
-.66
-.36
.01
-.75
-.54
-.66

-4.02
-4.34
-4.64
-2.37
-4.60
-2.87
-2.76
-.63
-3.55
-3.27
-4.15
-.52
-2.55
-2.89
-2.34
-1.83
-1.38
-3.75
-3.02
-.66
.04
-3.43
-2.46
-3.00

82.48

26.16

Multivariate

TLI = .91, RMSEA = .07, SRMR = .05, PCLOSE = .00), but the goodness-of-fit statistics
still did not meet the criterion cutoffs for good fit.
Model modification. Given that the two-factor model of the RRQ did not meet
the criterion cutoffs for good fit established for this study, potential points of misfit were
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identified through the same sequential process used in previous model modifications.
Table 20 provides a summary of the items that were deleted based on modification
indexes, standardized residuals, and content overlap. The resulting model still showed a
significant χ2 value but displayed good fit (χ2(64) = 129.42, Bollen-Stine bootstrap p = .00,
CMIN/DF = 2.02, CFI = .97, TLI = .97, RMSEA = .05, SRMR = .04, PCLOSE = .75).
The 13-item, modified two-factor model was retained for further analysis, and separate
models were tested to assess adequate fit for men (n = 186) and women (n = 316). The
results indicated good fit for men (χ2(64) = 89.26, Bollen-Stine bootstrap p = .17,
CMIN/DF = 1.40, CFI = .97, TLI = .97, RMSEA = .05, SRMR = .06, PCLOSE = .59)
and good fit for women (χ2(64) = 107.81, Bollen-Stine bootstrap p = .01, CMIN/DF =
Table 20
Items Deleted From the RRQ
Rumination
4. Long after an argument or disagreement is over with, my thoughts keep going back
to what happened.
5. I tend to “ruminate” or dwell over things that happen to me for a really long time
afterward.
6. I don’t waste time rethinking things that are over and done with. (RS)
7. Often I’m playing back over in my mind how I acted in a past situation.
8. I often find myself reevaluating something I’ve done.
10. It is easy for me to put unwanted thoughts out of my mind. (RS)
Reflection
13.
15.
16.
17.
20.

Philosophical or abstract thinking doesn’t appeal to me that much. (RS)
I love exploring my “inner” self.
My attitudes and feelings about things fascinate me.
I don’t really care for introspective or self-reflective thinking. (RS)
I don’t care much for self-analysis. (RS)

Note. RS = reverse scored item
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1.68, CFI = .97, TLI = .96, RMSEA = .05, SRMR = .04, PCLOSE = .63). The factor
loadings and factor determinants for the total sample, men, and women are presented in
Table 21. The correlations between the two subscale scores and the total scores on the
full, 24-item RRQ and the modified, 13-item RRQ were > .95 (all ps < .01) for the total
sample and for men and women.
Tests of invariance across gender for the modified RRQ. Since no study to
date has examined measurement invariance of the RRQ, this study examined possible
sources of variance across gender in the modified, 13-item two-factor model of the RRQ.
Invariance across gender was first assessed by conducting a simultaneous analysis of data
for men and women to evaluate the equality of the modified model between genders. The
results indicated that the simultaneous model provided good fit for the data (χ2(128) =
197.10, Bollen-Stine bootstrap p = .02, CMIN/DF = 1.54, CFI = .97, TLI = .96, RMSEA
= .03, SRMR = .06, PCLOSE = 1.00), which provided support for the invariance of the
configural model.
Given that the simultaneous group model provided good fit for the data, a second
model was specified wherein all factor loadings were constrained equal in order to assess
invariance across gender. The resulting model provided good fit for the data (χ2(139) =
214.26, Bollen-Stine bootstrap p = .02, CMIN/DF = 1.54, CFI = .97, TLI = .96, RMSEA
= .03, SRMR = .06, PCLOSE = 1.00). Comparing the model with constrained factor
loadings with the simultaneous baseline model (χ2 (128) = 197.10) produced a
nonsignificant change in chi-square (Δ χ2(11) = 17.15, p = .10, ns), which indicated that
the factor loadings demonstrated invariance across gender. The invariant factor loadings
were subsequently held equal, and the variances associated with the reflection latent
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Table 21
Standardized Regression Weights for the Modified RRQ

Item

Full
Sample

Men

Women

.57
.69

.61
.75

.55
.65

.69
.67

.75
.64

.66
.70

.75

.74

.75

.78

.81

.77

.66

.74

.62

.73

.70

.75

.77

.84

.73

.76

.81

.74

.50

.36

.58

.65

.64

.65

.59

.60

.57

.06
38.91
7.71

.04
38.40
7.67

.06
39.20
7.73

Reflection
14 I’m not really a meditative type of person.
(RS)
18 I love analyzing why I do things.
19 People often say I’m a “deep,”
introspective type person.
21 I’m very self-inquisitive by nature
22 I love to meditate on the nature and
meaning of things.
23 I often love to look at my life in
philosophical ways.
24 Contemplating myself isn’t my idea of fun.
(RS)

Rumination
1 My attention is often focused on aspects of
myself I wish I’d stop thinking about.
2 I always seem to be rehashing in my mind
recent things I’ve said or done.
3 Sometimes it is hard for me to shut off
thoughts about myself.
9 I never ruminate or dwell on myself for
very long. (RS)
11 I often reflect on episodes in my life that I
should no longer concern myself with.
12 I spend a great deal of time thinking back
over my embarrassing or disappointing
moments.

Factor determinacy
Mean
SD

Note. All standardized regression weights significant (p < .001). RS denotes reversescored items. Mean and standard deviation (SD) derived from summing all 13 items.
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variable and the rumination latent variable and the covariance between the two variables
were held constant. Comparison of the fully constrained model (χ2 (142) = 218.53) with the
simultaneous baseline model (χ2 (128) = 197.10) produced a nonsignificant change in chisquare (χ2(14) = 21.43, p = .09, ns), which indicated that the measurement model
maintained invariance across gender.
The invariant factor loadings, variances, covariance, and item intercepts were
subsequently constrained equal, and the latent variable means were constrained at zero
for men. Comparison of the mean structure model (χ2(152) = 226.94) with the baseline
model (χ2(128) = 197.10) resulted in a nonsignificant change in chi-square (χ2(24) = 29.84, p
= .19, ns), which indicated that the modified RRQ demonstrated scalar invariance across
gender. The results of the invariance tests across gender are summarized in Table 22. In
summary, the results of the sequential invariance testing indicated that the modified RRQ
displayed invariance across gender in terms of configural, measurement, and scalar
invariance.

Summary of Model Testing for Worry and Rumination Measures
Confirmatory factor analyses. Confirmatory factor analyses were conducted
with a total of five measures—three worry-related measures and two rumination-related
measures. The tested latent variable models were based on the construct
conceptualizations articulated by the developers of the measures or derived from other
published research, and different a priori models associated with each of the five
measures were compared in terms of goodness of fit. Surprisingly, none of the a priori
CFA models met the criterion cutoffs indicative of good fit (e.g., CFI and TLI > .95,
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Table 22
Overview of Modified RRQ Invariance Tests Across Gender

Model Description

χ

2

df

Δ
χ2

Δ
df

Statistical
Significance

1) Baseline multigroup model

197.10

128

---

---

---

2) Factor loadings constrained equal

214.26

139

17.15

11

.10 (ns)

3) Fully constrained model

218.53

142

21.43

14

.09 (ns)

4) Invariant parameters and intercepts
constrained equal; latent means for men
constrained at zero

226.94

152

29.84

24

.19 (ns)

RMSEA < .05) without model modification, so the best-fitting model from each set of
analysis was retained for modification prior to subsequent testing for invariance across
gender. Table 23 provides a comparison of the fit indexes associated with the initial
models and the subsequently modified models.
Invariance testing across gender. Invariance testing across gender produced
mixed results for the three worry measures and the two rumination measures. The results
are summarized in Table 24. All of the worry and rumination measures included in this
study displayed configural invariance across men and women, which indicated that the
unconstrained multigroup models displayed no statistically significant differences in
terms of the factors or the factor-loading patterns. However, tests of measurement
invariance showed mixed results, with only the modified RRQ displaying measurement
invariance across gender. The modified models derived from the PSWQ, the SWQ-30,
the AnTI, and the RRS demonstrated only partial measurement invariance. For the
modified PSWQ model, Item 2 (“My worries overwhelm me”), Item 5 (“I know that I

Table 23
Comparison of Goodness-of-Fit Statistics for Initial Models vs. Modified Models

Models

B-S χ

2

df

B-S
p

CMIN/
DF

CFI

TLI

RMSEA

90% CI

SRMR

PCLOSE

Worry Measures
PSWQ
Initial 16-item,
single-factor

ECVI

.00

4.91

.92

.91

.09

.08 - .10

.05

.00

741.81

1.15

19

.11

1.97

.99

.99

.04

.02 - .07

.02

.66

160.15

.14

SWQ-30
Initial 30-item,
6-factor

1005.20 390

.00

2.58

.94

.94

.06

.05 - .06

.05

.01

1546.59

2.31

Modified 24item, 6-factor

467.23 237

.00

1.97

.97

.96

.04

.04 - .05

.04

.95

922.00

1.18

AnTI
Initial 22-item,
3-factor

774.94 206

.00

3.76

.87

.86

.07

.07 - .08

.06

.00

1114.21

1.73

Modified 8item, single
factor

510.81 104

CAIC

37.43
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(table continues)

Comparison of Goodness-of-Fit Statistics for Initial Models vs. Modified models

Models
Modified 14item, 3-factor

B-S χ

2

136.12

df

74

B-S
p

.02

CMIN/
DF

CFI

TLI

RMSEA

90% CI

SRMR

PCLOSE

1.84

.98

.
97

.04

.03 - .05

.03

.92

Rumination measures

359.90

.40

CAIC

ECVI

RRS
Initial 22-item,
one-factor

.00

6.85

.78

.76

.11

.10 - .11

.07

.00

1750.20

3.04

53

.01

2.24

.98

.97

.05

.04 - .06

.03

.50

299.19

.34

Initial 24-item,
two-factor

885.84 251

.00

3.53

.88

.87

.07

.07 - .08

.05

.00

1239.55

1.96

Modified 13item, two factor

129.42

.00

2.02

.97

.97

.05

.03 - .06

.04

.75

324.32

.37

Modified 12item, two-factor

1432.58 209

118.73

RRQ

64
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Note. B-S χ2 = Bollen-Stine bootstrap adjusted chi-square; CMIN/DF = χ2 likelihood ratio statistic; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; TLI
= Tucker-Lewis Index; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation, SRMR = Standardized Root Mean Square Residual;
PCLOSE = p value for testing close fit; CAIC = Consistent Akaike Information Criterion; ECVI = Expected Cross-Validation Index.
PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire, SWQ-30 = Student Worry Questionnaire-30, AnTI = Anxious Thoughts Inventory, RRS =
Ruminative Responses Scale, RRQ = Rumination-Reflection Questionnaire
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Table 24
Summary of Invariance Tests Across Gender

Configural

Measurement

Scalar

Mean
Structure

Modified 8-item
PSWQ

Invariant

Partially
invariant

Partially
invariant

Partially
invariant

Modified 24-item,
6-factor SWQ

Invariant

Invariant

Partially
invariant

Partially
invariant
Partially
invariant

Model

Modified 14-item,
3-factor AnTI

Invariant

Invariant

Partially
Invariant

Modified 12-item,
2-factor RRS

Invariant

Partially
invariant

Partially
invariant

Partially
invariant

Modified 13-item,
2-factor RRQ

Invariant

Invariant

Invariant

Invariant

Note. PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire, SWQ-30 = Student Worry
Questionnaire-30, AnTI = Anxious Thoughts Inventory, RRS = Ruminative Responses
Scale, RRQ = Rumination-Reflection Questionnaire

should not worry about things, but I just cannot help it”), and Item 7 (“I am always
worrying about something”) showed variance across gender, with women displaying
higher item means than the mean in the sample. Additionally, Item 6 (“When I am under
pressure I worry a lot”) demonstrated variance across gender, with women displaying the
higher intercepts. Significant differences emerged across gender in terms of the latent
dimension of worry, with women displaying a significantly higher mean than men.
As noted in Table 24, the modified SWQ-30 model displayed only partial
measurement invariance. The factor loadings were invariant across gender, but men and
women differed in terms of the variance on significant others’ well being, with women
displaying higher variances than men, and on social adequacy concerns, with men
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displaying higher variances than women. Gender differences also emerged between
genders on the covariance between worrisome thinking and academic concerns, with
women displaying higher covariance estimates than men. Additionally, men and women
differed on the covariance between worrisome thinking and general anxiety symptoms,
with men displaying higher covariance estimates that women. The modified SWQ-30
model displayed partial scalar invariance in that men displayed higher intercept estimates
than women on Item 15 (“I feel restless and impatient when I worry about things”), and
women displayed higher intercept estimates than men on Item 22 (“I worry about asking
other people questions for fear of sounding dumb”). Finally, the latent group means were
partially invariant in that women displayed higher means than men on the worrisome
thinking, significant others’ well-being, academic concerns, and general anxiety
symptoms.
Like the other worry measures, the modified model of the AnTI displayed only
partial measurement invariance. The factor loadings were invariant across gender, but
the two groups differed in terms of the variance associated with the latent health variable,
with women displaying higher variance estimates. Differences between men and women
emerged in terms of the covariance estimates between the latent health and metaworry
variables in that women displayed higher estimates than men. The modified AnTI also
displayed partial scalar invariance in that women displayed higher intercept estimates
than men. Additionally, the modified AnTI displayed partial invariance in terms of latent
variable means, with women obtaining significantly higher means than men on the health
variable.
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As noted in Table 24, the modified RRS demonstrated only partial measurement
invariance. Invariance testing indicated that the factor loadings for Item 5 (“Think about
passive and unmotivated you feel”) and Item 7 (“Think about how you don’t seem to feel
anything anymore”) were not invariant across gender, with women obtaining higher item
means than men on both items. The modified RRS also displayed partial invariance in
terms of the variance associated with the lethargy latent variable, with women displaying
higher variance estimates than men. Gender differences also emerged on the covariance
estimate between the two latent variables, with women showing higher covariance
estimates than men. The modified RRS also demonstrated partial scalar invariance in
that women obtained higher intercept estimates than men on Item 3 (“Think about your
feelings of fatigue and achiness”). Additionally, the modified RRS showed partial
invariance in terms of latent means in that women obtained higher means on both the
recrimination and lethargy latent variables.

Differential Prediction Effects of Variables

Since worry and rumination have been conceptualized as the underlying thought
processes associated with anxiety and depression, respectively, this study examined the
relationship among observed variables derived from the modified worry and rumination
measures, anxiety, and depression. Worry or rumination variable scores were created by
summing the item indicators from the modified worry and rumination measures, and the
variable scores were then used as predictors in the regression analyses.
As previously reported in Tables 3, 7, 11, 15, and 19, initial data screening
indicated significant skewness and kurtosis in the distributions of individual item scores
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from the PSWQ, the SWQ-30, and the AnTI, and similar results were found for the RRS
and the RRQ. As expected, the skewness and kurtosis carried over to the summed
variable scores, and the two dependent variables derived from the BAI (Beck et al., 1988)
and the BDI (Beck et al., 1969) also displayed statistically significant skewness and
kurtosis. The descriptive statistics for the summed variable scores and the dependent
variables are reported in Table 25.

Table 25
Descriptive Statistics for Summed Variables and Dependent Measures
Variable

Mean

SD

Skew

Z-value

Kurtosis

Z-value

7.07
3.88
3.80
4.08
3.77
3.52
3.91
3.25
2.17
2.96
4.13
3.83
5.45
4.97

.59
.50
.63
.59
.46
-.06
.35
.84
1.88
1.00
.70
1.08
.16
.12

5.41
4.61
5.81
5.38
4.22
-.53
3.23
7.71
17.26
9.21
6.45
9.94
1.49
1.06

-.25
-.54
-.12
-.18
-.18
-.38
-.54
.33
3.83
.51
-.19
.85
-.31
-.62

-1.16
-2.47
-.55
-.82
-.81
-1.76
-2.48
1.53
17.56
2.36
-.85
3.90
-1.43
-2.86

8.45
7.15

1.80
2.04

16.49
18.71

4.38
6.94

20.07
31.82

Summed Variable Scores
PSWQ
SWQ WST
SWQ FRC
SWQ SOW
SWQ SAC
SWQ ACA
SWQ GAS
AnTI Social
AnTI Health
AnTI Meta
RRS Recrim
RRS Lethargy
RRQ Reflect
RRQ Rum

19.28
6.24
5.80
5.50
6.62
9.51
6.29
9.56
5.62
8.47
12.09
10.55
22.11
16.80

Dependent Measures
BAI
BDI

9.22
7.07
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Inter-relationships among Summed Variable Scores
Initially, the correlations among the summed worry and rumination variables were
examined separately for men and women, and the results are reported in Table 26. For
men, the results indicated statistically significant correlations among most observed
variables, with correlations ranging from -.13 to .78. The strongest correlation (.78, p <
.01) occurred between the PSWQ summed variable score and the SWQ worrisome
thinking variable score. The weakest correlation occurred between the RRQ reflection
and RRQ rumination variable scores (.02, ns), and a nonsignificant correlation also
occurred between the AnTI health variable and the SWQ academic concern variable (.06,
ns). The RRQ reflection variable score displayed negative correlations with most other
variable scores and nonsignificant correlations with all other variable scores except the
RRS recrimination and RRS lethargy variables (.16, p = .03; .21, p = .01, respectively).
A similar pattern of correlations emerged for women in this study, with latent
variable score correlations ranging from -.05 to .80. The strongest correlation (.80, p <
.01) occurred between the PSWQ variable score and the SWQ worrisome thinking
variable score. Nonsignificant correlations occurred between the RRQ reflection variable
score and the other variable scores except for significant correlations with the SWQ
general anxiety symptom variable (.14, p < .01) and the RRS lethargy variable score (.21,
p < .01).

Variable Scores as Predictors of Anxiety or Depression
One focus of the present study revolved around the question of whether the
individual summed variable scores used in the worry and rumination measurement
models differentially contributed to the prediction of concurrent anxiety or depression

Table 26
Correlations among Variable Scores From Worry and Rumination Measures
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

----

.80**

.40**

.41**

.53**

.57**

.61**

.67**

.45**

.68**

.54**

.48**

.07

.64**

2. SWQ WST

.78**

----

.42**

.44**

.54**

.53**

.64**

.67**

.45**

.73**

.57**

.50**

.08

.67**

3. SWQ FRC

.38**

.45**

----

.35**

.31**

.45**

.40**

.49**

.32**

.41**

.42**

.34**

.06

.36**

4. SWQ SOW

.39**

.45**

.43**

----

.39**

.36**

.34**

.34**

.54**

.37**

.35**

.28**

-.04

.36**

5. SWQ SAC

.52**

.56**

.31**

.38**

----

.41**

.42**

.61**

.31**

.53**

.50**

.40**

-.05

.54**

6. SWQ ACA

.45**

.39**

.39**

.38**

.41**

----

.38**

.51**

.32**

.48**

.38**

.34**

.01

.40**

7. SWQ GAS

.59**

.67**

.43**

.43**

.42**

.36**

----

.51**

.37**

.51**

.47**

.58**

.14**

.49**

8. AnTI Social

.59**

.61**

.38**

.38**

.64**

.39**

.45**

----

.45**

.76**

.64**

.52**

.04

.64**

9. AnTI Health .29**

.29**

.29**

.29**

.20**

.06

.30**

.29**

----

.46**

.36**

.34**

.07

.38**

.62**

.32**

.32**

.56**

.27**

.53**

.70**

.27**

----

.65**

.55**

.08

.67**

Measure
1. PSWQ

10. AnTI Meta

.65**

13.

14.

(table continues)
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Correlations among Variable Scores From Worry and Rumination Measures
2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

11. RRS Recrim .54**

.51**

.35**

.25**

.50**

.26**

.46**

.72**

.30**

.62**

----

.71**

12. RRS
Lethargy

.52**

.48**

.30**

.21**

.31**

.21**

.52**

.55**

.24**

.54**

.65**

13. RRQ
Reflect

.07

.03

-.11

-.13

-.14

-.10

.04

.05

.07

.06

.64**

.29**

.34**

.68**

.32**

.47**

.64**

.27**

.67**

Measure

1.

14. RRQ Rumin .62**

13.

14.

.06

.63**

----

.21**

.49**

.16*

.21**

----

.14**

.53**

.44**

.02

----

Note. Correlations above the diagonal are for women (n = 316), and correlations below the diagonal are for men (n = 186).
**p < .01, *p < .05
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scores. Because of the skewness of the data, bootstrapped multiple linear regression
analyses were performed to help determine which summed worry scale scores and which
summed rumination scale scores would best predict anxiety or depression as measured by
the BAI and the BDI, respectively. Since the results of the gender invariance testing
indicated that men and women differed in terms of latent mean structures on all measures
except the variables derived from the RRQ, separate regressions were conducted for men
and women. Two regressions were examined for men—one with the BAI scores serving
as the dependent variable and one with the BDI scores serving as the dependent variable.
Two regression analyses for women were also examined, one with each different
dependent variable. No a priori hypotheses were made regarding the order of entry of
the predictor variables.
Bootstrap samples of 1,000 cases each were generated by the PASW
Bootstrapping add-on package available through SPSS, Inc. Predictor variables were
created by summing the individual indicator items that loaded on each latent variable
within the five modified worry and rumination models. Since no a priori hypotheses
were made regarding the order of entry of the predictor variables, the summed predictor
variable scores were entered in separate single-predictor regression analyses, 14 form
men and 14 for women, and any statistically nonsignificant predictors were eliminated
from subsequent analyses (Efron & Gong, 1983). The statistically significant (p < .05)
were entered in a single block in a second regression analyses. Based on the results of
the second regression analysis, variables were eliminated from the regression analyses if
the probability associated with the t values for the standardized Beta coefficients
exceeded .01. The more conservative alpha level was used to decrease the likelihood of
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capitalizing on chance results. The zero-order bivariate correlations between the
dependent variable and each of the remaining predictor variables were used to rank order
the entry of variables in a final regression analyses. Each of the remaining statistically
significant predictor variables was entered in a separate block in order to evaluate the
significance of R2 following the addition of each predictor.
Predictor variables for anxiety. The results of the bootstrap multiple regression
analyses indicated that a different combination of latent variables acted as statistically
significant predictors of concurrent anxiety scores for men and women. For men, the
separate single-predictor regressions indicated that the Reflection predictor from the RRQ
did not significantly contribute (p = .94) to the prediction of concurrent anxiety, and it
was eliminated from subsequent analyses. The next bootstrap regression analysis
included 13 predictor variables entered as one block, which produced an R2 of .43 and an
adjusted R2 of .38 (F(13, 172) = 9.82, p < .001) for the prediction of concurrent anxiety as
measured by the BAI. The predictors with nonsignficant regression coefficients (p > .01)
included the PSWQ variable; the Financial-related Concerns, Significant Other’s Wellbeing, Social Adequacy Concerns, Academic Concerns, and General Anxiety Symptoms
variables derived from the SWQ-30; the Social and Health variables derived from the
AnTI; the Recrimination and Lethargy variables derived from the RRS; and the
Rumination variable from the RRQ. The two remaining predictor variables included the
Worrisome Thinking from the SWQ-30 and the Metaworry variable from the AnTI.
When entered as one block, the two predictor variables produced an R2 of .36 and an
adjusted R2 of .35 (F(2, 183) = 51.32, p < .001). Together, these two predictors shared 16%
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explained variance and uniquely predicted 20% of the variance. Table 27 provides the
descriptive statistics for the two predictors.
The two significant predictors were included in a final regression analyses with
each variable entered in a separate step in order to examine the extent to which each
variable improved the prediction of anxiety in men. The Worrisome Thinking variable
derived from the SWQ-30 was entered in Step 1, which produced an R2 of .31 and an
adjusted R2 of .31 (F(1,184) = 83.58, p < .001). Worrisome Thinking explained 31% of the
variance in anxiety. The Metaworry variable from the AnTI was entered in Step 2, which
resulted in an R2 of .36 and an adjusted R2 of .35 (F(2, 183) = 51.32, p < .001). The
addition of the Metaworry variable to the regression model explained an additional

Table 27
Descriptive Statistics for Bootstrap Multiple Regression of Variable Predictors on
Anxiety Scores for Men (n = 186)
Zero-Order r
(BCa 99% CI)
AbbrWST

Variable

DV-BAI

AbbrWST

.56
(.40 – .69)

AbbrMeta

.52
(.33 – .68)

.62
(.46 – .76)

Mean
CI
SD

7.25
(5.90 – 8.57)
6.80

5.67
(5.01 – 6.44)
3.52

AbbrMeta

8.41
(7.85 – 9.11)
2.86

Note. BCa = Bias Corrected and accelerated, BAI = Beck Anxiety Inventory, AbbrWST
= Abbreviated Worrisome Thinking, AbbrMeta = Abbreviated Metaworry. Bootstrap
results based on 1,000 bootstrap samples. All zero-order correlations significant at < .01.

132
5% of the variance in anxiety. The results of the sequential bootstrap regression analyses
showing the predictors of anxiety in men are shown in Table 28.
For women in this sample, the separate single-predictor regressions indicated that
all of the predictor variables from the worry and rumination measures significantly
contribute to the prediction of concurrent anxiety. When the 14 predictor variables were
entered in a multiple regression is a single block, the bootstrap regression analysis
produced an R2 of .60 and an adjusted R2 of .59 (F(14, 301) = 32.82, p < .001). The results
indicated that the PSWQ variable; the Worrisome Thinking, Financial-related Concerns,
Significant Other’s Well-being, Social Adequacy Concerns, Academic Concerns
variables derived from the SWQ-30; the Recrimination variable derived from the RRS;
and the Reflection and Rumination variables from the RRQ produced statistically
nonsignifcant (p > .01) regression coefficients. The remaining predictor variables
included the General Anxiety Symptoms variable from the SWQ-30; the Social, Health,
and Metaworry variables from the AnTI; and the Lethargy variable derived from the
RRS. When entered as one block, these five predictor variables produced an R2 of .59
and an adjusted R2 of .59 (F(5, 310) = 90.10, p < .001). Together, these five predictors
shared 35% explained variance and uniquely predicted 24% of the variance. Table 29
provides the descriptive statistics for the five predictors.
The five significant predictors were included in a final regression analyses with
each variable entered in a separate step in order to examine the extent to which each
variable improved the prediction of anxiety in women. The Metaworry variable derived
from the AnTI was entered in Step 1, which produced an R2 of .43 and an adjusted R2 of
.43 (F(1,314) = 240.00, p < .001). Metaworry explained 43% of the variance in anxiety for

Table 28
Sequential Bootstrap Regression Analyses Predicting Anxiety for Men (n = 186)
Predictors
B

Bias

Std. Error

Model Summary
BCa 99% CI

Model 1
Constant
AbbrWST

1.13
1.08

.01
.00

.60
.12

(-.38 – 2.74)
(.76 – 1.40)

.31

Model 2
Constant
AbbrWST
AbbrMeta

-2.53
.75
.66

-.02
.00
.01

1.25
.15
.20

(-5.58 - .82)
(.42 – 1.13)
(.03 – 1.20)

.35

R2

Δ R2

.05 ***

Note. BCa = Bias Corrected and accelerated, AbbrWST = Abbreviated Worrisome Thinking, AbbrMeta = Abbreviated Metaworry.
All Bs statistically significant (p < .01). Bootstrap results based on 1,000 bootstrap samples.
***p < .001

133

Table 29
Descriptive Statistics for Bootstrap Multiple Regression of Variable Predictors on Anxiety Scores for Women (n = 316)

Variable

DV-BAI

AbbrMeta

Zero-Order r
(BCa 99% CI)
AbbrSocial
RS Lethargy

AbbrGAS

AbbrMeta

.66
(.53 – .77)

AbbrSocial

.65
(.53 – .74)

.76
(.66 – .84)

RSLethargy

.58
(.46 – .68)

.55
(.43 – .65)

.52
(.40 – .62)

AbbrGAS

.57
(.45 – .68)

.51
(.38 – .62)

.51
(.36 – .64)

.58
(.47 – .67)

AbbrHealth

.52
(.37 – .66)

.46
(.31 – .60)

.45
(.30 – .57)

.34
(.19 – .51)

.37
(.20 - .50)

10.37
(9.10 – 11.77)
9.10

8.51
(8.08 – 8.92)
3.02

9.77
(9.22 – 10.34)
3.35

11.03
(10.48 – 11.67)
3.93

6.95
(6.33 – 7.52)
4.03

Mean
CI
SD

AbbrHealth

6.03
(5.68 – 6.36)
2.36

Note. BCa = Bias Corrected and accelerated, BAI = Beck Anxiety Inventory, AbbrMeta = Abbreviated Metaworry, AbbrSocial =
Abbreviated Social, RS Lethargy = lethargy predictor from RRS, AbbrGAS = Abbreviated General Anxiety Symptoms, AbbrHealth =
Abbreviated Health. Bootstrap results based on 1,000 bootstrap samples. All zero-order correlations significant at < .01.
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women. The Social variable from the AnTI was entered in Step 2, which resulted in an
R2 of .49 and an adjusted R2 of .48 (F(2, 313) = 148.90, p < .001). The addition of the
Social variable to the regression model explained an additional 5% of the variance in
anxiety. The Lethargy variable derived from the RRS was entered in Step 3, resulting in
an R2 of .54 and an adjusted R2 of .53 (F(3, 312) = 121.13, p < .001). The addition of the
Lethargy predictor explained an additional 5% of the variance in anxiety. The General
Anxiety Symptoms variable derived from the SWQ-30 was entered in Step 4, resulting in
an R2 of .56 and an adjusted R2 of .56 (F(4, 311) = 99.78, p < .001). The addition of the
General Anxiety Symptoms variable explained an additional 2% of the variance in
anxiety. Finally, the Health variable derived from the AnTI was entered in Step 5,
producing an R2 of .59 and an adjusted R2 of .59 (F(5, 310) = 90.10, p < .001). The addition
of the Health variable explained an additional 3% of the variance in anxiety among
women in this sample. The results of the sequential bootstrap regression analyses
including the predictors for anxiety in women are shown in Table 30.
Predictor variables for depression. Separate bootstrap multiple regression
analyses were conducted to identify those latent variable predictors that best predicted
concurrent depression scores for men and women as measured by the BDI. Like the
previous regression analyses, different patterns of predictors emerged for men and
women in this sample. For men, the separate single-predictor regressions indicated that
the Reflection predictor variable from the RRQ did not contribute (p = .67), and it was
subsequently eliminated from further regression analyses. The next bootstrap regression
included the 13predictor variables entered as one block, which produced an R2 of .66 and
an adjusted R2 of .64 (F(13, 172) = 26.05, p < .001) for the prediction of depression. The

Table 30
Sequential Bootstrap Regression Analyses Predicting Anxiety for Women (n = 316)
Predictors
Model 1
Constant
AbbrMeta
Model 2
Constant
AbbrMeta
AbbrSocial
Model 3
Constant
AbbrMeta
AbbrSocial
RS Lethargy
Model 4
Constant
AbbrMeta
AbbrSocial
RS Lethargy
AbbrGAS
Model 5
Constant
AbbrMeta
AbbrSocial
RS Lethargy
AbbrGAS
AbbrHealth

B

Bias

Std. Error

Model Summary
BCa 99% CI

-6.54
1.99

-.01
.00

1.44
.19

(-10.47 – -2.86 )
(1.51 – 2.54)

.43

-9.05
1.17
.97

-.01
.01
-.00

1.55
.21
.19

(-13.18 – -5.17)
(.64 – 1.78)
(.46 – 1.48)

.49

.05

***

-11.72
.87
.79
.63

-.01
.01
-.00
-.00

1.50
.21
.19
.12

(-15.77 – -7.49)
(.28 – 1.47)
(.31 – 1.29)
(.35 - .96)

.54

.05

***

-11.08
.78
.69
.45
.45

.00
.01
-.00
-.00
.00

1.52
.21
.17
.12
.13

(-15.07 – -6.81)
(.19 – 1.41)
(.25 – 1.16)
(.16 - .76)
(.12 - .78)

.56

.02

***

-12.98
.64
.59
.43
.39
.78

.01
.01
-.01
-.01
-.00
.01

1.57
.20
.18
.11
.13
.21

(-16.91 – -8.73)
(.10 – 1.29)
(.15 - .98)
(.15 - .74)
(.04 - .71)
(.31 – 1.38)

.59

.03

***

R2

Δ R2
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Note. BCa = Bias Corrected and accelerated, AbbrMeta = Abbreviated Metaworry, AbbrSocial = Abbreviated Social, RS Lethargy =
lethargy predictor from RRS, AbbrGAS = Abbreviated General Anxiety Symptoms, AbbrHealth = Abbreviated Health. Bootstrap
results based on 1,000 bootstrap samples. **p < .01, ***p < .001
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predictors with nonsignficant regression coefficients included the PSWQ variable; the
Worrisome Thinking, Financial-related Concerns, Significant Other’s Well-being, Social
Adequacy Concerns, Academic Concerns, and General Anxiety Symptoms variables
derived from the SWQ-30; the Health variable derived from the AnTI; the Lethargy
variable derived from the RRS; and the Rumination variable from the RRQ. The
remaining predictor variables included the Social and Metaworry variables from the
AnTI and the Recrimination variable derived from the RRS. When entered as one block
in a subsequent regression analysis, these three predictor variables produced an R2 of .62
and an adjusted R2 of .61 (F(3, 182) = 97.78, p < .001). Together, these three predictors
shared 34% explained variance and uniquely predicted 28% of the variance. Table 31
provides the descriptive statistics for the three predictors of depression scores.
The three significant predictors were included in a final regression analyses with
each variable entered in a separate step in order to examine the extent to which each
variable improved the prediction of concurrent depression in men. The Social variable
derived from the AnTI was entered in Step 1, which produced an R2 of .51 and an
adjusted R2 of .51 (F(1,184) = 190.64, p < .001). The Social variable explained 51% of the
variance in depression for men. The Metaworry variable from the AnTI was entered in
Step 2, which resulted in an R2 of .59 and an adjusted R2 of .59 (F(2, 183) = 133.35, p <
.001). The addition of the Metaworry variable to the regression model explained an
additional 8% of the variance in depression. The Recrimination variable derived from the
RRS was entered in Step 3, resulting in an R2 of .62 and an adjusted R2 of .61 (F(3, 182) =
97.78, p < .001). The addition of the Recrimination predictor explained an additional 2%

Table 31
Descriptive Statistics for Bootstrap Multiple Regression of Variable Predictors on Depression Scores for Men (n = 186)
Zero-Order r
(BCa 95% CI)
Variable

DV-BDI

AbbrSocial

AbbrMeta

AbbrSocial

.71
(.57 – .83)

AbbrMeta

.71
(.57 – .80)

.70
(.58 – .80)

RS Recrim

.67
(.52 – .79)

.72
(.61 – .81)

.62
(.48 – .75)

5.55
(4.51 – 6.69)
5.42

9.22
(8.56 – 10.00)
3.05

8.41
(7.85 – 9.11)
2.86

Mean
CI
SD

RS Recrim

11.19
(10.47 – 12.00)
3.94

Note. BCa = Bias Corrected and accelerated, BDI = Beck Depression Inventory, AbbrSocial = Abbreviated Social, AbbrMeta =
Abbreviated Metaworry, RS Recrim = Recrimination predictor from the RRS. Bootstrap results based on 1,000 bootstrap samples.
Zero-order correlations significant at < .01 except where noted.

138

139
of the variance in anxiety. The results of the sequential bootstrap regression analyses
including the predictors for depression in men are shown in Table 32.
For women in this sample, the separate single-predictor regression analyses
indicated that the Reflection predictor from the RRQ did not contribute (p = .09) to the
prediction of concurrent depression, and Reflection predictor variable was eliminated
from subsequent regression analyses. The next bootstrap regression analysis included the
remaining 13 predictor variables, which produced an R2 of .66 and an adjusted R2 of .65
(F(13, 302) = 45.89, p < .001). The results indicated that the PSWQ variable; the
Worrisome Thinking, Financial-related Concerns, Significant Other’s Well-being,
Academic Concerns variables derived from the SWQ-30; the Health variable derived
from the AnTI, the Recrimination variable derived from the RRS; and the Rumination
variable from the RRQ were statistically nonsignificant predictor variable. The five
remaining predictor variables included the Social Adequacy Concerns and General
Anxiety Symptoms variables derived from the SWQ-30; the Social and Metaworry
variables from the AnTI, and the Lethargy variable derived from the RRS. When entered
as one block, these five predictor variables produced an R2 of .64 and an adjusted R2 of
.64 (F(5, 310) = 111.22, p < .001). Together, these five predictors shared 24% explained
variance and uniquely predicted 37% of the variance. Table 33 provides the descriptive
statistics for the five predictors.
The five significant predictors were included in a final regression analyses with
each variable entered in a separate step in order to examine the extent to which each
variable improved the prediction of concurrent depression in women. The Social variable
derived from the AnTI was entered in Step 1, which produced an R2 of .47 and an

Table 32
Sequential Bootstrap Regression Analyses Predicting Depression for Men (n = 186)
Predictors

Model Summary
Std. Error
BCa 99% CI

R2

Δ R2

B

Bias

Model 1
Constant
AbbrSocial

-6.15 **
1.27 **

.01
-.00

.91
.11

(-8.42 – -3.59)
(.97 – 1.55)

.51

Model 2
Constant
AbbrSocial
AbbrMeta

-7.98 **
.77 **
.77 **

-.01
-.00
.01

.92
.14
.16

(-10.36 – -5.43)
(.39 – 1.08)
(.40 – 1.25)

.59

.08 ***

Model 3
Constant
AbbrSocial
AbbrMeta
RS Recrim

-8.57
.54
.66
.32

-.03
-.00
-.00
.01

.90
.17
.15
.13

(-10.86 – -6.10)
(.12 – .95)
(.25 – 1.07)
(.03 - .70)

.62

.02 **

**
**
**
*

Note. BCa = Bias Corrected and accelerated, AbbrSocial = Abbreviated Social, AbbrMeta = Abbreviated Metaworry, RS Recrim =
Recrimination predictor from the RRS. Bootstrap results based on 1,000 bootstrap samples. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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Table 33
Descriptive Statistics for Bootstrap Multiple Regression of Variable Predictors on Depression Scores for Women (n = 316)

Variable

DV-BDI

AbbrSocial

Zero-Order r
(BCa 95% CI)
AbbrMeta

RS Lethargy

AbbrGAS

AbbrSocial

.69
(.62 – .75)

AbbrMeta

.68
(.61 – .75)

.76
(.69 – .82)

RS Lethargy

.64
(.56 – .71)

.52
(.43 – .60)

.55
(.46 – .63)

AbbrGAS

.60
(.52 – .67)

.51
(.40 – .61)

.51
(.42 – .60)

.58
(.50 – .65)

AbbrSAC

.39
(.30 – .50)

.61
(.53 – .68)

.53
(.42 – 63)

.40
(.29 – .49)

.42
(.32 – .52)

7.97
(6.94 – 9.06)
7.86

9.77
(9.22 – 10.34)
3.35

8.51
(8.07 – 8.92)
3.02

11.03
(10.48 – 11.68)
3.93

6.95
(6.33 – 7.52)
4.03

Mean
CI
SD

AbbrSAC

6.74
(6.20 – 7.35)
3.68

Note. BCa = Bias Corrected and accelerated, BDI = Beck Depression Inventory, AbbrSocial = Abbreviated Social, AbbrMeta =
Abbreviated Metaworry, RS Lethargy = Lethargy predictor from RRS, AbbrGAS = Abbreviated General Anxiety Symptoms,
AbbrSAC = Abbreviated Social Adequacy Concerns. Bootstrap results based on 1,000 bootstrap samples. All zero-order correlations
significant at < .01.
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adjusted R2 of .47 (F(1,314) = 281.78, p < .001). The Social variable explained 47% of the
variance in depression for women. The Metaworry variable from the AnTI was entered
in Step 2, which resulted in an R2 of .53 and an adjusted R2 of .53 (F(2, 313) = 176.49, p <
.001). The addition of the Metaworry variable to the regression model explained an
additional 6% of the variance in depression. The Lethargy variable derived from the
RRS was entered in Step 3, resulting in an R2 of .61 and an adjusted R2 of .61 (F(3, 312) =
161.69, p < .001). The addition of the Lethargy predictor explained an additional 8% of
the variance in depression. The General Anxiety Symptoms variable derived from the
SWQ-30 was entered in Step 4, resulting in an R2 of .63 and an adjusted R2 of .63 (F(4, 311)
= 132.61, p < .001). The addition of the General Anxiety Symptoms variable explained
an additional 2% of the variance in depression. Finally, the Social Adequacy Concerns
variable derived from the SWQ-30 was added in Step 5, which produced an R2 of .64 and
an adjusted R2 of .64 (F(5, 310) = 111.22, p < .001). The addition of the Social Adequacy
Concerns variable contributed an additional 1% to the explanation of depression in
women. The results of the sequential bootstrap regression analyses including the
predictors for depression in women are shown in Table 34.

Table 34
Sequential Bootstrap Regression Analyses Predicting Depression for Women (n = 316)
Predictors
B
Model 1
Constant
AbbrSocial
Model 2
Constant
AbbrSocial
AbbrMeta
Model 3
Constant
AbbrSocial
AbbrMeta
RS Lethargy
Model 4
Constant
AbbrSocial
AbbrMeta
RS Lethargy
AbbrGAS
Model 5
Constant
AbbrSocial
AbbrMeta
RS Lethargy
AbbrGAS
AbbrSAC

Bias

Model Summary
Std. Error
BCa 95% CI

R2

Δ R2

-7.78
1.61

**
**

.00
-.00

1.30
.15

(-10.35 – -5.21)
(1.36 – 1.86)

.47

-9.54
.96
.96

**
**
**

-.01
-.00
.00

1.39
.15
.18

(-12.08 – -7.00)
(.60 – 1.32)
(.55 – 1.36)

.53

.06

***

-12.41
.76
.64
.68

**
**
**
**

-.02
-.00
.00
.00

1.36
.14
.18
.11

(-14.92 – -9.91)
(.43 – 1.10)
(.26 – 1.10)
(.46 – .90)

.61

.08

***

-11.89
.68
.56
.53
.37

**
**
**
**
**

-.02
-.00
.00
.00
-.00

1.35
.13
.17
.11
.09

(-14.35 – -9.43)
(.35 – 1.01)
(.19 - .94)
(.29 - .77)
(.15 - .60)

.63

.02

***

-11.98
.82
.61
.54
.40
-.30

**
**
**
**
**
*

-.02
-.01
.01
.00
-.00
.00

1.32
.15
.17
.11
.09
.11

(-14.40 – -9.55)
(.47 – 1.17)
(.24 – .98)
(.31 – .77)
(.18 – .63)
(-.54 – -.06)

.64

.01

**

Note. BCa = Bias Corrected and accelerated, AbbrSocial = Abbreviated Social, AbbrMeta = Abbreviated Metaworry, RS Lethargy =
Lethargy predictor from RRS, AbbrGAS = Abbreviated General Anxiety Symptoms, AbbrSAC = Abbreviated Social Adequacy
Concerns. Bootstrap results based on 1,000 bootstrap samples. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION

The extant literature has included a number of factor analytic studies related to
different worry and rumination measures. However, researchers (Brown, 2003; Brown et
al., 1992; Carter et al., 2005; Fresco, Heimberg, et al., 2002; Hazlett-Stevens et al., 2004)
have not yet reached consensus about the underlying factor structure of the PSWQ, a
widely-used measure that assesses the frequency and intensity of worry. Although a
number of studies have compared the one- and two-factor models of the PSWQ, none of
those studies have included comparisons of a variety of abbreviated models of the
measure that have emerged in the literature. Furthermore, research has been limited on
the factor structure of other worry-related measures such as the SWQ-30, which assesses
different worry domains, and the AnTI, which assesses metacognitions associated with
worry.
Similar questions have arisen about the underlying factor structure of the RRS,
the predominant rumination measure utilized in the research literature. In addition to
differences related to factor structure (Roberts et al., 1998; Segerstrom et al., 2003;
Treynor et al., 2003), questions have emerged regarding possible content overlap with
depressive symptoms (Segerstrom et al., 2000), but there has been little research in terms
of comparisons of comparative fit of the different models. Additionally, the factor
structure of the RRQ, an alternative rumination measure, has not yet been closely
examined to date. Comparison of the fit between the different models identified in the
literature seems a logical next step in the measurement validation process and a necessary
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step for understanding the possible limitations of measures used to assess the underlying
constructs of worry and rumination.
In addition to examining factor structure in worry and rumination measures, the
present study examined measurement invariance. Byrne and Watkins (2003) noted that
replication of factorial structure across groups does not provide sufficient evidence of
cross-group invariance given that a well-fitting, identically-specified model can still
display nonvariance at the first- and higher-order levels (Bryne & Campbell, 1999).
Therefore, tests of measurement invariance across groups represent a needed
precondition before making comparisons about group means (Byrne & Watkins, 2003;
Chen, Sousa, & West, 2005; Donaldson, 2005; Immekus & Maller, 2009), and the
present study expanded the extant literature by including invariance testing in model
evaluation.

The Penn State Worry Questionnaire

This study utilized CFA to assess the relative goodness of fit of the different
unifactorial and multifactorial models associated with the PSWQ The five a priori
models tested in this study included four unifactorial models: the full 16-item model
(Meyer et al., 1990), a 15-item model that omitted Item 1 (Brown et al., 1992; van
Rijsoort et al., 1999), an 11-item model that excluded five negatively-worded items, and
an abbreviated 8-item model that included only positively-worded items (Hopko et al.,
2003). The fifth CFA model included two factors, one that consisted of 11 positivelyworded items and one comprised of 5 negatively-worded items (Carter et al., 2005;
Fresco, Frankel, et al., 2002; Fresco, Heimberg, et al., 2002; Hopko et al., 2003; Olatunji
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et al., 2007). Given Brown’s (2003) contention that a two-factor model allowed for error
variance associated with the negatively-worded items, it was hypothesized that the twofactor would provide better fit for the data than the 16-item, one-factor model. As
expected, the results indicated that the two-factor model provided significantly improved
fit compared to the one-factor model, which coincides with the results of other studies
(Brown, 2003; Carter et al., 2005; Fresco, Frankel, et al., 2002; Fresco, Heimberg, et al.,
2002; Olatunji et al., 2007). However, the fit indexes for the two-factor model did not
meet the accepted criterion cutoffs indicative of optimal fit (Browne & Cudeck, 1993;
Byrne, 2010; Hu & Bentler, 1999; MacCallum et al., 1996). Only the 8-item, singlefactor model developed by Hopko et al. (2003) displayed good fit in terms of CFI, TLI,
CMIN/DF, SRMR, and PCLOSE values. One can surmise that the improved fit of this
abbreviated model resulted from elimination of potential method effects associated with
the five negatively-worded items and the content overlap between two items, which
provides support for Brown’s (2003) assertion that the two-factor model of full 16-item
PSWQ reflects method effects.
While the 8-item model presented by Hopko and his colleagues (2003)
represented the best fit out of the five tested a priori models, the RMSEA (.06) and
PCLOSE (.12) values suggested that the model still included potential points of strain. In
the present sample, freeing the path between Items 12 and 13 improved the model fit.
Thus, the results of this study provide general support for the model presented by Hopko
et al. (2003). Although the model in this study differed in terms of the correlated error
between Items 12 and 13, the abbreviated one-factor model appears to adequately
represent both college students (this study) and the clinical sample of older adults in the
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Hopko et al. study. Since Carter et al. (2005) found that the two-factor structure of the
PSWQ did not hold across African-American and White-American college student
samples, the one-factor abbreviated model may demonstrate less invariance across groups
based on the data to date, but cross-validation studies with the abbreviated measure have
not yet occurred.
Brown (2003) found evidence of invariance across gender in the 16-item PSWQ
using a clinical sample drawn from outpatient admissions at an anxiety disorder clinic,
but Hopko et al. (2003) did not examine measurement invariance across gender in their
clinical sample of older adults. The present study extended the extant literature by
examining invariance across gender for the modified, 8-item PSWQ. When interpreting
the results of the invariance testing for the modified PSWQ, one needs to consider that
SEMs involve factor analytic submodels that define measurement in terms of regression
of an observed variable on a latent variable (Donaldson, 2005), and the different levels of
invariance testing assess the different elements of the regression equation. Thus, the
different levels of invariance testing establish different degrees of invariance that, in turn,
allow for different levels of inference regarding equivalence across gender. Configural
invariance testing represents the most basic level of measurement invariance testing in
that it requires only that the same items act as indicators on the same latent factor for
each group (Chen et al., 2005). The next level of measurement invariance testing
involves comparison of the regression slopes or factor loadings across groups.
Donaldson (2005) referred to factor loading invariance as a “weak” (p. 2346) but
necessary and sufficient level of invariance. Invariance at this level suggests that the
cross-group regression lines are parallel, that the interval-level scaling of the observed
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variables is consistent across groups, and that the average change in the latent variable
per each unit of change in the indicator or observed variables is equivalent across groups
(Chen et al., 2005; Donaldson, 2005). Without invariance at the factor loading level, one
cannot assume that the two groups share a common metric or that one unit of change in
one group would be equivalent to one unit of change in another group. Additionally, lack
of invariance at this level may be indicative of construct bias or bias that occurs when the
measured construct is not identical across groups (Byrne & Campbell, 1999; Hong,
Malik, & Lee, 2003). Lack of invariance at the factor loading level could indicate
measurement bias in that the content of the noninvariant items taps different aspects of
the construct between men and women, that the items do not adequately define the
construct for both men and women, or that the items do not adequately capture aspects of
the construct that are relevant to both men and women (Byrne & Campbell, 1999). Bias
related to noninvariant factor loadings implies that the genders display different
characteristics, and the same items measure different qualtities or attributes of each group
(Byrne & Watkins, 2003).
Although factor loading invariance is a necessary and sufficient measurement
condition for establishing a common metric between groups, but both factor loading
invariance and intercept or scalar invariance are required for what Donaldson (2005)
referred to as “strong invariance” (p. 2346). Invariance in both factor loadings and
intercepts establishes that the measurement regression lines are equivalent and that
changes in the latent variable across gender account for all systematic changes in the
measured variable. The presence of strong invariance justifies inferences about true
latent mean differences across groups. In other words, invariance at this level implies
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that the scores from men and women have the same unit of measurement (factor loading)
as well as the same origin (intercept), so factor means can be compared across groups.
Without strong invariance, one cannot assume that any difference between gender of the
factor means is a true group difference or a measurement artifact (Chen et al., 2005).
Strict measurement invariance can be assessed by establishing invariance of factor
loadings, variable intercepts, and error variances (Donaldson, 2005). The presence of
strict measurement invariance implies that the standard errors of measurement for the
latent varable are equivalent across groups. Measurement invariance can also be tested at
the variance and covariance level, but invariance at this level is an ideal that typically
does not occur. Generally, one assumes that men and women will differ in terms of
variances and covariances.
Applying tests of invariance to the modified PSWQ revealed that the measure
displayed basic configural invariance but lacked measurement invariance at both the
factor loading level and the intercept level. Specifically, men and women displayed
factor loading variance on Items 2, 5, and 7 in that these items produced significantly
stronger parameter estimates for women than for men. These findings indicate that the
regression coefficients on these items are not equivalent across groups, which suggests an
apparent group difference in the way these items related to the latent worry variable for
women in comparison to men. The lack of invariance on Items 2, 5, and 7 signals the
presence of measurement bias in these items such that the items do not appear to define
or tap the worry construct in the same way for women as for men. Additionally, the
modified PSWQ displayed scalar or intercept variance on Item 6 (“When I am under
pressure I worry a lot”). This finding suggests that true latent mean differences between
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men and women could be at least partially confounded by the possible difference in the
origin on Item 6. Since the findings in the present study are at odds with previous
research (Brown, 2003), it raises questions as to whether the PSWQ maintains
measurement invariance in clinical samples but not in nonclinical samples like the one
included in the present study. If invariance is present in clinical samples but not in
nonclinical samples, it may mean that women in nonclinical samples view worry as more
uncontrollable or intrusive in daily life than do men, but the differences in perceptions
may disappear if men are experiencing a clinical degree of worry associated with anxiety
disorders. Alternatively, men may be less likely to report subjective distress as defined
by Items 2, 5, and 7 in that the content of these items seem to imply a lack of personal
control. Acknowledging such feelings may run counter to conceptualizations of the male
gender role, especially in a sample where the majority of individuals subscribe to a
conservative faith.

The Student Worry Questionnaire-30

Previous research has been limited on the SWQ-30 (Osman et al., 2001), so four a
priori SWQ-30 models were compared in this study: a correlated six-factor model, a
higher-order, six-factor model with a latent worry variable, a three-factor model with
separate worry frequency, worry content, and general anxiety factors, and a two-factor
model that included process (worry frequency and general anxiety) and content factors.
As hypothesized, Osman et al.’s correlated six-factor model provided the best fit for the
data, but the fit indexes suggested that this model contained points of strain. Subsequent
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model modification eliminated one item from each factor, which produced a 24-item, sixfactor model that met the criterion cutoffs established for this study.
Tests of invariance across gender indicated that the modified model displayed
configural invariance, which suggested that the number of latent variables in the model
remained the same across groups and the manifest indicators related to the latent
variables in the same way. In terms of measurement invariance, the model displayed
factor loading invariance, which suggests that the regression coefficients are equivalent
between men and women, that there is equivalent interval scaling for both groups, and
that changes in the observed variables would be equivalent across groups. This level of
invariance allows for examination of the relationships between the factors in the SWQ-30
and other external variables.
Invariance at the variance and covariance level is hard to achieve (Chen et al.,
2005), and that was true in the case of the modified SWQ. The latent variables did not
demonstrate the same variance across gender in that women demonstrated significantly
greater variability in terms of the significant others’ well being latent variable, and men
displayed more variability in terms of the social adequacy latent variable. Variance also
occurred among the worrisome thinking, academic concerns, and general anxiety
symptoms latent variables, which suggested that the interrelationships among these latent
variables were not consistent across groups. Specifically, significant differences occurred
in the covariance between worrisome thinking and academic concerns latent variables in
that they shared approximately 18% of the variance for men and approximately 35% for
women. Since Osman et al. (2001) specifically designed the SWQ-30 to assess content
domains pertinent to college students, this finding suggests that academic concerns may
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represent a particularly salient issue for college-going women, and such concerns may
substantially contribute to the frequency and severity of reported worries. Alternatively,
increased worry about academics may reflect constructive problem-solving or a
motivating cognitive process that helps women prepare for classroom demands. This
finding appears consistent with Schwarzer’s (1996) contention that worry frequently
relates to lack of confidence in one’s ability to reach certain challenging goals and the
body of research that indicates that women generally report lower levels of academic
self-efficacy than do men, especially in relationship to mathematics and science (Michie,
Glachan, & Bray, 2001; Nagy, Trautwein, Baumert, Koller, & Garrett, 2006).
Results of the invariance testing across gender showed that men and women also
significantly differed in terms of the covariance between the worrisome thinking and
general anxiety symptoms latent variables. These latent variables shared approximately
76% of the variance for men and approximately 59% for women. Given that both worry
and physiological arousal have been associated with anxiety disorders in general, the
finding of strong covariance between the two latent variables was not surprising.
However, one would have intuitively expected women to display higher covariance
estimates than men given extant research findings that women often report higher
frequency of worry and that prevalence rates for worry-related anxiety disorders such as
GAD occur more frequently in women. It is possible that this finding is a result of
characteristics of this particular college sample, but it is also possible that the wording of
the indicator items may have produced method effects that contributed to the result. For
instance, all of the indicator items on the general anxiety symptoms latent variable share
a common ending (“…when I worry about things”), and men may have been more
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willing to acknowledge tiredness, restlessness, soreness, and sleeplessness when the
physiological symptom was a result of worry rather than an indicator of seemingly deeper
pathology. The same wording did not appear any of the 20 other indicator items. Since
Osman et al. (2001) did not fit their six-factor CFA model to separate samples for men
and women during their initial validation studies, these findings need to be replicated and
explored.
Tests of measurement invariance on the modified SWQ indicated that scalar or
intercept invariance occurred on Item 15 (“I feel restless or impatient when I worry about
things”), an indicator on the general anxiety symptoms latent variable, and Item 22 (“I
worry about asking other people questions for fear of sounding dumb”), an indicator on
the social adequacy concerns latent variable. These findings indicated that the general
anxiety symptoms latent variable and the social adequacy concerns latent variable lacked
evidence of strong invariance where both factor loadings and intercepts demonstrated
invariance. Without evidence of strong invariance on these two latent variables, true
latent mean differences between men and women could be clouded by the possible
differences in origins on the items. These findings suggest that at least a portion of the
higher covariance between worrisome thinking and general anxiety symptoms for men in
this sample stemmed from higher reports of restlessness and impatience in the presence
of worry. The results were reversed for Item 22 (“I worry about asking other people
questions for fear of sounding dumb”), which served as an indicator on the social
adequacy concerns latent variable. Women in the sample reported more concerns about
others’ perceptions if they asked questions, which seems consistent with the higher
covariance estimate between worrisome thinking and academic concerns that occurred
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for women in this sample. If women feel more insecure about academic performance,
they may experience more concern or fear about being perceived as inadequate or stupid.

The Anxious Thoughts Inventory

There has been little in the way of previous research examining the factor
structure of the AnTI. This study extended the research by examining the three-factor
model originally proposed by Wells (1994), which included latent social worry, health
worry, and metaworry variables. The results indicated that the full 22-item, three-factor
model provided relatively poor fit for the data. Similarly, a post hoc exploratory model
that distinguished between process and content latent variables provided poor fit for the
data, which echoes the comparative fit results from the examination of fit for the SWQ30. Examination of an exploratory second-order model with Type 1 and Type 2 worries
as indicators for a broad latent worry variable also provided poor fit for the data. While
Wells (2000, 2004, 2006b, 2006c) has conceptualized metaworry as higher-order worry
about worry and the metaworry scale of the AnTI as representative of that cognitive
thinking process, the results of the CFA in the present study suggested that the AnTI has
not adequately captured the higher-order thought processes.
Subsequent exploratory model modifications resulted in the elimination of eight
items that contributed to problematic residuals, largely because of content overlap. The
resulting three-factor model provided good fit for the data, and the measure demonstrated
configural and factor loading invariance across gender. With invariance at the factor
loading level, it appears that the items in the modified AnTI operate as equivalent
indicators across groups. Like the modified SWQ, the AnTI displayed variance across

155

gender in terms of the variance associated with the health latent variable, and men and
women differed in terms of the covariance between the health and metaworry latent
variables. The group differences carried over to the latent mean structure in that women
displayed significantly higher latent means on the latent health variable than did men.
However, examination of the item intercepts showed that the items that loaded on the
latent health variable demonstrated scalar invariance across gender, so the evident
differences between men and women reflects a true mean difference rather than potential
measurement bias. Nevertheless, the AnTI demonstrated partial scalar variance on Item
21 (“I think I am missing out on things in life because I worry too much”), an indicator
associated with the metaworry latent variable, which suggests that this item does not
assess metaworry in the same way for both men and women.
Although the AnTI did not adequately capture the higher-order cognitions that
figure in Wells’ metacognitive theories (2000, 2004, 2006b, 2006c), it does appear to
assess a health-related dimension of worry that is missing from other worry measures.
The content of the health scale on the AnTI taps worry about adverse physical outcomes
such as serious illness and death, and the more concrete content seems to lend itself to
invariance across gender, whereas the general anxiety symptoms scale from the SWQ-30
taps more subjective physical symptoms that sometimes accompany worry. The
subjective nature of the described symptoms may contribute to the variance across gender
on this particular scale.
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The Ruminative Responses Scale

Of the five measures examined in this study, the RRS represented the most
problematic model in terms of comparative fit and subsequent model modifications.
None of the existing models provided adequate fit for the data, and the best-fitting a
priori model failed to meet the criterion cutoffs indicative of good fit after elimination of
items with problematic standardized residual covariances. As a result, this study tested a
three-factor exploratory model that included lethargy, recrimination, and reflection
factors based on the findings in previous research (Fresco, Frankel, et al., 2002; Roberts
et al., 1998; Treynor et al., 2003). The lethargy indicators included a combination of
eight items that overlapped with depressive symptoms as identified by Roberts et al. and
Treynor et al. The recrimination indicators included eight items that featured a selfblaming focus, and the reflection indicators included the seven items identified by Fresco,
Frankel, et al. and Treynor et al. as active appraisals or self-reflections. In spite of sound
conceptual reasoning behind this three-factor model, model modifications were still
necessary to meet the established criterion cutoffs for good fit. The resulting
modifications eliminated the reflection factor, and the final two-factor model included
lethargy and recrimination factors. Even though the two-factor model provided
statistically significant improvement in fit, goodness-of-fit tests for men and women
indicated that the model fell short of the criterion cutoffs for both men (TLI = .94,
RMSEA = .07) and for women (RMSEA = .06).
Subsequent tests of invariance across gender indicated that the lethargyrecrimination exploratory model demonstrated configural invariance across gender. In
terms of measurement invariance, the model demonstrated factor-loading variance on
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Item 5 (“Think about how passive and unmotivated you feel”) and Item 7 (“Think about
how you don’t seem to feel anything anymore”). Both of these items served as indicators
on the lethargy latent variable. These findings imply that the factor loadings on these
items are not equivalent for men and women, which suggests apparent group differences
in the way the items relate to the lethargy latent variable. In contrast, the recrimination
latent variable demonstrated factor-loading invariance across gender, suggesting that the
item indicators related to the latent variable in the same way for both men and women.
Even so, the recrimination latent variable demonstrated invariance across gender in terms
of the variance, but men and women differed in terms of the variance associated with the
latent lethargy variable, with women displaying higher variance estimates. Additionally,
the covariance between the lethargy and recrimination latent variables demonstrated
variance across gender in that women showed higher covariance estimates. Not
surprisingly, scalar variance occurred on one of the indicators for the lethargy variable,
which indicates that the item does not display an equivalent origin for men and women.
Men and women differed in terms of latent group means in that women displayed
significantly higher latent means on both variables.
The exploratory model in this study provided some support for a two-factor
model, but the two retained factors did not coincide with the abbreviated model that
included brooding and reflection factors (Treynor et al., 2003). Rather, the model
developed and retained in this study eliminated the reflection factor and retained two
factors that related to the amorphous physical symptoms and feelings associated with
depression and recriminating thoughts. The exploratory model did not coincide with
previous models presented by Roberts et al. (1998) or Fresco, Frankel, et al. (2002), so
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the results found here may be due to differences in statistical methods or unique
characteristics associated with this college sample.

The Rumination-Reflection Questionnaire

Like the RRS, the two-factor CFA model of the RRQ did not meet the criterion
cutoffs indicative of good fit. Unlike the RRS, though, the RRQ retained its two-factor
configuration following model modification to eliminate potential points of strain. The
resulting exploratory model demonstrated configural, factor loading, and scalar
invariance across gender, and men and women did not differ in terms of latent means on
the rumination and reflection latent variables. These findings indicated that the RRQ is
the only measure out of the five examined in the present study that demonstrated strict
measurement invariance that evidenced strong measurement invariance across gender,
displaying configural, factor-loading, and scalar or incept invariance across groups.
Additionally, the results indicated that men and women displayed equivalent latent mean
structure. Interestingly, the RRQ contains negatively-scored items, but those items do
not seem to contribute to problematic methods effects.

Predictors of Concurrent Anxiety and Depression

In order to determine which specific worry- and rumination-related variables
served as predictors for current anxiety and depression scores, this study included a series
of regression analyses. For men, the results of the regression analyses showed that the
worrisome thinking and general anxiety symptoms scores from the SWQ-30 and the
metaworry score from the AnTI acted as significant predictors for concurrent anxiety
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scores. These findings are consistent with a conceptualization of worry as an underlying
cognitive process associated with anxiety in men. The worrisome thinking variable
reflects the frequency of worry much like the PSWQ, and Hopko et al. (2003) suggested
that the abbreviated 8-item model of the PSWQ might prove helpful in discriminating
between symptoms of anxiety and depression. However, the results of this study
indicated that the summated variable score derived from the abbreviated model did not
contribute to the prediction of concurrent anxiety assessed by the BAI. It is possible that
the strong correlation between the PSWQ and the worrisome thinking variable of the
SWQ-30 did not allow for any unique explanation of the variance in anxiety.
The worry/anxiety relationship appeared less straightforward for women in that
five variables emerged as predictors of concurrent anxiety scores. Those variables
included the metaworry, social, and health variables from the AnTI, the general anxiety
symptoms variable from the SWQ-30, and the lethargy variable from the RRS. Neither
worrisome thinking from the SWQ-30 nor worry from the PSWQ added to the prediction
of anxiety scores for women. Rather, the metaworry variable explained 43% of the
variance in anxiety, and the other variables added nearly equal increments to explain a
total of 59% of the variance. Aside from the metaworry and social variables, all the other
variables contained health-related content, including the one rumination variable that
contributed to the prediction of anxiety. This raises the question of whether healthrelated concerns mediate the relationship between worry and anxiety for college-aged
women.
In terms of the best predictors for concurrent depression scores, the results of the
regression analyses showed that two variables from the AnTI, metaworry and social
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worry, explained a total of 59% of the variance in concurrent depression as assessed by
the BDI. Social worry served as the strongest predictor, explaining 51% of the variance,
and metaworry explained an additional 8% of the variance. The recrimination variable
from the RRS explained an additional 2% of the variance in depression.
For women, the pattern of predictors looked somewhat similar to those for men.
For instance, the social variable explained the largest proportion of the variance in
depression scores (47%), followed by metaworry (6%). The remaining predicators
included the lethargy variable from the RRS and the general anxiety symptoms and social
adequacy concerns variables from the SWQ-30. There seems to be some conceptual and
content overlap between the lethargy and the general anxiety symptom variables, which
could explain why the general anxiety variable contributed to the prediction of
depression. The final predictor from the SWQ-30, social adequacy concerns, taps a
dimension of self-evaluation in comparison to others (e.g. “embarrassing myself,”
“sounding dumb,” “making a fool of myself,” “what other people think”).
Variables from the RRS appeared as significant predictors for both men and
women, but the specific RRS variables differed. The recrimination variable contributed
to the prediction of concurrent depression for men, which suggests that negative selfevaluation figures into the relationship between rumination and depression. The lethargy
variable contributed to the prediction of depression for women, which suggests that
feelings of general malaise figure into the relationship between rumination and
depression. This is consistent with Nolen-Hoeksema’s conceptualization of response
style theory. Men may be more apt to engage in distracting activities to deflect from
personal anger and frustration, whereas women may be more apt to engage in more
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passive cognitive activities because of underlying feelings of lethargy and low
motivation. Additionally, the findings of this study suggested that men engage in
personal recrimination, whereas women engage in self-evaluation which includes
comparisons to others or concerns about what others think. This may be a salient
difference in the depressive thinking processes displayed by men and women.

Contributions

This study utilized CFA to assess the relative goodness of fit of the different
unifactorial and multifactorial models associated with the PSWQ and the RRS.
Additionally, this study extended the available literature by conducting CFA to
investigate the factor structure of other worry-related measures such as the SWQ-30 and
the AnTI. Finally, this study extended the available research by utilizing CFA to
investigate the factor structure of a rumination-related measure, the RRQ. This study has
added to the extant literature by examining the comparative fit among a set of worry and
rumination measures.
Hopko et al. (2003) cited a need for independent research on the 8-item PSWQ,
and this study addressed that call. Only one study related to the PSWQ has examined
invariance across gender (Brown, 2003), and that study utilized a clinical sample. The
findings of this study indicated that the PSWQ did not display the same invariance across
gender in a nonclinical college sample. This study extended the available research by
examining the sources of gender variance within other worry and rumination measures.
Although it is not clear whether the gender differences identified in this study are sample
specific or extend to other groups, this study provides a jumping-off point in identifying
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the sources of gender variance in the measures. Additionally, the results of the regression
analyses have highlighted possible differences in the cognitive processes utilized by men
and women (e.g., self-recrimination without comparison to others vs. negative selfevaluation in comparison to others). Although these differences are not yet clearly
delineated, they open the door for additional research.

Limitations

Although this study has made a number of contributions to the extant literature,
several limitations should be noted. First, this study utilized a sample of college students,
and it is unclear whether the results stem from characteristics specific to this sample or if
the results will generalize to other student populations, especially since the sample was
collected in northern Utah and 86% of the participants identified as LDS (Mormon).
Additionally, the number of men in this study was relatively small for CFA.
Another methodological issue related to the present study revolves around the
adherence to fairly stringent criterion cutoffs established as indicators of good fit. Even
though efforts were made to follow recommendations in the literature for goodness of fit,
the adherence to criterion cutoffs across the CFI, TLI, RMSEA, and PCLOSE fit statistics
necessitated moving from CFA to exploratory modeling that involved significant model
modification. If less stringent criterion cutoffs established for adequate fit had been
utilized in this study, the two-factor model of the 16-item PSWQ and the six-factor model
of the 30-item SWQ-30 would have met criteria for adequate fit, and model modifications
would not have been necessary. However, that was not the case with the AnTI in that the
measure did not initially meet criterion cutoffs of adequate fit. For the rumination
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measures, the a priori three-factor model presented by Roberts et al. (1998) met criterion
cutoffs for adequate fit prior to model modifications. In contrast, two-factor model of the
RRQ originally developed by Trapnell and Campbell (1999) did not meet criterion
cutoffs for adequate fit.
Although modifications were not undertaken without sound conceptual reasoning,
there is no question that the model modifications reflect characteristics of this sample
rather than substantive model parameters. Furthermore, the model modifications
involved elimination of items, and elimination of items makes it more difficult to identify
possible second-order factors. In addition, the utility of these abbreviated measures has
not been established. This work certainly needs to be replicated and cross-validated to
address the methodological short comings and to ensure that the findings in this study do
not represent unwarranted capitalization on chance.

Future Research

The results of this study point to several possible venues for future research. For
instance, Hopko et al. (2003) noted a strong correlation (r = .92) between the full PSWQ
and the abbreviated measure. They suggested that the abbreviated instrument potentially
represented an improved measure of trait worry in their clinical sample of older adults
since it eliminated the difficulty of answering reverse-scored items and provided for
quick screening of worry. However, the full, 16-item measure has previously
demonstrated utility as a screening instrument for differentiating between GAD and no
GAD; distinguishing groups with GAD, GAD with comorbid disorders, and social
phobia; and differentiating between cases and noncases of PTSD, social phobia, and
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depression (Behar, Alcaine, Zuellig, & Borkovec, 2003; Fresco, Mennin, et al., 2003).
The results of this study have clinicl implications in that dropping 50% of the original
items from the PSWQ may fundamentally change the measure’s specificity, sensitivity,
and predictive power, thereby reducing the measure’s utility as a screening measure.
This is an area that warrants further research. Future studies could compare the screening
utility of the full-scale and abbreviated models of the PSWQ.
Similar issues arise in relation to the AnTI. Although the CFA of the AnTI and
the resulting exploratory model modifications provided some support for Wells’ threefactor structure of the measure, elimination of eight items to improve model fit raises the
question as to whether the modified measure assesses worry in the same way as the full,
22-item measure. In terms of clinical implications, the results of this study suggest that
metaworry seems to be a commonality linked to anxiety and depression in both men and
women. This lends support to Wells’ (2009) metacognitive therapy for both anxiety and
depression. However, further research needs to focus on the relative contributions of the
symptom-focused variables, since these appear to contribute to both anxiety and
depression for women but only to anxiety in men.
Since the results of this study did not coincide with the results of previous
research involving the RRS, replication and further study needs to occur. Although
researchers (Segerstrom et al., 2000) have noted that the RRQ items are contaminated by
depressive symptoms, items that specifically related to depression served as indicators for
both lethargy and recrimination latent variables. Clearly, the RRS items that refer to
depressive symptoms exhibit a relationship to depression, but it is unclear whether that
relationship reflects content overlap or genuine predictive qualities related to cognitive
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content. Further research also needs to explore the nature of reflection since a reflection
factor did not contribute to a better measurement model of the RRS and the RRQ
reflection variable displayed little relationship to depression. In terms of clinical
implications, these findings suggest that the absence of reflection may contribute to levels
of anxiety and depression. If that is the case, those individuals who do not display
openness to experience may be at higher risk for anxiety or mood disorders. It is unclear,
though, whether openness to experience or reflection provides a buffer against anxiety
and depression, and it is unclear whether Trapnell and Campbell’s (1999)
conceptualization of reflection closely parallels Nolen-Hoeksema’s findings that
distraction serves as a buffer against depression.
The results of the invariance testing across gender need to be validated in other
student samples. Such cross-validation studies could closely examine the relative
contribution of the negatively-worded items by using models that specifically include
method effects as a correlated late variable, which would separate the variance into
content and method or wording-related components (DiStefano & Motl, 2009). This
would allow researchers to draw more definitive conclusions about whether the twofactor solution merely represents correlated method effects or whether the negativelyworded items represent a substantive factor. Understanding the extant of the method
effects is a necessary step in addressing Brown’s (2003) concerns about accepting models
based solely on goodness of fit without consideration of interpretability.
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INFORMED CONSENT
Thought Processes Associated with Different Moods
Introduction/Purpose
Dr. Scott C. Bates, a faculty member in the Department of Psychology at Utah State
University (USU), Janet A. Carter, a psychology graduate student, and Adam Kynaston,
an undergraduate research assistant, are conducting research to examine the relationship
between an individual’s thought processes and his/her reported feelings of anxiety and
depression because, at times, most people experience thoughts that are difficult to control
and hard to ignore or shut off. There will be approximately 600 participants involved in
this study.
Procedures
If you volunteer and agree to be in this study, you will be asked to participate in one
research session where you will read and respond to questions about different types of
thoughts and various emotions. You will also be asked to provide demographic
information (age, marital status, ethnicity, education level, religious affiliation). The
research session will take place in a lecture hall located in the College of Education
Building. All participants will be entered in a random drawing for a gift certificate from
a local book/music store or optional extra credit will be offered with your instructor’s
consent prior to your participation. Therefore, you will be asked to supply some
identifying information so that the researchers can report your extra credit or notify you if
you won the drawing. Once the extra credit has been noted or the drawing is completed,
all identifying information will be shredded.
If the results of your scores on the depression or anxiety measures fall between a certain
range, the researcher(s) will contact you and provide a referral to a mental health
professional for further evaluations at your discretion. Then the researcher(s) will
separate your identifying information from your responses on the questions immediately
after evaluating your responses to the anxiety- and depression-related questions. The
questionnaire packet will include 12-14 pages and may take approximately 45 – 90
minutes to complete. In exchange for your participation, you will have the chance to win
a gift certificate from a local book/music store. In addition, you may have the option of
earning extra credit with your instructor’s consent; the researchers will inform you if your
professor has agreed to the additional extra credit option. If your instructor gives extra
credit but you do not want to participate, an alternate activity will be provided so you
may earn extra credit. Dr. Bates will not have access to any information as to which
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student in his class participated in this research; only the graduate teaching assistants will
have this information to avoid coercion.
New Findings
During the course of this study, you will be informed of any significant new findings
(either good or bad) such as changes in the risks or benefits related to participation in this
research or new alternatives to participation that might cause you to change your mind
about continued participation in the study. If new relevant information is obtained or if
any aspects of the study change, your consent to continue participating in this study will
be obtained again.
Risks
You may experience some discomfort while answering questions, but this risk is
considered minimal. There will be some loss of anonymity if your scores on the anxiety
and depression measures fall within the clinically significant range in that the graduate
student researcher will contact you by telephone to make a referral to a mental health
professional, but all personal identifiable information will be destroyed within six
months. Any documents linking your identity to the information data will be kept
separate.
Benefits
This study may not provide direct benefits to you, but clarification of the thought
processes associated with anxiety and depression may help clinicians develop specific
interventions for these mood states.
Explanation and Offer to Answer Questions
Janet Carter, Dr. Scott Bates or Adam Kynaston has explained this study to you and
answered any questions you have at this time. If you have other questions, you may
reach Janet Carter at jacarter@cc.usu.edu or (435) 752-5924 (after August (505) 7623493) or Dr. Scott Bates at (435) 797-2975.
Voluntary Nature of Participation and Right to Withdraw Without Consequence
Participation in this research is entirely voluntary. You may refuse to participate or
withdraw from the study at any time without consequence.
Confidentiality
The information you supply during the study will be kept confidential consistent with
federal and state regulations and will be available only to individuals directly involved in
the project. You will be assigned a code number, and this number will be used when the
data is stored in the computer. Public presentation of the results of this study will be in
aggregate with no identifying information. All data will be kept in a locked file cabinet,
which will be accessible only by Dr. Bates, Janet Carter and Adam Kynaston, the
researchers directly involved in the project.
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IRB Approval Statement
The Institutional Review Board (IRB) for the protection of human subjects at USU has
reviewed and approved this study. You may call the IRB at (435) 797-1821 with any
questions or concerns regarding the approval of this project.
Copy of Consent
You have been given two copies of this Informed Consent. Please sign both, return one
to the researchers, and retain the other for your files.
Investigator Statement
“I certify that this research study has been explained to the individual by me or my
research staff and that the individual understands the nature and purpose, the possible
risks, and benefits associated with taking part in this research study. Any questions that
have been raised have been answered.”
Signature of Principal Investigator and Student Investigator

____________________ __________
Scott C. Bates, Ph.D.
Date
Principal Investigator
(435) 797-2975

____________________ __________
Janet A. Carter, M.A.
Date
Student Investigator
(505) 762-3493

Signature of Participant
By signing below, I agree to participate in this study.

__________________________
Signature of Participant

____________________
Date
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Demographic Information

Age: _____

Gender (Circle One): Male Female

Code Number: ________

Ethnic/Racial Group:
_____ European American/White

_____ African American

_____ Hispanic/Latino

_____ Asian or Asian/American

_____ Native American

_____ Other

_____ Single, Never Married

_____ Married

_____ Separated

_____ Divorced, Not Remarried

_____ Widowed

Marital Status:

Educational Level:
_____ Freshman

_____ Sophomore

_____ Junior

_____ Senior

_____ Graduate Student
Religious Affiliation:
_____ Protestant

_____ Catholic

_____ LDS

_____Jewish

_____ Buddhist

_____ Other (specify: ___________________________)

_____ Islamic

================================================================
The following information will be used to 1) report your participation in the study if
you are participating in exchange for extra credit in a USU course (contingent on
instructor approval), 2) notify you if you won the drawing for a gift certificate,
and/or 3) give you a referral to a mental health care provider if the results from the
questionnaires indicate that you are experiencing clinically significant levels of
anxiety or depression. In order to protect confidentiality, this identifying
information will be separated from your questionnaire packet and destroyed after
reporting extra credit, conducting the drawing, and making appropriate referrals.
Any mental health information (the results from the questionnaires) will not be
disclosed to others.
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Name:
Course Number (e.g., Psy 1010):
Section Number (e.g., 001):
Instructor:
Day and Time of Lectures:
E-mail:
Telephone:
Check One:

Participating for Credit? ______

Participating for Drawing? _____
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3316 Fairmont Drive, Odessa, Texas 79762-7138
Home Telephone: (432) 362-3389
Office Telephone: (432) 552-2146
Cell Phone: (432) 230-7401
E-Mail: carter_j@utpb.edu
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2001 – 2010
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Children’s Hospitals and Clinics-Minneapolis, Minneapolis, Minnesota:
Psychology Intern
• Provided outpatient therapy and assessment services to children
and families.
• Provided inpatient diagnostic, consultative, intervention, and
liaison services for pediatric medical patients and their families.
• Offered consultation and support services within outpatient
medical clinics including Hematology-Oncology, Cystic Fibrosis,
and Cleft and Craniofacial Clinics.
• Completed community placement rotation in local high school,
which included work with AVID to train at-risk students in stress
management techniques and problem-solving skills.
• Participated in didactics, diversity workshops, case presentations,
and other activities associated with APA accredited internship

Jan 2003 –
June 2004

Center for Persons with Disabilities, Clinical Services (USU), Logan,
Utah: Case Coordinator/Practicum Student
• Provided psychological assessment services and comprehensive
psychological evaluations as practicum student and graduate
intern.
• Acted as case coordinator for clients and participated as member of
multidisciplinary team.

Sep 2003 –
May 2004

Utah Leadership Education in Neurodevelopmental Disabilities
(University of Utah, USU), Salt Lake City/Logan, Utah: Leadership
Trainee
• Participated in clinical, research, and didactic experiences geared
to enhancing knowledge of best practices and other issues that
impact children with special health care needs and their families.

May 2003 –
July 2003

Autism Support Services: Education, Research, and Training (USU),
Logan, Utah: Practicum Student
• Delivered ABA-style behavioral interventions in a classroombased preschool program for children with autism.
• Provided ongoing behavioral data for individual clients to support
efficacy of intervention and continue grant funding
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Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder Study (USU, Dr. Gretchen
Gimpel Peacock, principal research coordinator), Logan, Utah:
Therapist-in-Training
• Provided behavioral parent training, stress management, and
booster sessions for families of children with ADHD.
• Collaborated on research papers detailing on-going study results.

Aug 2001 June 2004

USU Community Clinic, Logan, Utah:
Therapist-in-Training
• Provided psychological services including LD and ADHD
assessment, individual therapy, and parent training.

Sep 2000 Aug 2001

Hastings Regional Center, Hastings, Nebraska:
Associate Psychologist/Psychology Intern
• Conducted admission interviews and psychological evaluations for
patients admitted to the acute care units of the hospital.
• Maintained active involvement in treatment planning for clients
within a multidisciplinary team milieu.
• Conducted individual therapy under the supervision of unit
psychologist.
• Co-facilitated group therapy for female trauma victims.
• Participated in group supervision, seminar-style training, and
continuing education opportunities.
• Assumed responsibilities appropriate to rotations in the psychiatric
rehabilitation unit and the outpatient services unit of the hospital.

Dec 1999 Aug 2000

American Corrective Counseling Services, Inc, San Clemente, California:
Group Facilitator.
• Facilitated 8-hour adult cognitive-behavioral groups on behalf of
the Polk County, Iowa District Attorney.

Jan 2000 Apr 2000

Mental Health Institute-Cromwell Unit, Independence, Iowa:
Therapist (practicum placement).
• Conducted individual therapy sessions with children as part of
inpatient services.
• Provided psychological testing and completed evaluation reports.
• Acted as a member on multidisciplinary team and attended regular
medical rounds.
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Department of Correctional Services, Waterloo, Iowa:
Co-Facilitator (practicum placement)
• Facilitated discussion in a cognitive restructuring group for young
adults between the ages of 19-22.
• Provided individual counseling to a female adolescent on a weekly
basis.
• Completed psychogenderual evaluation reports of adolescent and
adult offenders.

Sep 1998 Sep 1999

Independence Haven, Waterloo, Iowa:
Supported Living Staff
• Provided on-site supervision in a residential home for mentally ill
adults.
• Taught a variety of social skills and independent living skills to
clients.
• Provided individual counseling on an as-needed basis.

PROFESSIONAL/ACADEMIC ASSOCIATIONS
American Psychological Association, student affiliate
Society of Clinical Child and Adolescent Psychology
Psi Chi National Honor Society in Psychology
Alpha Chi National College Honor Society

PROFESSIONAL PRESENTATIONS
July 2004

Ehrlick, A., Carter, J. A., Gifford, J., Collett, B. R., Gimpel, G. A.,
Veeder, M. A., et al. (2004, July). Parents’ understanding of
psychological evaluations. Poster session presented at the annual
convention of the American Psychological Association, Honolulu, HI.

July 2004

Gimpel, G. A., Gifford, J., Veeder, M. A., Sneddon, P., Bushman, B.
B., Carter, J. A., et al. (2004, July). Addition of stress management
training to parent training. Poster session presented at the annual
convention of the American Psychological Association, Honolulu, HI.

May 2000

Carter, J. A., Blalock, L. J., Dennis, A. N., & Harton, H. C. (2000,
May). The relationship between self-monitoring, extraversion,
neuroticism, and choice of potential partners. Poster session
presented at the meeting of the Midwestern Psychological Association,
Chicago, Illinois.
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AWARDS
Mar 2000
Jan 2000
Dec 1998

Sept 1998

Graduate College Travel Award ($276)
Graduate Tuition Scholarship ($827)
President’s Medal for Excellence, Midwestern State University,
Wichita Falls, Texas (conferred for highest GPA among graduates in
the College of Social and Behavioral Sciences).
Graduate Tuition Scholarship ($1,498)

OTHER WORK EXPERIENCE

Aug 2003-

Academic Resource Center, USU, Logan, Utah:

May 2004

Learning Skills Specialist
• Providing individual consults for students needing academic
support and instruction in basic learning strategies.
• Serving as data analyst and consultant; tracking service delivery
statistics, student evaluations, and pre- and post-test scores.

1989-1995

Times Record News, Wichita Falls, Texas:
Independent Contractor
•

Supplied accurate and consistent daily service to a customer base
of 400 while attending college.

1985-1986

Cliff Sanders, Western American Real Estate Corporation, Austin,
Texas:
Administrative Assistant
• Filled the office of Secretary in corporation.
• Established accounting system and office procedures for new
business.

1984-1985

Cliff Sanders, Woerner Properties, Austin, Texas:
Administrative Assistant
• Inspected new properties to monitor construction progress.
• Acted as liaison between construction manager and contractors.
• Coordinated with contractors to handle maintenance for tenants in
leased properties.
• Managed correspondence and designed sales brochures.
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1978-1983

Credit Bureau of the TriCities, Pasco, Washington:
Office Supervisor, Sales Representative, Credit Reporter
• Supervised the work of 6-10 employees.
• Presented educational programs in the community.
• Trained business customers on the use of leased computer
terminals.
• Worked with individuals to resolve credit-related problems.

COMMUNITY SERVICE
•

•

•

•

•

•
•

•
•
•

Currently act as member of Community Resource Coordination
Group for Midland/Ector counties, will assume facilitator role in
September 2010.
Currently serve as president of a faith-based women’s group of
approximately 140 members; monitor welfare needs of individuals
and families, develop annual budget, fill staffing positions, oversee
service activities and curriculum delivery, and coordinate with
ecclesiastical leaders to meet organizational needs
Acted as student representative for College Computing Advisory
Committee, College of Social and Behavioral Sciences, University
of Northern Iowa.
Served as regional camp director in Lawton, Oklahoma for three
years; managed a week-long camp for approximately 100 girls
between the ages of 12 and 18.
Acted as an advisor to the regional president of a children's Sunday
school organization; assumed responsibility for the training of
teachers and for the implementation of curriculum for 600 children
between 18 months and 12 years of age.
Acted as an advisor for the children's Sunday school organization
in Burkburnett, Texas; served approximately 100 children.
Served as the president of a church youth organization in
Burkburnett, Texas; planned and organized weekly activities for
approximately 15 adolescents between the ages of 12 and 18.
Served on the Burkburnett Public Library Board in Burkburnett,
Texas.
Joined the board of the Beaver County Sheltered Workshop in
Beaver, Oklahoma.
Assisted with the establishment of the North Star Volunteer Fire
Department in North Pole, Alaska; completed state certification as
a volunteer firefighter.

